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Abstract	
  
Today, crude oil remains a vital resource all around the world. This nonrenewable resource powers countries worldwide. Besides serving as an energy source,
crude oil is also the most important component for different world economies, especially
in developing countries. Ecuador, a small member of the OPEC oil cartel, presents a case
where its economy is oil dependent. A great percentage of the country’s GDP and
government’s budget comes from oil revenues. Ecuador has always been a primary
exporter of raw materials. In the last centuries, the country experienced three important
economic booms: cacao, bananas, and, ultimately, crude oil. In this sense, the country has
not been able to fully industrialize and begin to export manufactured goods, i.e., Ecuador
suffers from the Dutch disease. The latter has deterred Ecuador from achieving broadbased economic development.
Given crude oil’s importance for the Ecuadorian economy, the government has
always tried to influence the oil industry in search of profits and benefits. Therefore, this
thesis, explores the question: how and to what extent have political interventions affected
the oil industry in Ecuador from 1990 until March 2014? In general, this thesis
establishes an economic history context during the last twenty-four years, attempting to
research how political interventions have shaped Ecuador’s oil industry and economy. In
the analysis, it covers a period where political instability prevailed, until Rafael Correa
became president. The thesis examines Ecuador’s participation in OPEC, trying to find
explanations as to why the country voluntarily left the organization in 1992, only to
rejoin in 2007 when Correa rose to power. During the “Revolución Ciudadana” period,

vii

the thesis researches reforms to the Law of Hydrocarbons, variations in the relations with
other nations, the controversy surrounding the Yasuní-ITT oil block, and the “Refinería
del Pacífico” construction.
The thesis is an Industrial Organization detailed case study that analyzes, updates,
and evaluates the intersection of economics and politics in Ecuador’s crude oil industry
during the last 24 years. In this sense I have consulted past theses, newspaper articles,
books, and other published data about the petroleum industry, both from a global and
Ecuadorian perspective. In addition to published sources, I was able to interview
sociologists, public figures, history and economics academics, and other experts,
accessing unique unpublished data about Ecuador’s oil industry. I made an effort to
collect information that shows the private and public side of the industry, i.e., from
government-related and independent sources.
I attempted to remain as objective as possible to make conclusions about the
appropriate Industrial Organization policy for Ecuador’s oil industry, addressing the issue
from an economic, social, political, and environmental point of view. I found how
Ecuador’s political instability caused public policy to fail, molding the conduct and
market structure of the crude oil industry. Throughout history, developed nations have
benefited from low oil prices, but things shifted since oil prices began to rise, which is
more beneficial for the developing nations that actually possess and produce the raw
material. Nevertheless, Ecuador, a victim of the Dutch disease due to its heavy reliance
on crude oil as a primary product, has not achieved broad-based development.
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Chapter	
  1.	
  Introduction	
  
Ecuador is a democratic republic in South America. The equator line cuts across
and gives the country its name. Ecuador has beautiful unique landscapes, globally
recognized biodiversity, and rich natural resources. Geographically it has four different
regions: Costa, Sierra, Amazon, and Galápagos; each one with endemic weather, flora,
and fauna. Yet, Ecuador faces different issues typical of developing nations. Throughout
history, the nation has been a primary exporter of raw materials, including cacao beans,
bananas, and, ultimately, crude oil. The latter boomed around the 1970s when Texaco
discovered “Oriente” crude oil in the Lago Agrio oilfield in the province of Sucumbíos.
Nowadays, oil is a vital resource all over the world. It remains a principal energy
source that powers the great economies around the globe. By the same token, other
countries rely on crude oil exports to sustain their economies. Currently a member of the
OPEC, Ecuador is one of those countries whose economy is tied to the non-renewable
resource. Oil exports contribute to at least 40% of the government’s budget and a great
percentage of Ecuador’s GDP. Especially under the current government, Ecuador’s
economy is extremely oil dependent.
Given the importance of crude oil especially in the government’s budget for
generating revenues to use in important development programs, the state has always tried
to influence the industry in one way or another. Through the years, Petroecuador, the
state owned oil company, has strengthened its position, slowly dominating oil production.
During the period 1990 to 2007, Ecuador experienced a wave of political instability,
having ten different presidents in power, when the official term lasts four years. Even
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though the presidents had diverse ideologies, most were inclined to the center-right of the
political spectrum. Those presidents who belonged to leftist or populist parties ended up
taking decisions that had rightist characteristics, except for Correa. Ecuador not only
exited the OPEC oil cartel in 1992, but also became welcoming to major international
private oil companies. Things changed in 2007 when President Correa rose to power.
Being re-elected three times, Correa will be president until 2017, marking the end of the
stability era. The “Revolución Ciudadana” started signified a complete shift to left-wing
politics. Under the socialism of the 21st century, Ecuador reentered OPEC, reformed oil
contracts, changed its relations with developed nations, and began a nationalist tendency.
The changing political ideologies influence the oil industry, hence, Ecuador’s economy.
Currently, Ecuador’s oil industry still experiences controversies linked to political
decisions. The Yasuní National Park located in Ecuador’s Amazon region is one of the
most unique places in the world with great biodiversity. The rainforest is home to many
endemic protected species including reptiles, fish, amphibians, birds, insects, bats, trees,
shrubs, and others. The Park, however, is also rich with black gold; it contains the ITT
(Ishpingo-Tiputini-Tambococha) oilfields. The block represents approximately 20% of
Ecuador’s total crude oil reserves. After starting the Yasuní Initiative in 2007 to protect
the National Park, things changed as the progress of the project was evaluated in 2013.
Correa announced his intent of exploiting the ITT oilfields. The announcement caused
huge turmoil locally and international, and if enough signatures were collected
Ecuadorians would hold a popular vote about it. Experts were skeptical about the
Initiative’s veracity, given that, at par, a new refinery, Refinería del Pacífico, was under
construction. Ecuador’s proved reserves don’t justify investing in such an expensive
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energy project. As a result, experts believe the original plan was to exploit ITT block
regardless. The political and economic considerations that have led the current
government to contemplate opening the new refinery and exploiting the ITT oil reserves
present an ideal case study to examine the complex politics and economics that surround
the modern oil industry.
The present case study attempts to answer this question: how and to what extent
have political interventions affected the oil industry in Ecuador from 1990 until March
2014? The purpose of the thesis, in turn, is to examine in detail how the political
interventions have affected Ecuador’s oil industry and economy, focusing especially on
the current government’s decisions regarding usage of the oil reserves. It also investigates
the history of Ecuador’s membership and participation in the OPEC oil cartel,
endeavoring to find explanations as to why Ecuador left the organization voluntarily in
1992, while resuming membership in 2007. In this sense, the thesis establishes a
historical context for the current state of Ecuador’s oil industry. It revises the era of
political instability until President Correa came to power in 2007, converting in the
longest running president in the last two decades. Under the current regime, the thesis
explores the changes in oil contract law and relations with other nations, the controversial
drilling of the ITT oilfields, and the construction of a new refinery.
The thesis is a detailed case study of the Ecuadorian oil industry, to thoroughly
review, analyze, update, and evaluate the intersection of politics and economics in the oil
industry for Ecuador for the last 24 years. Case studies are standard methods in Industrial
Organizations, allowing the exploration of structural and background conditions that
produce a given set of industrial outcomes and pricing/production decisions. The case
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study consists of an extensive review and analysis of past studies, theses and
dissertations, books, newspaper articles, and international organizations’ published data
on the oil industry. Sources consulted are specific to Ecuador, OPEC, and the
international oil industry in general. The information was collected from government and
non-government related sources, in an effort to remain objective. Additionally, I
conducted interviews with experts on the different oil fields in Ecuador, including
politicians, sociologists, Ecuador history and economics professors, and professionals
knowledgeable about the public and private oil sector and Yasuní National Park. Past
studies have left gaps in their analyses, specifically excluding environmental and political
considerations. By the same token, studies were based on what have proven to be
incorrect assumptions about the planned usage of the ITT oilfields, given the presidential
change of decision in August 2013. After the material was been collected, synthesized,
and analyzed, conclusions were made about the appropriate policy for Ecuador’s oil
industry based on Industrial Organization theory. The case study is of value because it
addresses the problem from a political, economic, social, and environmental perspective.
At the conclusion of my thesis, my findings include how Ecuador’s public policy
failure, which derived from the political instability, shaped the market structure of the
domestic oil industry. Developed nations that buy the crude oil benefit the most from the
business transaction, not Ecuador, who actually possesses and produces the commodity.
Crude oil prices present a complete paradox, since high oil prices benefit the developing
nations that produce this resource by increasing their sales revenues, but adversely affect
the developed nations that buy the good. In contrast, developed nations are able to profit
low prices because they can obtain more volume of crude oil for less, but the economies
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of the developing nations that have the oil are harmed terribly, especially in country as
Ecuador, where oil is the backbone of the economy. The country’s economic history of
reliance on primary products, such as cacao and bananas, is repeating itself with crude
oil, since industrialization has not been reached yet. Ecuador only exports oil as a raw
material, not any petroleum based processed product, leaving the latter to be produced by
developed nations, only to be resold to Ecuador and other developing nations. This
process has deterred the process of industrialization. Ecuador suffers from the Dutch
disease because of its continual reliance on crude oil, a raw material, which has not
allowed the country to achieve broad-based development.
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Chapter	
  2.	
  OPEC	
  and	
  the	
  Global	
  Petroleum	
  Industry	
  
The following chapter sets a background to the global petroleum industry. It will
describe how the industry started and highlight main events that lead to the creation of
OPEC as an organization that colludes for market share and oil prices. Given Ecuador’s
current and past membership in the oil cartel, the chapter’s purpose is to provide a
context on OPEC matters that are relevant to my study. In this sense, some parts of the
general history of the global petroleum industry that Yergin covers, such as the boom of
the oil industry in the USA during the 1870s, are omitted since they are not very relevant
to my research. This chapter primarily focuses on the rise of OPEC during the 20th and
21st centuries.

Early	
  Beginnings	
  
Petroleum, or black gold, as it has been called, is a valuable natural resource. The
dark liquid forms “when large quantities of dead organisms, usually zooplankton and
algae, are buried underneath sedimentary rock and undergo intense heat and pressure”1.
The resource was present in society since very ancient times. However, it was not until
the 19th century that petroleum gained importance in economics and politics.
Around the 1850s in northwestern Pennsylvania, a group led by the chemist
Benjamin Silliman Jr. envisioned a new use for a substance called rock oil, which had
been primitively gathered and used in “folk medicines believed to relieve everything
from headaches, toothaches, and deafness to stomach upsets, worms, rheumatism, and

1

Jukić, A. (n.d.). Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Processes Presentation. Faculty of Chemical
Engineering and Technology. Retrieved February 17, 2014, from
http://www.fkit.unizg.hr/_download/repository/PRPP_2013_Crude_oil_composition.pdf
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dropsy-and to heal wounds on the backs of horses and mules”2. The group believed that
exploiting rock oil on a larger scale could present a cheap, high quality liquid that could
be burned to light lamps. This motivation led Silliman in 1854 to become the first person
to distil petroleum. Since that time, the oil rush began and has not ceased. Today, oil is an
iconic source of political and economic power.
Figure	
  2.1	
  Real	
  Price	
  per	
  Barrel	
  of	
  Crude	
  oil,	
  January	
  1970	
  –	
  December	
  2006	
  
(2006	
  Dollars)	
  

	
  

Source: Brock, J. W. (2009). The Petroleum Industry. The structure of American industry (12th ed., pp.
31). Upper Saddle River: Pearson/Prentice Hall.

Crude oil operates in a world market, which can be explained looking at the
fluctuations in price shown by Figure 2.1, meaning that global demand and other
exogenous shocks the price of oil. Some of the major political impacts illustrated by the
graph include the Arab-Israel War of 1973, the fall Iran Revolution in 1979 […], the First
and Second Gulf Wars, and Hurricane Katrina in 2003.3 The Ecuadorian industry itself
has been affected by different economic shocks including the nationalization of oil
companies, the development of new oil fields, the vertical integration of national
2

Yergin, D. (1991). The prize: the epic quest for oil, money, and power. (pp. 20) New York: Simon &
Schuster.
3
Brock, J. W. (2009). The Petroleum Industry. The structure of American industry (12th ed., pp. 30).
Upper Saddle River: Pearson/Prentice Hall.
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companies, the presence of multinational oil companies, the implementation of new
technology, and the drive towards greener energy sources.
At the present day, petroleum is critical for thousands of industries and for all
nations around the world. Worldwide, in 2011, around 89 million barrels of oil and liquid
fuels were consumed per day, 32 billion barrels per year.4 The largest consumers are
developed nations. In 2012, the top consumer was the USA with 18.5 millions of barrels
per day, closely followed by China with 10.3 million barrels a day. Ecuador, on the other
hand, consumed 210,000 barrels per day, while producing 500,000 barrels per day5.

Structure	
  
The oil industry is one of the largest industries in the world. It includes four stages
that are vertically related. The stages are not all served by the same companies, but the
trends lately have been for firms to integrate vertically and perform all four stages, which
include:

•

Production: involving the location, development and extraction of oil from the
fields. Petroleum might required drilling or may be located close to the surface
depending on the type of reservoir.

•

Refining: operations that turn the crude petroleum into derivatives that can be
sold in the market. These include gasoline, fuel, and diesel, among others.

4

FAQs: Oil. (n.d.). IEA: International Energy Agency. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from
http://www.iea.org/aboutus/faqs/oil/
5
Countries Oil Consumption. (n.d.). U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics
and Analysis. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from
http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view=consumption
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•

Marketing: distribution of the petroleum based products to worldwide markets
where consumers can acquire them.

•

Transportation: connection for all of the previous levels. After crude oil is
pumped out of the oilfields, the raw material is transported to refineries in a
system of pipelines and tankers. After the oil is transformed into other products in
the refineries, it is again transported to the end customers.

The	
  Seven	
  Sisters:	
  International	
  Majors	
  	
  
After World War II, seven major companies controlled the oil industry. Enrico
Mattei, an Italian public administrator active in the development of the oil industry in
Italy, heavily criticized this “cartel”, as he called the group of companies. Mattei is
attributed with naming this cartel the Seven Sisters. The group dominated at least 95% of
the world’s oil reserves. Mattei wanted to share the profits of the Middle Eastern
petroleum. Hence, Mattei wasn’t against the existence of the group, but rather concerned
that his Italian company was not a part of it. The group was composed of:

•

Five USA based firms: Exxon, Texaco, Gulf, Mobil, and Chevron

•

Two UK based firms: Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum (BP)

Oil experts claim that there actually was an eighth sister: the French Compagnie
Française des Pétroles (CFP), which was also involved in the Iranian consortium along
with the other Seven Sisters. However, because CFP didn’t fit as “Anglo-Saxon”, Mattie
didn’t include it in the group. In terms of ownership, most of the companies were private
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except for BP and CFP that were partially owned by the government, exemplifying the
public belief that oil is too important to be left to the oil companies.6
Mattei argued that the Seven Sisters functioned as a cartel because they
maintained control through a system of joint ventures that divided the ownership of the
firms exploiting the oil fields in the Middle East. These joint ventures were formed with
the aid of the domestic governments of the companies. The US government helped
reorganize Aramco (Arabian-American Oil Company) that produced oil in Saudi Arabia,
into a joint venture between Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and Chevron. The French
government setup CFP to exploit their part of the Iraqi concession. The British
government supervised an agreement to split the Kuwait concession between BP and
Gulf. The latter was in contradiction to US Antitrust policy, but the Department of State
claimed it was a matter of national security, so antitrust was disregarded.
The international companies were horizontally integrated in a very informal
manner, where they not only had a common interest, but also shared information among
them. The companies colluded in such a way that each one knew what the others were
planning to do in the future, allowing output limitations. For instance, “partners in the
Iraq Petroleum Company were obliged to file their requirements for crude oil five years
in advance.”7 The situation allowed them to plan ahead of time, guaranteeing control over
the exploration, development, marketing, and oil supply. Acting as an oligopolistic cartel,
companies did not compete for price, but instead for marketing, brand development, and
access to oil deposits. The interesting fact about this oligopolistic behavior is that it had
the support of the different domestic governments of each major company.
6

Sampson, A. (1991). The seven sisters: the great oil companies and the world they shaped. (pp. 68)
Toronto: Bantam Books.
7
Brock, J. W. (2009) (pp. 33)
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Emergence	
  of	
  Independent	
  Oil	
  Companies	
  
The Seven Sisters had much influence over the price levels of oil, but they had no
control over the entry of new independent firms. The profitable oil industry caught the
eye of many different firms that sought to take advantage of the surge in demand of oil.
Several independent oil firms emerged from 1950 until 1973, changing the balance of
power in the industry. Governments in oil producing countries adopted policies that
welcomed newcomers. Until then, the industry had been in the hands of the corporate
oligopoly, but now the governments of the oil producing countries gained more power
over the market.
The growing number of firms in the industry increased oil supply. Even when
demand was growing at a fast rate, the excess supply adversely affected prices by
pressuring them downward. The international majors couldn’t sustain the pressure for
such low prices. On the other hand, governments of oil producing nations sold the oil
with a tax at unchanging posted prices. The taxes were much higher than the equivalent
transaction costs, which were actually falling. Altogether, it meant that larger proportions
of the revenues went to the governments of oil producing countries. As a result, having
new independent firms decreased the domination of the Seven Sisters over the oil
industry.
The surpluses of oil continued and greater discounts over the posted prices
followed. The discount on posted prices were a result of more aggressive marketing
attempts by the Soviet Union, who wanted to increase their sales to the West. On August
1960, [the Standard Oil of New Jersey cut USD 0.14 (7%) a barrel in posted crude oil
prices. The announcement triggered a reaction that resulted in a meeting between
19

Abdullah Tariki (1919 – 1997, Saudi politician) and Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo (1939 –
1979, Venezuelan politician and diplomat) to establish a new organization made up
solely of oil exporting countries. Pérez Alfonzo had advocated an international
association for many years, so he became ecstatic when it was actually happening. By
September 14, the major exporting countries: Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and
Iran, met and established a new entity: OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries.8
Establishing a new organization helped prevent further declines in the posted
price of oil, but it was not able to recover the losses for the price decreases that had cause
the formation of the organization. OPEC has received criticism ever since its creation.
Stephen Martin, in his case study of the petroleum industry, argues, “It was the radical
states, rather than OPEC, that led the way”9 to the shift in power. Martin’s theory is that
the control of the world market away from the Seven Sisters and other international
majors to the oil producing countries would have happened regardless of the creation of
OPEC.

The	
  Organization	
  of	
  Petroleum	
  Exporting	
  Countries	
  –	
  OPEC	
  
OPEC was born in 1960 with the intention of defending the price of oil. The
members constantly asked corporations to consult with the organization before making
decisions on price that could affect the revenues of oil producing countries. To sustain the
price levels, OPEC also lobbied for a system to regulate production. Additionally, the

8
9

Yergin, D. (1991). (pp. 521)
Brock, J. W. (2009) (pp. 36)
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organization aimed for solidarity among the members in case the international majors
retaliated against any of them.
OPEC’s members at that time, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Iran,
were the source of approximately 80% of the world’s oil exports. OPEC Deputy
Secretary General, Fadhil al-Chalabi, commented that the organization was “the first
collective act of sovereignty on the part of the oil exporters, the first turning point in the
international economic relations towards the states’ control over natural resources.”10
Nevertheless, at the time of its creation, the Seven Sisters didn’t believe it would work
and didn’t take it seriously.
During the first decade of its existence, OPEC did not have many
accomplishments. It had succeeded at stopping companies from taking abrupt decisions
about oil without consultation and that the posted price is not cut again. In reality, for a
long time, most of the member countries had limited control since the ground reserves
were property of the concessionaries, expect for Iran. The latter combined with the excess
surplus made it somewhat impossible for nations to alienate the companies, since they
depended on them for market access.
OPEC members pursued the same economic goal of increasing their own
revenues, but their political interests diverged, which gave rise to internal rivalries. For
this reason, OPEC has had a hard time acting as a monopoly or a perfectly colluding
cartel. Iraq suspended its membership when Kuwait gained independence from Britain.
Iran and Saudi Arabia were envious of each other since they were the major producers.
OPEC was only able to take advantage of demand because of political events rather than
economic coordination, surrounded by US import quotas, Russian oil exports, and
10

Yergin, D. (1991). (pp. 523)
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competition. OPEC’s founding father, Pérez Alfonzo, grew disappointed and resigned in
1963, since his mission of bringing together the oil producers was accomplished. In fact,
he had a complete change of heart and referred to oil as “the excrement of the devil.”
In 1973, oil-producing nations cut back supply to the international majors and to
independent corporations. The independent companies turned to bid in the spot market
for oil, increasing prices, ultimately, driving official OPEC prices up as well. Because
demand for oil was also on the rise, OPEC revenue “rose from USD13.7 billion in 1972
to USD 87.2 billion in 1974.”11

Petroleum	
  in	
  the	
  Less	
  Developed	
  Countries	
  
Oil production of Less Developed Countries (LDCs) in Latin America, Africa,
and Asia, has risen over the past years. The international majors lost many of their
concessions in the Middle East after OPEC was formed, so they searched for oil
anywhere outside OPEC for the precious black gold. Companies exploited the benefits of
oil until its development costs are below the spot market price for the resource.
In Latin America, oil production has continued to expand since the 1970s.
According to the American Petroleum Institute, output grew from 1,789 million barrels in
1974 to 2,487 million barrels in 1990 and 3,926 million in 2005. Martin predicts that this
trend will continue. Despite its membership in OPEC, Venezuela expanded its oil
reserves by aggressively acquiring refineries and moving into trade agreements. By the
same token, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia seek to expand their oil networks and
industries, either by cooperating with international oil companies or signing joint
ventures with other oil producing countries.
11
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Most of the LDCs depend on foreign companies for the development of their oil
reserves. Politicians vouch for the exploitation of oil, even if the development costs are
greater than the spot market price, because their budgets depend on the revenues from the
exploitation. This is exactly the case of Ecuador, a country whose economy heavily relies
on the oil industry. For this reason, international majors will always be welcome in new
fields all around the world. In this sense, many times oil is exploited more for political
rather than economic reasons.
Just as the success of the international majors triggered the entry of new
independent firms, the birth of OPEC motivated the discovery and development of new
oil fields in different countries around the globe. International majors sought to profit
from the newly oil producing countries. The latter weakened OPEC’s power, which
sparked for the organization to take action. As a result, vertical integration between
OPEC members and oil companies became the new trend.

Integration	
  
Market performance is threatened by the changes in oil supply. Oil firms merge,
integrate or restructure, hoping to have long-term impacts that reduce their costs. In order
to compete with the international majors, state owned companies are integrating forward,
including production, refining, and distribution. Nevertheless, in some states,
international companies are allowed to return, but with much stricter terms to develop
new reserves.
In the most recent era of the petroleum industry, mergers have become very
popular. In 1998, Exxon and Mobil proposed and were approved to consolidate their
operations by the US Federal Trade Commission. At the turn of the century, in 2001,
23

Texaco and Chevron joined to form the third largest US Oil Company. The trend to
merge between private companies is a result of the vertical integration and diversification
of state owned companies like Venezuela’s PDVSA and Brazil’s Petrobras.
Behind the forward integration and diversification lay a composite of economic
and political reasons. States want to capitalize their assets and skills by diversifying into
other activities rather than solely oil exploitation. Government owned refineries provide
the countries with a competitive advantage. The real cost of crude oil to the integrated
refiner is the cost of crude production […]. But the cost of crude oil to an independent,
nonintegrated refiner is the much higher market price for crude oil.12
One of the major problems that oil-producing nations are encountering nowadays
is the exploration and development of new reserves. The procedures are of high risky and
very expensive, especially for LDCs. In this case, it becomes much more attractive to
work the international majors.

Conduct	
  
Oil producing nations favor high oil prices. Their argument is based on the
scarcity of the resource and its impact on future generations. Oil prices have fluctuated
over the past century. Surplus, the Seven Sisters, OPEC, independent oil firms, and other
events are just some of the reasons for the high variation in prices. Generally, low prices
favor the developed nations as they can obtain higher volumes of oil for less money.
This, however, adversely affects the economies of LDCs, which, in contrast, favor high
prices to increase their GDP. Oil pricing is antithetical.

12
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“Some analysts have suggested that the world oil industry is driven by a single
dominant firm: Saudi Arabia.”13 As of 2012, according to the US Energy Information
Administration, Saudi Arabia had 267,02 billion barrels14 in proven reserves of crude oil,
around 20% of the world’s reserves. The state could actually dominate the entire market,
reduce output and have prices increase.
Despite the fact that OPEC’s individual members don’t have enough power to
manipulate price, the organization as a whole can behave as a collusive leader.
Throughout the years, however, OPEC has lost market share, primarily due to the long
queues implied for the development of new reserves. In the last century, offering lower
prices, market share has stabilized at around 40%.
OPEC	
  as	
  a	
  Cartel	
  
Headquartered in Vienna (Austria), OPEC is an oil cartel that coordinates policies
among member countries to secure oil supply to the consumers and rents for its members.
As of today, OPEC has 12 members: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela15. OPEC
operates by setting production quotas for its members, controlling oil supply, and, thus,
setting prices. The cartel is inclined to increase supply when prices increase above the
production costs. However, it is very difficult to coordinate actions because of the cartel
nature of the organization. Incentives to cheat, i.e. not adhering to the agreements of
OPEC are great, since the member states push their profit making interests forward.
13
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LDCs with low GDP per capita, large populations, and small oil reserves lobby for
economic development through the maximization of their oil profits, with high pressured
of their local governments.
OPEC’s bargaining power comes from the production capacity of each of its
members. For instance, in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, both nations ceased
production, but Saudi Arabia was able to fill the missing output because the nation had a
greater production capacity. Different political and economic conflicts arise between the
member states. Gabon and Ecuador withdrew from the cartel in the 1990s, but Ecuador
returned in 2007. The role of Ecuador in OPEC will be addressed in the following
chapter.
OPEC’s quotas have fluctuated throughout the years, hoping to have some type of
influence over the world price. However, as Martin states, “The price of crude oil is not
trending upward because OPEC is cutting back the supply of crude oil. The price of crude
oil is rising because the world demand for energy is increasing.”16 The cartel has not been
able to control the market, yet it has taken advantage of the different price increases and
opportunities. OPEC’s lack of dominance comes from imperfect collusion, i.e., the
inability to adhere to agreements due to self-interest.

Oil:	
  The	
  Black	
  Gold	
  or	
  Curse?	
  
Oil, the black gold, is one of the most important resources in our society today.
Oil is valuable, hence its nickname of “black gold”. It powers the majority of the
industrial world and is a source of economic income for many nations and companies.
However, oil also brings out the worst of civilization, as it is the source for many political
16
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disputes, wars, and invasions. One of the most problematic sources of energy, in terms of
geographic distribution, supply, drive for power, price control, temptation to cheat, etc.
Over the years, “creativity, dedication, entrepreneurship, ingenuity, and technical
innovation have coexisted with avarice, corruption, blind political ambition, and brute
force.”17 It is the age of oil.

17
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Chapter	
  3.	
  The	
  Oil	
  Industry	
  in	
  Ecuador	
  
The	
  Evolution	
  of	
  the	
  Ecuadorian	
  oil	
  industry	
  
In Ecuador, oil is a key resource for the economy and one of its main sources of
income. Between 1972 and 2006, oil accounted for 48% of the country’s exports, and
between 1995 and 2004, it generated a third of the government’s income.18 In 2011, the
income from oil represented 41% of the Government’s budget19. Sánchez (2009) and
many other experts on the field would have described the nature of Ecuador’s economy
as being extremely oil dependent.
As mentioned above, today Ecuador is a member of the OPEC oil cartel. The
country is one of the smallest members of the cartel, thus, being compelled to agree to
production quotas and prices determined by the most powerful members, such as Saudi
Arabia. Ecuador originally joined OPEC in 1973, but withdrew voluntarily in 1992,
mainly due to political reasons that will be explored below. In 2007, under the leadership
of President Rafael Correa, Ecuador again joined the OPEC. The latter decision caused
controversy, given the leftist ideology that the president holds.
Oil production in Ecuador began in the first quarter of the twentieth century. In
1925, the British company Anglo began the oil exploitation at the Santa Elena Peninsula
located in the Coastal region. Nevertheless, the “oil boom” really took off in the 1970s,
with 1.570 barrels per day. The industry consolidated in 1972 as Ecuador not only
18
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produced oil for national consumption, but also exported it, which allowed the country to
participate in international trade, increasing the national revenue.20 Many different events
have occurred in the industry since. In 2012, production increased to 500.60 thousand
barrels per day. Ecuador has approximately 8.24 million barrels of crude oil reserves, the
largest ones in South America after Venezuela and Brazil.21 Today, the industry has
become a source of controversy in different aspects. Recently, President Correa
announced the decision to exploit the ITT (Ishpingo-Tiputini-Tambococha) oil fields,
located in the Yasuní National Park.
Yasuní is located on the eastern side of Ecuador, in the Napo and Pastaza
provinces of the Amazon region. With an area of 9,820 sq. km, the Park houses the ITT
oil fields that contain around 20% of Ecuador’s reserves, i.e., 800 million barrels of crude
oil. The issue relies on the fact that the National Park is one of the most bio-diverse
places on the planet with incredibly rich flora and fauna, having different species of trees,
shrubs, reptiles, amphibians, fish, birds, insects, bats, and other endemic protected
species22. One hectare of the Park contains 644 species of trees, which is as many tree
species as in North America.23 In June 2007, President Correa launched the Yasuní-ITT
Initiative, an attempt to protect the park’s oil reserves if the international community
rewarded Ecuador with compensation. Nevertheless, after an evaluation of the Initiative,
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President Correa stated on August 16th 2013 in a news conference: “the world has failed
us,”24 calling the world’s powerful countries “hypocrites”, and stopping the initiative to
protect Yasuní. The new policy on Ecuador’s ITT reserves will alter the national oil
industry and ecology.
Currently, Ecuador has three small and outdated refineries run by Petroecuador
EP, the state owned oil company: Refinería Esmeraldas, Refinería Libertad, and
Complejo Industrial Shushufindi. Nevertheless, their capacity is not enough for the
number of barrels produced per day. For this reason, a project for a new refinery was
presented and approved under the current presidential regime. On June 2013, the
government issued an official communication25 announcing “Refinería del Pacífico –
Eloy Alfaro”, would be completed by 2017 and is to be an emblematic project of the
country’s energy plan. Creamer (2010) commented on the highly elevated costs of the
energy project, the most expensive one in Ecuador’s history with an approximate cost of
USD 12.5 millions. The refinery is being constructed under a joint venture between
Ecuador and Venezuela’s state oil company (Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.). In the joint
venture, Petroecuador (Ecuador’s state-run oil company) will have a 51% stake in the
refinery and PDVSA will have the rest. Additionally, Jorge Glas, Ecuador’s Vice
President, commented in the televised weekly government report: “We've worked to have
a third partner [...] and this third partner will be no one more and no one less than the
biggest oil company in the world, China's CNPC (China National Petroleum Corp).”26
24
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Both PDVSA and Petroecuador agreed to finance 30% of the project, relying on external
partners, like CNPC, for the remainder. Opinions vary on the Chinese-Venezuelan
collaboration and the drilling of the ITT fields to justify the huge investment in the
refinery. Industry observers have raised questions about whether the refinery is being
built to utilize the oil to be extracted from the Yasuní fields or whether the plan to extract
oil from the Yasuní fields is prompting the investment in the new refinery.27

Problem	
  of	
  Investigation	
  
The majority of case studies about petroleum focus on the largest and most
influential members of OPEC, that is to say, the Middle Eastern countries. However,
smaller members like Ecuador have been disregarded. The present case study will focus
on the political interventions that affected Ecuador’s oil industry and economy, especially
focusing on the current government’s decision about the ITT oil reserves.
This thesis examines in detail how Ecuador’s shifting political ideologies have
influenced the oil industry, in turn affecting the country’s economy. Having ten
presidents in the last twenty years, Ecuador is known for its political instability, which
has had a large impact on the oil industry. Ecuador’s OPEC participation and
membership is another area that will be explored, attempting to find connections with
politics.
After reviewing the historical context for the current state of Ecuador’s petroleum
industry, the case study focuses on the current regime, because President Correa is the
longest running president in the last two decades. Correa’s regime began in 2007 and he
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is still the president at this moment of writing this thesis. In this sense, the case study also
analyzes Correa’s decision to drill the ITT oil fields and the construction of the Pacific
Refinery “Eloy Alfaro” as a partnership with Venezuela and China. Therefore, the case
study attempts to answer: How and to what extent have political interventions affected
the oil industry in Ecuador from 1990 until 2013?
Ecuador has continually relied on the export of primary products. The country
exports the raw materials to developed countries that, in turn, transform the products into
industrialized goods for the development of their economies. My hypothesis for this
study is that Ecuador suffers from the Dutch disease because of the country’s reliance on
crude oil, a primary raw product, which, together with its political instability, has
impeded broad-based economic development. The Dutch disease is an economic
phenomenon that affects small resource-rich countries; the increased reliance on the
exploitation of one natural resource, leads to decreased manufacturing and an increasing
dependence on import for industrialized goods. The latter is Ecuador’s situation with the
export crude oil and the import of petroleum-based products.
Based on Scherer and Ross’s Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm displayed
in Appendix 1, I expect to find that Ecuador’s public policy failed because of the political
instability, which influenced the market structure of the domestic oil industry. I expect to
find reasons that explain why consumers in the developed countries benefit more than
Ecuador a developing nation that produces the oil. Ecuador’s political instability has
caused an industry conduct where the country’s economy heavily relies on crude oil as a
raw material. The country, however, has not been able to benefit fully from the export of
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this primary product, which deters the process industrialization and, hence, economic
development.

Method	
  
In industrial organization, according to Waldman and Jensen (2007), there are two
major approaches: the SCP (Structure-Conduct-Performance) approach and the Chicago
School approach. Case studies in SCP are more empirically oriented. Developed by
Mason and Bain in the 1940s and 1950s, this method “hypothesized that basic market
conditions determine market structure, market structure determines conduct, and conduct
determines performance.”28 Additionally, the government is also a critical component
influence structure, conduct, and performance. Shepherd and Shepherd point out in The
Economics of Industrial Organization (2004) that case studies have become a standard
method for exploring the structural and background conditions that produce a given set of
industrial outcomes and pricing/production decisions. In studying the oil industry, where
the structural, political, environmental, and other background factors vary so much from
country to country, case studies are essential in examining the standard structure /
conduct / performance trajectory of an industry, in preparation for evaluating the
important policy considerations and the impact on consumer welfare. As mentioned
above, the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm 29 demonstrates how political
actions are key in affecting the structure and conduct of the main players in Ecuador’s oil
industry. For this reason, this study consists of a detailed case study of the Ecuadorian oil
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industry, thoroughly reviewing, analyzing, updating, and evaluating the intersection of
politics and economics in the oil industry for Ecuador for the last 24 years.
Case studies represent a qualitative research method that requires consulting
multiple sources of evidence30. Sources are specific to Ecuador and its oil industry,
OPEC, and, more generally, to the international oil industry. Consequently, my source
material consists of an extensive review and analysis of past studies, theses and
dissertations, books, newspaper articles, and international organizations’ published data
on the oil industry. The information was collected from government and non-government
related sources, in an effort to compare and contrast both the public and private
standpoints to be able to analyze the information objectively. Much of this material is
published in Spanish; as a result, I had to translate the information in order to use it in
this study. Additional information was gathers from interviews with experts in Ecuador
from the industry and academia.
Books	
  
Among the books consulted for the elaboration of the case study are Daniel
Yergin’s The Prize (1991) and James Brock’s The Structure of American Industry (2009)
for data on the evolution of the oil industry worldwide and OPEC’s role in it. By the
same token, Breve Historia Económica del Ecuador (2006) by Ecuadorian author Alberto
Acosta was used as a source to Ecuador’s economic background, the history of the
various booms of the economy, and the presidential influences in parts of the analyzed
period. In January 2013, Fernando Villavicencio (researcher, independent journalist,
author, and political activist and anti-corruption) published Ecuador Made In China. The
30
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book gained popularity as it promised to denounce the hidden side of the oil businesses
with China unknown to the Ecuadorians. Villavicencio “details the direct oil sales
agreements between Ecuador, China and Venezuela, and denounces the participation of
several companies and states as intermediaries in these transactions, thus hurting the
economy of the country.” 31 Linking the oil industry with the ITT fields at Yasuní
National Park, Matthieu Le Quang comments about the Initiative in Dejar el petróleo bajo
tierra (Leave the oil underground - 2013). On the other hand, Ecuadorian sociologist
Sergio Vélez Valarezo, whom I had the chance to interview, classifies the Initiative as
utopian in Yasuní-ITT Situación y Perspectivas (Yasuní-ITT Situation and Perspectives 2013).
Interviews	
  
Coupled with the published sources of information, I conducted interviews in the
second week January 2014 in Quito, with experts on Ecuador’s oil industry. The
interviews were conducted in Spanish; they were recorded and the digital audios files can
be found on Appendix 7. However, being a Spanish native speaker, I have translated the
direct quotes into the body of the thesis. The people interviewed were closely selected
and include experts in Political Science, Law, Economics, Sociology, Petroleum
Engineering, Consulting, and in the public and private sectors of oil. The experts
interviewed for this thesis and their background are described next. Their resumes in
Spanish and interview guides are attached in Appendix 2.
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•

Luis Alfredo García, MS. Economist García obtained his Bachelors Degree in
Economics at Universidad Central del Ecuador in 1975. After specializing in the
Elaboration and Evaluation of Investment Projects at the Inter-American Bank for
Development in 1976, he obtained a Master of Science in Petroleum Economics
at Colorado School of Mines in 1979. Economist García has worked for the
Ministry of Energy in Ecuador, Petroecuador, Tripetrol Oil Trading, and Anglo.
Currently, he is a commercial agent and adviser for Shell Trading Co. and Shell
Western Supply and Trading. In his interview, I discussed the oil industry from
the perspective of the private sector, the economics of the industry, and demand
trends for the energy resource.

•

Pablo Lucio Paredes, Ph.D. Doctor in Economics with 28 years of experience in
the academic, consulting, entrepreneur, and communications areas. He has also
been the author of many books and articles along the years. In 1981, he obtained
his Masters and DEA in Nuclear Physics at the Université Paris. Later, in 1985,
Dr. Paredes got his Doctorate in Applied Economics at the Institut d’Études
Politiques Paris. He was the Planning Secretary for the Government of President
Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1993). As a consultant, he has worked for the InterAmerican Bank for Development, World Bank, CAF, Central Bank of Ecuador,
and other national and international organisms. He has also been involved in the
realm of politics as a member of the National Assembly. Currently, he is the
Director of the Institute of Economics and a professor at Universidad San
Francisco de Quito. Dr. Paredes discussed the economics involved in the oil
industry and how the shifts in political ideologies influenced the industry as a
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whole. Additionally, he commented on the evolution of the relationships with
different oil producing countries.
•

Segundo Rodríguez Acosta, MBA. BE. Petroleum engineering graduate from
Universidad Central del Ecuador in 1976. In 2001, he obtained his MBA at
Universidad Central del Ecuador. He began to work in the public sector in 1978 at
the Gas Plant at Complejo Industrial Shushufindi. He has worked primarily for
the state-owned oil company Petroproducción and Petroecuador. He is a professor
at Universidad Central del Ecuador for Operations Research, Project Design and
Evaluation, Process Management, and Mathematics. Segundo Rodríguez was able
to discuss about the dynamics of the industry from the perspective of the public
sector, especially about the changes there have been in the company and how
decisions and projects are managed.

•

Esteban Santos, L.M.A. LL.M. obtained his Law Bachelors Degree at
Universidad San Francisco de Quito in 2008. In 2009, Dr. Santos obtained his
Master of Arts in Integration with a mention in International Economic
Negotiations. Later on, in 2010, he completed his Master of Law at the Graduate
Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) and Law Faculty at
the University of Geneva. Currently, he is a civil litigation specialized lawyer at
Izurieta Mora Bowen Law Firm and a professor of Contemporary Political
Theory, Negotiation II, and International Organisms at Universidad de las
Américas – Quito. Dr. Santos discussed the new legislation affecting the oil
industry, the trade relationships with the international majors, OPEC membership,
Ecuador’s politics, and the future of the oil industry in the country.
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•

Fernando Santos Alvite, Doctor in Law, graduated from Universidad Central
del Ecuador in 1968. Dr. Santos has worked for the oil industry in the private and
public sectors. In the private realm, he has performed advising for Amoco,
Occidental Petroleum Company (OXY), Santa Fe, CNPC, and BHP for their
operations in Ecuador. In the public sector, he worked for OPEC in Vienna from
1976 to 1984 as the Chief of the unit for Legal Studies. In 1984, Dr. Santos
returned to Ecuador to be the Vice Minister of Energy and Mines; in 1986 he was
promoted to Minister, position he held until 1987. He has performed consulting
for the World Bank for the energy reform in Ecuador. Dr. Santos is also involved
in academics, being an Economic Law professor at Universidad de las Américas.
Aside from teaching and being a lawyer, starting in 2005, Dr. Santos is the
director of LAFARGE CEMENTOS S.A., an important Ecuadorian cement
company. Additionally, he is an arbitrator at the Centers of Arbitration of the
Chamber of Commerce in Quito and the American Ecuadorian Chamber of
Commerce. During his interview, we discussed how each government has
approached the oil industries and what changes have been made throughout the
years, the controversial Yasuní-ITT oil fields, as well as the future of the industry.

•

Sergio Vélez Valarezo, Ph.D. Sociologist and Political Scientist, graduated from
Universidad Central del Ecuador in 1973. Later on, he specialized in Strategic
Planning, and Scientific and Technology Policies at the University of Brasilia
(Ministry of Science and Technology of Brazil). In 1989, Dr. Vélez obtained his
Masters in Philosophy at Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, and in
2009, obtained a Doctorate in Philosophy at the same University. He has
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experience in the private and the public sector. Also, he authored different books
and publications. His most recent work published in October 2013: Yasuní-ITT
Sitaución y Perspectivas is directly related to the topic of this thesis. In the
interview with Dr. Vélez we discussed relevant historical, political, and social
events in the oil industry. We also talked about his opinion of the current
government and different aspects covered in his most recently published book.
Given the importance of interviews for my thesis, it is also relevant to discuss
how the above experts were selected and contact to ask for their collaboration. During the
early stages of the thesis, I knew I had to select a group of people that would have
different backgrounds and knowledge about the oil industry. In Ecuador, I have family
connections in the private sector academia. After talking to a couple of faculty members
at UDLA’s (Universidad de las Américas) campus in Quito, through networking, I was
able to establish connections with Luis Alfredo García, Segundo Rodríguez, Esteban
Santos, and Fernando Santos Alvite who, after reading my proposal, agreed to collaborate
with my thesis. Contacting Economist Paredes, however, was different. In June 2013, I
assisted to a cycle of Economics conferences where Economist Paredes was one of the
main presenters. He is a very renowned economist and I had always admired him. For
this reason, when I started working on my thesis, I contacted him seeking for his
collaboration, and, fortunately, he agreed. All the interviewed experts were carefully
selected so that I would be able to get broad and objective perspective about Ecuador’s
oil industry.

My	
  Contribution	
  

39

Oil is a very important resource for my country, as the evidence clearly suggests.
Due to its relevance, it has always been in the public eye and regulated by the state. For
this reason, political interventions have made the industry very dynamic. Studies in the
past have left gaps in the analysis, especially in respect to the environmental and political
considerations. Also, the studies were under the assumption that President Correa’s
Yasuní’s Initiative was going to be respected, but after the announcement in August
2013, many things will change. The decision to exploit the ITT fields is a great source of
controversy, turmoil, and concern for Ecuadorians and for the International community.
In Ecuador, many protests and signature collection events have taken place so far. The
present case study would serve as a source of information for other researchers interested
in the topic. The case study is of special interest because it synthesizes and combines
data, from published sources and unpublished interview information that I gathered,
concerning the political, economic, social, and environmental aspects of the oil industry
in Ecuador.
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Chapter	
  4.	
  The	
  case	
  of	
  Ecuador	
  1990	
  –	
  2014	
  
Ecuador is a small democratic republic in northwest South America, between
Colombia and Peru. As of 2012, in an area of 283,561 sq. km.32, the nation houses 15.49
million inhabitants.33 UNESCO declared Quito, the capital, a World Heritage site in
1978. The country’s name comes from the equator line, which cuts it unevenly, leaving
most of it in the Southern Hemisphere. From north to south, the Andes mountain range
divides continental Ecuador in three regions: Costa, Sierra, and Amazonía (Coast,
Highlands, and Amazon). The Galápagos Islands comprise a fourth region located in the
Pacific Ocean, west of the continent. According to the Fourth National Report of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, Ecuador is the most biodiverse country in the world
per unit area, housing many endemic species in flora and fauna. The country is also rich
in natural resources, oil being the most important one for the Ecuadorian economy.
Nevertheless, it has been plagued with political instability, causing the office to change
frequently throughout history. Ten different presidents have governed Ecuador in the last
twenty-three years. Correa has been in power ever since implementing the “Revolución
Ciudadana” (Citizens’ Revolution) as part of the Socialism of the 21st Century political
ideology that currently dominates South American.
This particular chapter will give a brief background on Ecuador’s economic
history as an exporter of cacao, bananas, and oil. The purpose is to get a better
understanding of the country’s general context, based on published sources of
32
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information. Later, I combine the data with unpublished sources, i.e., interviews, to
investigate the last two decades of the Ecuadorian oil industry.

Brief	
  History	
  of	
  Economic	
  “Booms”	
  in	
  Ecuador	
  
Ecuador is a country rich in natural resources. Having natural resources is
regarded as positive for any country. Nevertheless, the counterpart, i.e., the negative
aspect, is always forgotten. In my interview with Eco. Paredes, he reassured that Ecuador
and many other LDCs suffer from the Dutch disease, or what other people call the natural
resource curse. Countries rich in commodities or natural resources tend to lack sustained
economic growth and development, with masses of impoverished people. The society
becomes more dependent on only one product. Ecuador’s economy has peaked at
different points in history, having three notable “booms”: cacao beans, banana, and oil.
Natural resources, however, have been both a blessing and a curse. Throughout history,
Ecuador has been an exporter of primary products, but it has not yet become
industrialized. In Ecuador: De Banana Republic a la No República (Ecuador: From the
Banana Republic to the No Republic 2009), current President Rafael Correa, writes about
how Ecuador, a country that produces cacao beans imports chocolate, and a country that
is an oil exporter, imports gasoline.
Throughout economic history, Ecuador’s economy has relied mainly on primary
products including cacao, bananas, and, ultimately, crude oil. Developed nations have
benefited from the latter as they can purchase raw materials at lower prices and convert
them into industrialized goods for the growth of their economies. Today, Ecuador’s
economy is focused on the production and export of crude oil. However, the country’s
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continual reliance on crude oil, a primary-raw product, has caused Ecuador to suffer from
the Dutch disease, which impedes broad-based economic development.
The	
  Cacao	
  Heights	
  
Ecuador’s economy peaked at the end of the 19th century with the export of cacao
beans. By the end of 1866, cacao beans exports exceeded five million dollars. In addition
to cacao beans, other primary products also emerged: ivory nuts, coffee, leather, and
rubber. Demand for cacao and other tropical products had increased in the global market
due to available funds from the North American and European populations. Ecuador had
natural conditions of land and a cheap labor force to meet the growing demand for the
product. The revenues from the exports benefited the privileged social classes of the
Coastal region who owned the land, a small oligopolistic group. Cacao or the golden seed
inserted Ecuador to the global economy, helping the country reach an economic
recuperation. Nevertheless, instead of accumulating capital for the development of other
economic activities, the revenues were used to expand the rudimentary production of the
resource, and to finance the elites’ expenditures at luxury-imported goods, fostering
capital outflow. The industry was very profitable with an uneven distribution of wealth,
but it was also very vulnerable to competition from other countries that had been former
European colonies. As other countries entered the industry, surplus increased, pushing
down the prices (Acosta, 2006).
The industry began to be crippled in 1914 with WWI. The Hamburg port in
Germany, used to deliver most of the imported Ecuadorian cacao beans, was closed.
After WWI, around 1920, the price continued to fall, reducing Ecuador’s revenue. At the
same time, Ecuador was hit by natural disasters such as floods, droughts, and other
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plagues that especially afflicted single crop farming. In 1924, cacao prices rose again, but
because of the plagues, Ecuador was not able to gain back the lost market share.
Banana	
  Boom	
  
The production and export of banana saved Ecuador’s economy from falling into
a depression by the end of the 1940s. There was an improvement from the previous
experience with cacao beans, because agricultural borders were extended to include small
and medium banana farms, allowing the agricultural class to rise. Once again, foreign
demand impelled the specialization in banana production, which affected Ecuador’s
economy and society. Being an agricultural product, Ecuador had the natural conditions
for banana production, just as it happened with cacao.
When WWII ended, a combination of structural events improved Ecuador’s
comparative advantage. The state played a key role during this boom. In 1950, the Sucre
(Ecuador’s former currency) was devaluated in order to make the country’s exports more
competitive. Unlike during the cacao boom, the state reinvested the gains obtained from
the banana exports in other areas of the economy. During this time, government spending
on infrastructure increased, attempting to aid the industrialization. The government
intervention aided the rise of the middle class. The government-spending component of
aggregate demand increased, especially on roads that facilitate national integration.
Policies that sought an active involvement of Ecuador in the international economy were
developed, fostering foreign direct investment.
The banana era expanded into different zones of the Coastal region aided by the
improvement in transport infrastructure. It also fostered migration from the Sierra to the
Coast, speeding the development of cities. The internal market was benefited with the
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improvement of wage relations, the increase of public works, and the diversification of
the economy. The latter is an important change from the cacao era monopolized the
productive activities. At the end of the1950s, difficulties rose as the terms of trade for
Ecuadorian bananas worsened. In 1964, three thousand banana properties with an average
extension of 64 hectares existed. However, things were not ideal since there were
constant conflicts between producers and exporters, which, later on, spiked a regional
peasant movement. The economic issues peaked between 1964 and 1965, until in 1971
the commercial balance had a deficit. In the 1990s, the market leaders were one domestic
company, Noboa 44.1%, and four international ones: Standard Fruit 17.2%, Chiquita
13.7%, Del Monte 7.8%, and Banacol 4.2% (Acosta, 2006).
	
  The	
  Oil	
  New	
  Rich	
  
Ecuador’s oil reserves were rejected when they were first explored during the
1950s, a time where it was more profitable to obtain the more easily refined oil from
other regions like Saudi Arabia or Venezuela. Ecuador’s heavy crude oil is difficult to
refine and punished by the market with a markdown in price. Nevertheless, as presented
earlier, as those countries began to collude to weaken the power of the international oil
majors, the companies went desperately seeking for reserves in other places. Ecuador
became one of those attractive countries when in 1967 the Texaco-Gulf joint venture
discovered “Oriente” type crude oil in the Amazon region in what became the “Lago
Agrio #1” oil well, located in near the city of Nueva Loja (Sucumbíos province). As in
the cacao and banana eras, external needs determined the exploitation of oil. In this
period, foreign direct investment grew significantly, peaking in 1971 at 162.1 million
dollars. The 1970s was a period in which Ecuador entered the world oil market, because
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of the revenues produced by the export of oil. Because of the high oil revenues, Ecuador
became attractive for foreign banks, which regarded the country as a “new rich”.
During the 1970s, the Ecuadorian economy flourished, given the increase in the
market price for oil from USD 3.83 per barrel in 1973 to USD13.40 in 1974. Ecuador’s
increased financial resources, together with the world’s financial expansion, gave the
country access to credits that the cacao and banana industries had not allowed. As a
result, there was an accelerated process of indebtedness. The external debt grew from
USD 260.8 million (16% of the GDP in 1971) to USD 5.87 billion (42% of the GDP in
1981). By the end of the 1980s, for every USD 100 in exports, USD 71 was compromised
by debt (Acosta, 2006). Industry was stimulated by the availability of resources, revenue
from the exportation of oil (known as “petrodollars”), and foreign credits. Even when
industry developed, the distribution of wealth was uneven due to the lack of planning
policies for the long run. This industrialization was based on capital-intensive activities
that worked to satisfy the demand of small privileged groups of society. The oil boom
had an “unequal and excluding character from the sectorial, regional, and social
perspectives.” 34 The oil prosperity appeared massive and unexpectedly. Wealth
accumulated over the previous existent social structures, widening the social gaps. The
development myth surged as Ecuador did experiment economic growth, but no changes
in the quality of life of the majority of its inhabitants occurred.
In Breve Historia Económica del Ecuador (2006), Acosta describes oil as
characterized with a clear increase in the internal demand and an accumulation of fixed
capital (equipment, machinery, and tools) for production. Important infrastructure works
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were developed, including the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline, the state-owned refinery in
Esmeraldas, Esmeraldas-Quito-Ambato and Shushufindi-Quito “Poliductos” (pipelines),
storage and distribution centers, and Paute, Pisayambo, and Agoyán hydroelectric dams.
Ecuador’s GDP grew at least 8% between 1972 and 1981. The country experienced an
annual 3.3% growth per capita, the greatest in the twentieth century, even greater than the
average in Latin American countries (2.3%), Iberian countries (1.4%), USA (1.0%), and
other advanced countries (1.8%)35. Together with the improvement in GDP, came an
increase in migration of people towards the north, especially to the USA.
The oil industry boomed while military governments were in power. The
dictatorial political environment allowed, however, an important influx of foreign money
into the economy. Ecuador had a stable exchange rate of 25 sucres for 1 USD that
facilitated importing capital goods for the industries and luxury consumer goods. At this
time in the economy, the government designed a system to aid the private sector through
the freezing of prices and tariffs of the goods and services from the public sector, like
those related to energy. The gasoline subsidy, for instance, helped those groups of society
that consumed the most energy. The import substitution policy implemented was not used
as a tool against the private sector, but as a way of protecting the industrialization of the
country.
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In essence, during the oil boom, there was a generalized sensation of Ecuador
having reached paradise and people thought that broad economic development was soon
to occur. However, there was also a huge impact on the environment, one of the biggest
setbacks affecting Ecuador until today. As shown in Figure 4.1, Ecuador’s oil era
staggered in 1982 due to the fall in the oil prices and the effects of the loans given to less
developed countries. This period corresponds to the Latin American debt crisis, when
Latin America’s foreign debt exceeded their earning power and many countries defaulted,
affecting both the USA and the developing countries. WTI oil price per barrel is higher
for the majority of years because Ecuador’s Oriente oil has the punishment for having a
higher viscosity. The price of Oriente oil increased from USD 2.40 per barrel in 1972 to
USD 35.20 in 1980 and USD 34.40 in 1981, only to fall to USD 32.50 in 1982 following
a downward trend. OPEC reduced the official price of oil by USD 5.00 worldwide. Crude
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oil prices continued to fall up to USD 9.00 per barrel on July 1986 (Acosta, 2006). The
Ecuadorian economy was stagnant, and the foreign banks that had loaned the country
money were eager to get it back. As a result, new loans were taken to cover up the
existing ones. Additionally, in 1981 a border conflict with Peru began, so most of the
International Monetary Reserve was consumed in war equipment. In the following years,
Ecuador attempted to implement the Washington Consensus’s reform/adjustment policies
to get out of the crisis.
Having set and understood the historical and economic context of past reliance on
primary products, the following is a narrative of that begins in 1990 and concludes on
March 2014, the moment of writing of this research. The narrative is based on a
combination of my interview research and other published sources.

The	
  1990	
  –	
  2014	
  Period	
  
Over the past twenty-four years, Ecuador has experienced a series of social,
economic, and political changes. One of the most notable characteristics of the period is
its political instability. In Ecuador, a president is supposed to remain in office for 4 years.
Nevertheless, in this period, not all of the Heads of State have been able to complete the
entire period in office. There have been coup d’états, military juntas, office abandonment,
impeachments, and corruption. Political instability affects the economy adversely
because policies, plans, and projects can’t be completed, especially if ideologies differ
between presidential regimes.
The country experienced very high inflation periods, which ultimately lead to the
dollarization in 2000. In 2007, however, things changed when Rafael Correa came to
power with the so-called “Revolución Ciudadana”, which introduced a radical new
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ideology, social reforms, and economic policies, aiming to change Ecuadorian society
with a socialist approach. Correa’s mandate remains a source of controversy, yet it has
also brought a greater sense of political stability. As of this writing, Correa is still the
president of the Republic of Ecuador.
To better understand the dynamics of politics in Ecuador in the last twenty-three
years, it is important to know the presidents in power, as well as their political affiliation,
ideology, and key economic events at different periods. The following timeline briefly
summarizes this information:

Table	
  4.1	
  Presidential	
  Timeline:	
  1990	
  –	
  2013	
  
Period

August
10, 1988
–
August
10, 1992

August
10, 1992
–
August
10, 1996

36

President

Rodrigo
Borja
Cevallos

Sixto
Durán
Ballén

Political Party
(Political
Ideology)
Izquierda
Democrática
ID –
Democratic
Left
(Socialdemocracy)

Partido Unidad
Republicana –
Republican
Union Party
(Rightconservative)

Relevant Facts
and Events
• External debt
and IMF
pressures worsen
• Fiscal reforms
• Education
promoted
• Political
dialogues begin
with indigenous
people
• Neoliberal model
is enforced,
reducing
subsidies,
increasing
external debt,
and decreasing
state
participation
• Privatization

Annual
% GDP
Growth36

1988: 5.9
1989: 1.0
1990: 3.7
1991: 4.3
1992: 2.1

1992: 2.1
1993: 2.0
1994: 4.3
1995: 2.3
1996: 1.7

Energy / Oil
Occurrences

• Texaco exits
Ecuador
• CEPE becomes
Petroecuador

• Small
international oil
companies are
allowed
• State oil
monopoly
(Petroecuador)
not considered
ideal

GDP growth (annual %). (n.d.). The World Bank. Retrieved April 4, 2014, from
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/all?display=default
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August
10, 1996
–
February
6, 1997

Abdalá
Bucaram

February
6, 1997
–
February
9, 1997

Fabián
Alarcón
(Interim
President)

February
9, 1997
–
February
11, 1997

Rosalía
Arteaga
(Interim
President)

• Regional
demands
increase
• Pachacutick
movement
(Indigenous and
ethnic radical
left) appears
• Cenepa War with
Peru for
territorial
disputes
• Monetary
reforms
• Regime based
on nepotism,
corruption, and
Partido
intolerance
Roldosista
• Feb. 5, 1997
Ecuatoriano
national outrage
PRE –
from the
1996: 1.7
Ecuadorian
economic,
1997: 4.3
Roldosist Party
social, and
(Populist
political sectors
socialfrom different
democracy)
tendencies
• Bucaram is
demoted by
Congress for his
“incapacity to
govern”
Frente Radical
Alfarista –
• Interim
Alfarist
president
Radical Front
1997: 4.3
elected by the
(Liberal
Congress
Democratic
Centre)
• First women
Frente Radical
president in
Alfarista –
Ecuador’s
Alfarist
history
Radical Front
1997: 4.3
• Being
(Liberal
Ecuador’s ViceDemocratic
president,
Centre)
Arteaga self

-

-

-
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•

•

•

February
11, 1997
–
August
10, 1998

Fabián
Alarcón
(Interim
President

Frente Radical
Alfarista –
Alfarist
Radical Front
(Liberal
Democratic
Centre)

•
•

•

•
August
10, 1998
–
January
21, 2000

Jamil
Mahuad

Democracia
Popular DP Popular
Democracy
(Christian
democracy /
Centre-right)

•

•
•

proclaims
herself as
President
Congress meets
on Feb. 11 to
vote on
Alarcón’s
permanent role
as president
Not being
welcomed by
the Congress,
Arteaga
resigned
publicly outside
of the
Legislative
Palace
Alarcón is
reassigned the
interim
presidency with
the support of
Congress and
the military
Unemployment
is heightened
“El Niño”
current
adversely
affects coastal
region
Constitutional
reforms that
allow reelection
Privatization of
economy
Brasilia
Presidential Act,
peace treaty
with Peru
Uncontrolled
inflation
Banking crisis
resulting in
closing of 70%

1997: 4.3
1998: 3.3

• PetroEcuador
remains a
strong
monopoly
• Oil price
decreases,
worsening the
deficit

1998: 3.3
1999: -4.7
2000: 1.1

• Removal of
subsidies to
gas, diesel, and
electricity,
causing
economic and
political turmoil
• Plans to build
OCP
(Oleoducto de
Crudos Pesados
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•

•

•

•

January
22, 2000
–
January
14, 2003

Gustavo
Noboa

Democracia
Popular DP Popular
Democracy
(Christian
democracy /
Centre-right)

•

•

•

January
15, 2003
–
April 20,
2005

Lucio
Gutiérrez

Partido
Sociedad
Patriótica –
Patriotic
Society Party
(Populist
Centre Left)

of country’s
banking
institutions
Social and
indigenous
discontent
Continuous
devaluation of
sucre
On Jan. 21,
2000, Mahuad
is forced to
resign in
military revolt
directed by Col.
Lucio Gutiérrez
Economic
policy from
Mahuad is
continued
Dollarization of
economy at very
high exchange
rates
Migration to
European
countries,
especially
Spain, peaks
Privatization is
pushed forward

• Austerity
measures in
food and
electricity
implemented
• Previous
economic issues
remained
• Free Trade Area
of the Americas
Debate
• Dissolution of
the Supreme
Court, alleging

/ Heavy crude
oil pipeline)

2000: 1.1
2001: 4.0
2002: 4.1
2003: 2.7

• OCP
construction
begins

2003: 2.7
2004: 8.2
2005: 5.3

• Conflict with
Occidental
Petroleum
Company
(OXY) begins
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•

•

•

April 20,
2005
–
January
15, 2007

Alfredo
Palacio

No political
party
affiliation
(Centre Left)

•

•

•

•

•

January
15, 2007
–
Present

Rafael
Correa

Alianza PAIS
– PAIS
Alliance
(Socialism)

•

•
•

bias
On April 15,
2005 protests
against
government
began in Quito,
leaving it in
State of
Emergency
Gutiérrez flees
Ecuador,
leaving it in
chaos
Congress
appointed
Palacio to serve
as president
Proposal to
amend 1998
Constitution
Negotiations
with USA to
sign free trade
agreement
Ecuador rejects
participation in
Plan Colombia
Longest lasting
Head of State in
last years
Increased
participation of
state and more
regulation
New
Constitution is
developed and
approved by
popular
consultation
Separation from
IMF policies
Increased
percentage of
GDP dedicated
to education

2005: 5.3
2006: 4.4
2007: 2.2

• FEIREP oil
fund is replaced
by a special
account in the
government
budget named
CEREPS
• OXY expelled
from Ecuador
• New legislation
for distribution
of profits in oil
contracts

2007: 2.2
2008: 6.4
2009: 0.6
2010: 3.0
2011: 7.8
2012: 5.1
2013:N/A
2014:N/A

• In 2009,
energetic crisis
pushes for
rationing
• In 2010, new
Law of
Hydrocarbons
approved,
implying the
renegotiation of
oil contracts,
causing many
companies to
exit Ecuador
• Great support
for
PetroEcuador
• Yasuní ITT
Project
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• Renegotiation
of external debt
• Free trade
agreement with
USA rejected
• New Law of
Communication
, new Criminal
code that spark
discontent
among citizens
and attention
from
international
organizations
• Increased
relationship
with countries
with leftist
governments

• Construction of
Refinería del
Pacífico “Eloy
Alfaro” begins

The	
  behavior	
  of	
  crude	
  oil	
  prices	
  
Oil prices fluctuate according to the market’s supply and demand. OPEC sets up
country production quotas in order to maintain or alter the global price levels. In the past,
increased surplus has been responsible for the drop in oil prices. The quality of crude oil
is assessed based on the density and sulfuric content. Petroleum analysts use the API
(American Petroleum Institute) gravity, an inverse measure of the density of the crude oil
compared to the density of water, to compare the densities of different types of oil. In this
sense, crude oil is classified in four groups:
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Figure	
  4.2	
  API	
  Gravity	
  

Source:
RIGZONE - What is Heavy Oil and How is it Formed?. (n.d.). RIGZONE. Retrieved March 18, 2014, from
http://www.rigzone.com/training/heavyoil/insight.asp?insight_id=184&c_id=14

Ecuador has two types of oil. Oriente crude oil, considered medium, with a 24.1°
API gravity, and Napo crude oil, considered heavy, with a 19° API gravity. In my
interview with Economist García, he revealed that, in Ecuador, the price for a barrel of
crude oil is calculated based on the following formula:
	
  
𝐸𝐶  𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒  𝑂𝑖𝑙  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔   𝑁𝑎𝑝𝑜  𝑜𝑟  𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒
=   𝑊𝑇𝐼  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒   ± 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
Where:
•

West Texas Intermediate (WTI) is a type of light crude oil used for benchmark
pricing. It has low density and low sulfuric content with 39.6° API gravity. WTI
varies daily according to market forces.

•

Differential calculated monthly based on the assessments of Argus and Platts, “ a
global provider of energy, petrochemicals, metals and agriculture information,
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and a premier source of benchmark price assessments for those commodity
markets.” 37 To calculate the Ecuadorian differential, the previous month’s
assessment is used. García argued that assessments should not be used, because it
doesn’t match the market; instead, the differentials should be based on bidding.
•

Premium that varies according to the API gravity of the oil type. Currently, the
premiums are around USD 0.50 – 0.70.
Figure	
  4.3	
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Note: Elaborated by the author based on information on Appendix 338

Figure 4.2 demonstrates how oil prices have been on the rise during the last
twenty-three years. WTI prices are higher for the most of the years, because it is a lighter
crude oil, which is only used as a benchmark for Ecuadorian oil. Oriente crude oil starts

37

About Platts. (n.d.). Energy Products & Services, Oil, Coal Insight, Natural Gas Shipping, Electric
Power Methodology Analysis, Metals, Petrochemical. Retrieved March 18, 2014, from
http://www.platts.com/about
38
Data for the price of Napo Crude Oil before 2005 was not found
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with a price of USD 20.20 in 1990 compared to USD 24.53 for WTI. However, in 2013,
Napo crude oil barrel was at USD 92.91, Oriente at USD 97.36, and WTI at USD 97.98.
In my interview with Dr. Santos Alvite, he explained that, over the years, the gap
between the WTI and Ecuadorian oil prices has become smaller because of the
improvement in technology, “refineries have adapted to be able to process heavier crude
oil, which is why heavy crude oil is performing well in the market.”39 From 1996 to
1998, the price dropped because OPEC increased the output quotas, underestimating the
impact of the Asian Financial Crisis. As the graph reveals, oil prices went on a downward
spiral reaching USD 14.42 for WTI and USD 9.20 for Oriente oil. OPEC cut back the
production quotas in 1998, but the recovery did not happen until 1999. Regardless of the
global economic recession that began in 2008, oil prices peaked at USD 99.67 (WTI),
USD 85.39 (Oriente), and USD 80.79 (Napo). However, the price bubble burst in 2009
and prices dropped sharply to USD 61.95 (WTI), USD 54.22 (Oriente), and USD 49.95
(Napo). In the last years starting in 2008, prices have continued to increase which has
been beneficial for the Ecuadorian economy, as the government’s budget has increased
considerably. In those years, under the socialist regime of Correa, business deals and
contracts have changed in nature, which will be discussed further in the next sections.
Prices are volatile depending on the conditions of the market, especially because oil is a
commodity.
	
  

39

Personal interview with Santos Alvite (2014)
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The	
  Instability	
  Wave	
  (1990	
  –	
  2007)	
  
Rodrigo	
  Borja	
  (August	
  10,	
  1988	
  –	
  August	
  10,	
  1992)	
  
Borja, being the candidate from the Democratic Left (Izquierda Democrática),
was supposed to have a socialist political ideology. However, his regime constantly
shifted and used policies typically associated with the right. When Borja came to office,
Ecuador had problems left by the previous head of state. Borja applied macroeconomic
policies that would solve issues in the short run, coupled with liberalization policies.
Economist Acosta (2006) argues that monetary and exchange rate policies were essential
tools used to return the economy to equilibrium due to their flexibility and promptness in
results.
Ecuador had increased government revenues due to the increase in oil prices
because of the Persian Gulf War. In 1990, the government did not renew the Texaco-Gulf
(the company that had first exploited oil in the country) contract. CEPE (Corporación
Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana), the state owned company, was transformed into
Petroecuador. The company became a state monopoly and took charge of managing the
operations of the SOTE (Sistema de Oleoducto Transecuatoriano), the Trans-Ecuadorian
oil pipeline network that Texaco-Gulf built in 1972. During my interview, Dr. Santos
Alvite mentioned that the shift in the management of the pipeline network brought
inefficiency and syndicalist abuse. Collective contracts by the labor unions pushed for
higher wages, but not increased productivity, adversely affecting the Ecuador’s booming
oil industry.
The government focused too much of its attention on the macroeconomic
equilibrium, neglecting social and economic development. Even when the country had
USD 200 million from oil, Borja was not able achieve great economic growth. “The
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levels of poverty, homelessness, malnutrition, and unemployment deteriorated even
further. […] The focalization of social services to take care of the needy became part of
the neoliberal strategy.”40 The World Bank’s prescribed adjustment policies, were costly,
but regarded as inevitable.
Borja attempted to handle Ecuador’s eternal problem: the external debt. The
president had the best intentions and wanted to renegotiate the debt. In 1990, US
President Bush launched “The Initiative for the Americas”, which Borja and the
dominant sectors of the economy supported and promoted. However, debt was not
renegotiated. In general, Borja’s regime was plagued by intricate, but incomplete
adjustments (Acosta, 2006).
Sixto	
  Durán	
  Ballén	
  (August	
  10,	
  1992	
  –	
  August	
  10,	
  1996)	
  
Born in Boston (MA), Durán Ballén ran a conservative government. Acosta
qualifies his economic management as a quasi-orthodox stabilization scheme. The policy
aimed to attract foreign capital by restraining the exchange rate that allows flexible
interest rates. By 1994, the inflationary rate had decreased by 25%. The end of 1994
followed the fixed exchange rate followed by consecutive controlled devaluations of the
sucre, which continued until 1999. Durán Ballén began the “modernization of the state”.
The purpose was to change the role that the state played in the economy. The president
was a huge defender of privatization strategic areas of the economy.
Having originally joined OPEC in 1973, under Durán Ballén’s government,
Ecuador filled a petition to leave the organization voluntarily in 1992. In January of 1993,
the country officially left the oil cartel. Experts interviewed for this thesis gave different
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theories for Ecuador leaving the country, but most of them agree that it was due to
political inclinations. In my interviews, Dr. Santos Alvite, former Minister of Energy and
Mines, and Economist García believe that Durán Ballén’s rightist-privatizing ideology
was not compatible with OPEC’s Arab countries. The expert believes that Ecuador’s
decision to leave OPEC was asserted because “the country produced relatively small
quantities of barrels per day in comparison to big oil nations such as Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, or Venezuela.”41 During my personal interview with Segundo Rodríguez, who
worked in Petroecuador for several years, he agreed that being marginal producers, there
were more disadvantages with Ecuador staying in the oil cartel. Economist Pablo Lucio
Paredes, who actually worked for the government during Durán Ballén’s office, argues
the reasons were pragmatic. Paredes talked about two reasons for Ecuador’ exit. The first
is that Ecuador couldn’t keep up with the maintenance costs associated to OPEC, which
Eco. García said was simply an excuse from the government during the personal
interview. The second is that there was no direct benefit from the country’s presence in
the organization, because there were moments in which the cartel wanted to cut back
production in order to increase prices, something that was hard to do in Ecuador, given
that it could benefit from higher market oil prices even without the OPEC membership.
Dr. Esteban Santos agreed with the latter. All things considered, the experts agree that
Ecuador left OPEC mainly due to political reasons and because Ecuador’s membership
had more disadvantages and costs that actual tangible benefits.
Durán Ballén’s conservative government was characterized by a series of
adjustments. One of the most painful episodes was the increase in the price of petroleumbased fuels in January 1994. Ecuador’s “extra” gasoline (81 – 87 octanes) increased its
41
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price by 71%. The president used the increase in energy prices as a way of collecting
money fast for the payment of the debt. The latter was one of the IMF’s conditions to
approve a loan. The government released a letter of intent to “modernize” the sate
through the privatization of the electric, communications, and hydrocarbons industries, as
well as the reform of the social security system, the labor laws and the labor market.
Petroecuador, for instance, had just been formed in the last presidency as the big stateowned oil monopoly, which didn’t go with the president’s privatizing ideology just like
the OPEC membership. Durán Ballén didn’t agree with the idea of having such an
important area of the economy bestowed in the state. As part of the modernization,
between 1993 and 1994, he began to dismantle the monopoly by allowing international
bidding from small private oil companies. Nevertheless, Petroecuador remained
powerful. “The idea of privatizing Petroecuador existed; Sixto Durán would have done it,
but he became afraid because oil was very important.” 42 Under this regime,
Petroecuador’s privatization never occurred.
Durán Ballén was able to renegotiate the debt using the US’s Brady Plan, which
aimed to transform the loans to foreign countries into different bonds. Yet, even with a
renegotiated external debt, the Ecuadorian economic conditions were difficult at the time
and the efforts to fulfill the new demands of the foreign banks were not recognized. For
this reason, after five years, the renegotiation was proved to be ineffective.
The economic issues were aggravated by the Cenepa war from 1995, following a
territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru. The war cost USD 360 million and the
losses double the cost of the war (Acosta, 2006). On the other hand, vice-president
Dahik’s getaway due to his white-collar crime of improper handling of expenses also
42
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adversely impacted the economy. As Acosta puts it, Durán Ballén’s economic policies
were a “chronicle of a crisis foretold”, stimulating speculative financial investments, but
not production.
Abdalá	
  Bucaram	
  (August	
  10,	
  1996	
  –	
  February	
  6,	
  1997)	
  
Bucaram is an interesting personality in Ecuador’s history. He nicknamed himself
“el Loco”, the crazy one, for his eccentric leadership and lifestyle. Bucaram government
was characterized for extreme liberalization, high levels of corruption, and a neoliberal
economic policy. In his short period in office, Bucaram attempted to dismantle the state
by privatizing the state-owned firms. Even when his government was promoted as
populist, during this period the dominant classes were clearly favored. Acosta stated that
Roberto Isaías, owner of Filanbanco (the largest bank of Ecuador that later will go
bankrupt), was the president’s adviser, and the richest man of the country, Alvaro Noboa,
was the president of the Currency Board. During my interview, Dr. Santos Alvite thinks
Bucaram was confused at having powerful men from the private sector occupying high
executive posts, given that the president had a socialist / populist inclination.
During this political regime was one of the most important price reforms. The
adjustment increased the tariffs on public services, completely eliminated the subsidy on
natural gas for domestic use, implemented collection of fees for public hospitals’
services, and energy prices continued to peak. Petroleum based fuels, such as gasoline
and diesel, continued to escalate like during the last government. The oil industry
continued to grow strong, and despite Bucaram’s efforts to privatize state companies,
Petroecuador remained untouched.
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The president tried to remove the strict adjustments when he saw his government
faltering, but it was rather late. On February 5th, 1997, a National Civic Strike began as
the Ecuadorian people filled the streets of the different cities to express their rejection of
Bucaram’s political regime. That night, the head of state escaped to Panama, where he
remains in political asylum. On February 6th, Ecuador’s National Congress declared
Bucaram as “mentally unfit to rule”.
Rosalía	
  Arteaga	
  (February	
  9,	
  1997	
  –	
  February	
  11,	
  1997)	
  
Arteaga was the vice-president during Bucaram’s regime. Her relationship with
the president had worsened over time and she was relegated to insignificant posts.
Bucaram’s distancing, prepotency, abuse, and “machismo” humiliated Arteaga. In the
same resolution where Congress declared Bucaram’s mental problem, Fabián Alarcón
was declared “interim president” alleging a constitutional void that impeded Arteaga’s
rise to power. Nevertheless, Arteaga believed that according to the Constitution, she had
to assume the presidency. She became the first woman president in Ecuador’s history on
the night of February 6, when Arteaga signed a decree self-proclaiming president. At the
same time, Bucaram claimed his dismissal was unconstitutional and the National
Congress appointed Alarcón. This event is known as “the night of the three presidents”.
February 7th dawned with three different people claiming the title of head of state.
(Acosta, 2006)
After a discussion between Alarcón and Arteaga, on February 9th, they agreed that
she would assume the presidency until Congress solved the constitutional void. On
February 11th, Congress met and voted Alarcón as “interim” president, a title that didn’t
exist in the country’s constitution at that moment. Arteaga tried to protest, but without
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the support of a strong political party, her lack of experience in politics, and a corrupt
“machista” power, she wasn’t received. Angered at the situation, she wrote a manifesto
that she read outside the Presidential mansion, quitting her presidency. She continued,
however, to serve as vice-president for Alarcón’s government.
Fabián	
  Alarcón	
  (February	
  6,	
  1997	
  –	
  February	
  9,	
  1997	
  &	
  February	
  11,	
  1997	
  –	
  August	
  10,	
  
1998)	
  
After being appointed president by the National Congress, Alarcón was left with a
country with economic issues. The fiscal deficit was one of the biggest issued he had to
face. Alarcón continued the leadership on the neoliberal process. However, his action was
not what the Ecuadorian people were expecting. His government was plagued with
corruption and he became famous for having made dishonest deals. Even before he left
office, Alarcón tried to manipulate the National Constituent Assembly. The constitution
was reformed in order to allow the reelection of Heads of State.
Attempting to please the IMF, Alarcón attempted to apply conservative
adjustments, which only ended in the increase of the internal and external debt. During
this period of time, the Asian economic crisis took place, while “El Niño” was hitting the
coasts of Ecuador. As discussed earlier, the price for the barrel of crude oil decreased,
and unemployment rose. Alarcón revised the profit margins of the fuel-commercializing
firm. Problems during this regime sharpened, leaving the economy in trouble for the next
president.
Jamil	
  Mahuad	
  (August	
  10,	
  1998	
  -‐	
  January	
  21,	
  2000)	
  
Mahuad’s regime was characterized by a financial crisis that had been
foreshadowed since 1992. This president focused on solving the old dispute with Peru,
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which culminated with the signing of the Brasilia Presidential Act, a peace treaty.
Mahuad had a center-right ideology and preferred the interests of the dominant groups of
society. Acosta presents Mahuad’s preference for the private sector with a banking
example. “While for Filanbanco’s bailout, which belonged to one family, USD 416
million were given without collateral, for the rehabilitation of Banco de Fomento, in
charge of agricultural credits, only USD 20 million were destined and asking for a whole
bundle of guarantees.”43
For the oil industry, the president first proposed the construction of the Oleoducto
de Crudos Pesados (OCP / heavy crude oil pipeline) by and for the use of the private
sector. “Petroecuador didn’t want this to happen, the company wanted the state to build
the pipeline.”44 With this decision, the president sought an increased participation of the
private sector in the Ecuadorian oil industry, in conjunction to the state monopoly.
As an economic policy, the head of state removed the income tax and
implemented a 1% tax on the movement of capital. At this time, there was great
speculation about what will happen with the adoption of this policy. The economy
reached a critical point when people and companies began to buy dollars, legally and in
the black market, and sent them abroad. The new tax laws imposed a burden on the
middle class, while benefitting the higher classes and the big companies. Mahuad
increased the prices of petroleum-based fuels, the electric and phone tariffs, and the
added value tax from 10% to 12%.
Ecuador’s banking crisis began on March 8th 1999 with a banking holiday that
lasted seven days. On the 15th, bank deposits, savings accounts, checking accounts, and
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certificates of deposit, both in dollars and sucres, were frozen. According to an IMF
Working Paper by Luis Jácome45, Ecuador entered a recession where the economic
activity decreased by 8%, unemployment levels rose and the country suffered from
hyperinflation. Attempting to solve the economic crisis, a floating exchange rate was
adopted. The Central Bank of Ecuador kept printing money, but the sucre devaluated
almost 195%. A private consulting firm was hired to assess the situation, since the
Superintendence of Banks was said to have conflict of interest with the big banks. The
banking crisis caused 70% of the banks to close.
The collection of events caused turmoil and protests, including the indigenous
populations, which jeopardized the stability of Mahuad’s government. In an attempt to
gain back the trust of the people, the president worked with the leftist-socialist sectors of
society, re-implementing the income tax, decreasing petroleum-based fuels’ price, and
establishing stricter sanctions for tax evasion. In August 1999, with the support of the
IMF and the US Department of Treasury, Mahuad defaulted on the external debt. Acosta
criticized that the latter event together with a vote against Cuba, and the authorization for
the establishment of a US military base Manta (coastal city in Manabí) helped Mahuad
please the IMF and cemented relationships with the USA. By the same token, as a last
resort, Mahuad announced on January 9th 2000, the adoption of the US dollar to replace
the sucre at an exchange rate of 25,000 sucres for USD 1. This was a terrible decision,
given that at the beginning of his regime the exchange rate was 5,500 sucres for a dollar.
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On January 21st 2000, protesters filled the streets. The military led by Col. Lucio
Gutierrez, with the support of the indigenous confederation CONAIE (Confederación de
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador), executed Ecuador’s first coup d’état in its
democratic era. The morning of January 22, realizing that the military junta was unable to
govern, Mahuad’s vice-president took power.
Gustavo	
  Noboa	
  (January	
  22,	
  2000	
  –	
  January	
  14,	
  2003)	
  
Being Mahuad’s vice-president, the Congress promoted Noboa to Head of State,
after the military junta led by Gutiérrez drove out Mahuad. The first move of the
president was to ratify Ecuador’s dollarization, wiping of the traces of the sucre, which
had been the national currency for approximately 115 years. Noboa’s management shared
Mahuad’s rightist views and implemented adjustments to speed up the adaptation to the
dollar. The privatization of the public firms was pushed even forward and a revision of
the social security system started, both supported by the IMF. In the end, the World
Bank, the IMF, and the Washington Consensus in general supported Ecuador’s
improvised dollarization as a structural adjustment. The IMF demanded the overcoming
of the bilateral and commercial external debt moratorium, and the increase in the prices
of oil derivatives. The World Bank also issued a series of recommendations for the
country, which, overall, supported those from the IMF.
Following the dollarization, Noboa pushed for a renegotiation of the external
debt. Nevertheless, Ecuador’s economic paying conditions were not taken into account.
“There were no contingency clauses for a decrease in GDP, or the increase of the interest
rates in the world market, or a decrease in global oil prices, or another “El Niño”
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storm.”46 On the other hand, as a consequence of the crisis caused by the dollarization,
migration to European countries, especially Spain, increased. The latter phenomenon
continued throughout the years and it was typical for low-income families to try to
migrate illegally with the help of smugglers.
The bank crisis problem continued. Noboa was not able to recover the money that
Mahuad used for bailouts. The non-performing loans from the nationalized banks were
not collected. Filanbanco, which initially received USD 414 million during Mahuad’s
regime in 1998, ended up receiving a total of USD 1,400 million when it was
nationalized. Noboa issued an extra USD 300 million in government bonds to save the
bank, but the bank had to close. Filanbanco’s operations were a total failure, since it had
gone bankrupt twice under, both, private and public ownership. During Noboa’s
government, the free market speech was popular, but in reality, there were many
contradictory economic policies, such as the nationalization of banks.
Noboa is famous for an economic reform named “Ley Trole 1”, a fundamental
law for the economic transformation of Ecuador. The law ratified the official
dollarization, eased labor market, privatized the telecommunications and electricity
industries, and authorized a private firm to build and manage OCP, the new pipeline that
Mahuad had initially proposed. Petroecuador was not content about the decision of
leaving such an important project for the industry in the hands of a private firm. In my
interview with former Petroecuador employee, Rodriguez commented, “Although the
project is profitable, the pipeline has too much capacity, and until now only about 50% of
it is used.” OCP, starting operations on November 14th 2003, allowed the private sector to
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grow “from 77.9 million barrels in 2003 to 120.3 million in 2004.”47 Even with the
underutilization, the new pipeline was beneficial to the Ecuadorian economy.
Lucio	
  Gutiérrez	
  (January	
  15,	
  2003	
  –	
  April	
  20,	
  2005)	
  
Gutiérrez, a former military colonel who led Mahuad’s coup d’état, became the
president because Ecuador’s people sought desperately for a change. When the president
first rose to power, he promised to govern for all Ecuadorians. If sharing and caring for
the poor, and fighting corruption, social injustices and impunity were leftist, then he was
leftist; but if generating profit and promoting production was rightist, then he was
rightist. 48 However, his government was one of the most corrupt and immoral in
Ecuador’s history, including rumors about drug trafficking funding his political
campaign. Many accused his regime of being a dictatorship. Gutiérrez did not keep the
promises made during the political campaign and increased oil prices. People turned to
the streets to reject the anti-populist measures. Seeking the support of the military, the
head of state put key people in the military as Ministers and other positions in the public
sectors, including Petroecuador.
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Figure	
  4.4	
  Oil	
  blocks	
  operated	
  by	
  oil	
  companies	
  in	
  Ecuador,	
  2003	
  

Source:
Sebastian, M. S., & Hurtig, A. (2004). Oil exploitation in the Amazon basin of Ecuador: a public health
emergency. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S1020-49892004000300014&script=sci_arttext

Up to this point, ever since Durán Ballén opened international bidding for private
international oil companies, many big firms had concessions for the development of oil
blocks in the eastern side of the country (Amazon region). Figure 4.4 shows the
distribution of oil blocks among different private companies in 2003 when Gutiérrez
assumed power. The companies include Perenco (UK-France), Agip (Italy),
OXY/Occidental (USA), Repsol-YPF (Spain-Argentina), and Vintage Petroleum (USA).
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Gutiérrez actually began analyzing the creation of a free-trade agreement with the USA.
However, Petroecuador owned and managed the block concessions, remaining solid and
strong. In 2004, trying to act nationalist, Gutiérrez decided the invalidity of OXY’s
contract (Block 15), which resulted in a lawsuit with the company. The court settled in
favor of OXY, demanding Ecuador to pay USD 75 million for damages in July 2004.
Ecuador did not want to pay because it disagreed. It was until 2007, when the
government gave up on the case and had to pay the amount settled in 2004 plus interest,
which totaled, approximately, USD 153 million.49
The difficulties continued under this regime. Public opinion believed that
Bucaram, from Panama, was actually governing the country through Gutiérrez. The latter
proved to be true to a certain extent, given that the president was processing Bucaram’s
absolution and return to the country. In the midst of social, political, and judicial
uncertainty, the municipalities of Ecuador’s main cities (Cuenca, Guayaquil, and Quito)
called the people to protest the dictatorial decisions of the president. Gutiérrez retaliated
with an “anti-protest” where he actually paid people to participate and act as if they
supported him. The president had such a problem with the public opinion that he tried to
pass the “Ley Orgánica de Telecomunicaciones” (Organic Law of Telecommunications)
that gave him absolute control over telecommunications.
In 2005, the people became tired of the government’s different controversies and
issues, especially the people in the capital, Quito, which led to the “Rebelión de los
Forajidos” (Rebellion of the Outlaws) from April 13th until the 15th. The “forajidos”, as
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Gutiérrez called them, was Quito’s middle class in a series of street protests with pots and
pans asking for the president to leave. On April 15th, through the Executive Decree
#2752, Gutiérrez declared the National State of Emergency. The decree dissolved the
Supreme Court, and suspended some basic Civil Rights for the citizens: “the freedoms of
opinion and speech, the inviolability of households, the right to travel freely throughout
the Ecuadorian territory, and the freedom of congregating.”50 The president later realized
the Decree was absurd and removed it. However, the protests didn’t cease in the
following days and even the Military retired their support. Finally, on April 20th, the head
of state trapped in the Presidential Mansion surrounded by forajidos, escaped in a
helicopter from the army. Congress quickly met to remove the president from office for
dereliction. Gutiérrez sought asylum in the Brazilian embassy until he obtained the safeconduct to leave the country.
Alfredo	
  Palacio	
  (April	
  20,	
  2005	
  –	
  January	
  15,	
  2007)	
  
Being the vice-president during Gutiérrez’s regime, Palacio took charge of the
presidency after the chaotic event. Originally a medical doctor, Palacio had been the
director of IESS (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social – Ecuadorian Social Security
Institute) and Minister of Health during Durán Ballén’s government. As vice-president,
he faced budgetary breaches in the areas under his control (Science, Technology, and
Universal Health Insurance). Even though Rafael Correa, the vice-president’s adviser,
had created a mechanism to use part of FEIREP (Fondo de Estabilización e Inversión de
los Recursos Petroleros - Stabilization and Investment Petroleum Resources Fund) for
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Palacio’s areas, the executive argued that these oil funds were primarily destined to pay
the external debt.
As president, Palacio announced the end of the dictatorship. His promises
included improving the country’s situation respecting the separation of powers, to
analyze the free trade agreement with the USA, to revise the Supreme Court situation,
and to stop the oil concessions. However, the country desired that all of the legislators
leave Congress and, once again, took it to the streets on May 2005. Palacio attempted to
apply political reforms with different mechanisms that allowed him to know the opinion
of the citizens. He asked the TSE (Tribunal Supremo Electoral – Supreme Electoral
Tribunal) to call for a national vote for the creation of Constituent Assembly, to reform
the existing constitution, but Congress did not allow this petition.
Finishing what Gutiérrez had begun, Palacio terminated OXY’s operating contract
in May 2006, transferring the operations of Block 15 to Petroamazonas, which was
actually a branch of Petroecuador. The reason behind the entire feud was that OXY had
sold a part of the oil field to Canada’s Alberta Energy Corp. without having the
appropriate authorization. Critics argue though “Palacio was under pressure from
indigenous groups to expel the company for allegedly exploiting natural resources with
no benefit for poor local communities in the Amazon region.”51 Dr. Santos Alvite reveals
that this event planted an anti-MNC sentiment in society. Even though relationships with
the USA suffered with the exit of OXY, Palacio continued the negotiations for the Free
Trade Agreement setting sovereignty standards.
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Former vice-president adviser, Rafael Correa, was promoted to Minister of
Finance. Correa eliminated the FEIREP oil fund because he though it was a mechanism
that favored the interests of those who held public debt government bonds. The fund was
transformed into a special account in the government’s budget called CEREPS (Cuenta
de Reactivación Productiva y Social – Productive and Social Reactivation Account).
Correa also created FEISEH (Fondo Ecuatoriano de Inversión en los Sectores Energético
e Hidrocarburífero – Ecuadorian Fund for the Investment in Energy and Hydrocarbons
Sectors) aiming to strengthen the energy and oil industries. Correa was very skeptical of
the free trade agreement. He rejected the advice from the IMF and increased
collaboration with other Latin American countries, especially with Venezuela. He issued
government bonds at lower interest rates, of which Venezuela bought almost half. Correa
resigned after the World Bank withheld a loan accusing the country from making
changers in the FEP (Fondo de Estabilización Petrolera – Oil Income Stabilization Fund).
His resign reduced the credibility of the Palacio’s government.
After Correa left, the president started discussions on reforming the Law of
Hydrocarbons, since the state was only keeping 20% of the profits. On May 2006,
Palacio’s passed Law # 42, which established that at least 50% of the profits from oil,
which was selling at extraordinary high prices, would have to be paid to Petroecuador.
	
  
The	
  End	
  of	
  the	
  Instability	
  Era	
  
The period of seventeen years had many important changes. The country’s
political ideology, which started as rightist and conservative with Borja and Durán
Ballén, began to slowly shift to the left with socialist undertones, especially during the
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last government. Political instability was definitely a characteristic of this period with
Bucaram’s incapability to govern, Arteaga and Alarcón’s dispute of the presidency,
Mahuad’s coup d’état, and Gutiérrez’s escape. Ecuador faced an economic crisis, where
policies kept changing as presidents came and went. The country indeed needed a
change. Luckily, the price for the barrel of oil kept increasing with time. By the end of
the period in 2007, the barrel of oil had gone up to USD 57.01 (Napo) and USD 61.84
(Oriente). High oil prices benefited the country as it could remain profitable and provided
constant sources of revenue. By the same token, the period began with a positive attitude
towards private international companies for the development of oil fields, but with
Palacio’s revision of the Law of Hydrocarbons and OXY’s forced exit, the attitude
towards foreign oil companies had reversed. Political instability ended when Rafael
Correa marked the beginning of a new era: La Revolución Ciudadana (The Citizen’s
Revolution).
La	
  Revolución	
  Ciudadana:	
  Rafael	
  Correa	
  (January	
  15,	
  2007	
  –)	
  
Correa first became involved in politics during Palacio’s regime, first as adviser
and then as Minister of Finance. The president obtained his Bachelors degree in
Economics while in Ecuador, but continued to pursue a Masters degree in Belgium, and a
second Masters and PhD in Economics at the University of Illinois in UrbanaChampaign. Correa soon started an intense and heavily planned political campaign
promising revolutionary change, targeting the popular sectors and the indigenous people.
Finally, on November 26th 2006, he won the second electoral round with 56.4% of the
votes. Since this date, Correa has already served three presidential terms and will remain
to be Ecuador’s head of state until 2007.
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First	
  Presidential	
  Term	
  (2007	
  –	
  2009)	
  
Correa promised to end corruption in politics and to continue implementing
socialism emphasizing the fight for social justice under his political motto “Hasta la
victoria siempre” (Until the victory always). Having a radical and revolutionary ideology,
Correa didn’t agree with the Washington Consensus’s adjustments and announced that he
would not allow the IMF to dictate Ecuador’s economic policy. Correa constantly
criticizes the neoliberal policies of previous governments. In this sense, the head of state
believes Ecuador’s dollarization was a big mistake because it took away the country’s
ability to use monetary policy as a macroeconomic tool. The president has taken some
very different approaches in terms of foreign relations. Ecuador distanced itself from the
USA by not signing the free trade agreement and not renewing the lease for the USA’s
military base in Manta. The country also distanced itself from Colombia as well due to
political disagreements over how to fight FARC, a terrorist group from that country. On
the other hand, Correa admired Hugo Chávez, who was then the president of Venezuela.
As promised in the political campaign, Correa pushed for a Constituent Assembly, which
congress approved on February 2007. By April 15th of that year, Ecuadorians voted in
favor of forming a Constituent Assembly. On September 30th, the country elected the
people that were going to compose the Assembly; Correa’s political party had 80 of the
130 available seats (61.5%). After eight months, a new constitution. Again, on September
28th 2008, Correa held a referendum where Ecuadorians ratified the pass the constitution.
Every Saturday morning until now from 10 AM until 1 PM, Correa delivers the “Enlace
Ciudadano” (Citizen’s Link), broadcasted in the majority of radio stations and TV
channels. In these broadcasts, he generally talks about new laws, the progress of his
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projects, but he also takes time to make fun of the opposition, calling them “pelucones”52.
Correa is also known for having constant conflict with print and broadcasted media. Even
though the country is under a democratic regime, the president has already revoked the
broadcasting rights of many radio stations. Two TV broadcasting companies that used to
belong to the Isaías family (previous owners of Filanbanco) were confiscated. National
and international groups have protested against the state’s actions with no success.
During this presidential term, the president also promoted the Yasuni-ITT Initiative,
aiming to maintain the crude oil reserves underground in exchange of monetary
retributions from other countries. Correa also began relationships with China for oil
exploitation purposes. The president’s management of the oil industry will be discussed
in detail later.
Second	
  Presidential	
  Term	
  (2009	
  –	
  2013)	
  
In 2009, after approving the new Constitution, the head of state called for
presidential elections. Not surprisingly, Correa was reelected, again with a great number
of legislators from Alianza PAIS (Correa’s political party) in the National Assembly. The
Citizens’ Revolution continued with a Socialism of the 21st century ideology. In this year,
Ecuador was hit by an energy crisis, which forced the country to experience energy
rationings. Months later, in January 2010, protests began against large-scale mining as
the indigenous people felt that Correa had abandoned them. The government stopped
them using force. In July of the same year, the head of state approved a reform in the Law
of Hydrocarbons that aimed at nationalizing oil production, which is further discussed in
the next sections. The control and regulation against the media continued. In 2007, the
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government only controlled one radio station, but by 2011, the government had four radio
stations, two newspapers, four magazines, and five TV channels. On May 7th 2011,
Correa called for another referendum; this was the eighth since he had been in power.
This time the vote was on a set of questions related to judiciary reform. In this year,
business deals with China kept increasing. The country had loaned Ecuador large sums of
money at preferential interests rates, in exchange of oil reserves.
September 30th 2010 is a very important date for this government; it is known as
“the day that democracy triumphed”. After the president passed a bill that ended giving
bonuses as part of promotions for the National Police, they went on strike, creating
national chaos. There are many theories about what actually happened that day. However,
the official verdict, meaning the one released by the government, is that Correa angered
at the occurrences, challenged the police to kill him and they held the president hostage.
After a violent encounter between the military and the police that resulted in a national
state of emergency, the military rescued the president and took him from the presidential
palace. In his victory speech, the president stated that a coup d’état had been attempted
but failed.
Third	
  Presidential	
  Term	
  (2013	
  –)	
  
Rafael Correa had already been in power for six years, when presidential elections
were held on February 2013. Once again, Correa triumphed and was reelected. This
regime is fairly new and only few policies have been implemented. The National
Assembly passed the Organic Law of Communications, which increased state regulation,
reduced freedom of speech, and prohibited monopoly structures in the media. The law
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was very controversial and caught the attention of the international eye. In terms of oil, in
July after evaluating the progress of the Yasuní-ITT initiative, Correa announced the
Initiative failed and the ITT fields would be exploited.
Correa’s	
  Oil	
  Politics	
  
	
  
OPEC	
  
One of the first things that the Correa did with the oil industry was to renegotiate
the reentry of Ecuador in OPEC. Venezuela’s president, Chávez, actually advised Correa
to rejoin the organization. Ecuador had originally abandoned the oil cartel under the
presidency of Durán Ballén who had a more conservative approach. The experts I
interviewed for the thesis agreed the reasons for the exit and the reentry were mostly
related to political ideology. In my interview with García, he argued, “Correa, being the
head of a leftist government, is trying to defend and nationalize the country’s natural
resources”. During my interview with Dr. Esteban Santos, he said that there is a benefit
associated to belonging to a big oil organization, Ecuador benefits from accessing a
system of international oil pricing, which opens the door to many other markets. Segundo
Rodriguez mentioned in his interview that OPEC is composed of countries that not only
produce oil, but also share a similar leftist ideology. In my interview, Economist Paredes
expressed his belief that Ecuador requested membership because of two main reasons: to
strengthen the South-South relationships and to gain political voice in the North-South
conflict, given that OPEC is the center for that conflict. Nevertheless, as Dr. Santos
Alvite commented, Ecuador’s participation in the oil organization remains minimal. By
the same token, Figure 4.3 shows that during the years that Ecuador was not part of the
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organization, that is 1992 to 2007, OPEC was unable to maintain high prices in the world
oil market. By contrast, when Ecuador rejoins the oil cartel, OPEC’s influence had
resulted in higher prices. In this sense, Ecuador also renewed its membership with OPEC
as a way to be supported by the oil magnates and be able to sustain higher prices on the
raw material. All things considered, the decision to return to OPEC was primarily
political.
	
  
Law	
  of	
  Hydrocarbons	
  Reform	
  
After Durán Ballén allowed international oil companies to exploit Ecuador’s oil in
1993, until 2010 most of the companies had “participation contracts”. Under these
contracts the state receives part of the oil produced and the private company stays with
the rest, the company pays the exploration, development and exploitation costs. The
state’s participation is decided on each contract, but Sergio Vélez revealed that originally,
the state kept only 20% of the revenues. However, as seen in Figure 4.3, oil prices
rocketed during 2005, and Palacio passed a reform that required for companies to pay
50% of the oil profits to Petroecuador. A nationalization of the oil industry had begun. In
July 2007, however, President Correa, not happy with the reform, through the Executive
Decree #662, mandate the state should keep 99% of the oil profits, but the percentage
was dropped to 70% on December of the same year. The international oil companies
were not pleased with the arrangement. By the same token, in 2008, in the new
Constitution, the state was declared the sole owner of the natural resources of the country,
including oil.

81

Later on, in July 2010, the Reforming Law to the Law of Hydrocarbons, which
aimed at increasing the state control of the industry, was passed and approved. The first
adjustment gave 120 days to the existing foreign oil companies to modify the
participation and service contracts to match the service contracts described on Article
1653 of the New Law of Hydrocarbons; else the contracts would end. On November 23rd,
when the allowance term finished, AGIP oil (Italy), ENAP-SIPEC (Chile), Andes
Petroleum (China), Petroriental (China), and Repsol-YPF (Spain-Argentina ratified the
service contracts until 2025 by accepting the reforms. However, Petrobras (Brazil),
Canada Grande (Canada), EDC: Energy Development Corporation (USA), and CNPC:
China National Petroleum Company (China) didn’t accept the new conditions and left the
country. Petroamazonas and Petroecuador absorbed their oil blocks. Figure 4.5 is a map
key (translated by the author) that explains the distribution of oil blocks as of August
2013; it accompanies the map on Figure 4.6:
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From the Law of Hydrocarbons updated to May 2013: “Contracts, where qualified, national or foreign
legal entities, aquire service obligations with the Secretariat of Hydrocarbons for the exploration and/or
hydrocarbon exploitation with their own financial resources, in areas designated for that; the companies
will invest capital and use the equipment, machinery and technology necessary for the performance of the
contracted services. If the company finds oil in the area assigned it is entitled to a fee for net barrel of oil
produced and delivered to the state. The fee, which is the net profit for the contractor, will be fixed in the
contract taking into account investment amortization, costs and epxesnas, and a reasonable profit according
to the risk aquired. From the oil production profits, the Ecuadorian state will keep 25% of the gross
revenues as margin sovereignty. From the remaining value , transportation and marketing costs incurred by
the State will be covered. Once these deductions are taken, the fee for services rendered will be covered.”
(Translated by the author)	
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Figure	
  4.5	
  Oil	
  blocks	
  distribution	
  in	
  Ecuador	
  Map,	
  August	
  2013	
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Figure	
  4.6	
  Oil	
  blocks	
  distribution	
  in	
  Ecuador	
  Map,	
  August	
  2013	
  

Note: Modified by the author based on Mapa de Bloques Petroleros del Ecuador. (n.d.). Secretaría de
Hidrocarburos. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from http://www.hidrocarburos.gob.ec/mapa-de-bloquespetroleros/

Figure 4.6 shows a map of how the oil blocks are distributed among different
companies. Under the new constitution, the state owns all of the oil blocks; however it
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also dominates the exploitation of the majority (1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 28, 31,
44, 48, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 78, 86) through Petroamazonas – EP (Empresa Pública –
Public Company), marked in the map with the lime green, light gray, and bright turquoise
colors. Private companies hold two blocks at the most, due to the changes in the Law of
Hydrocarbons. Nevertheless, all the oil blocks marked in orange (22, 29, 70, 71, 72, 73,
79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87) are still available for bidding, which means that they haven’t even
been explored yet. Also on the map, below blocks 16, 31, and 43 lays the Yasuní
National Park, the source of controversy for containing the ITT oil fields, which will be
covered in the next sections.
Furthermore, the state wanted to revalue Ecuador crude oil by controlling the
destiny of the exploited oil, so under the new law, the “Strategic Alliance” agreement
eliminated intermediary purchasers of oil. In this manner, crude oil is only sold to final
consumers, state-owned companies, and big refineries all over the world54.
The	
  Chevron	
  Case	
  
After 26 years in the country beginning in 1964, President Borja didn’t renovate
Texaco’s contract in 1990. Oil contracts have clauses indicating that once the concession
is finished the company is responsible for cleaning the land and making sure no
hazardous waste stays in the exploited area. In 1993, however, the indigenous people
living near Texaco’s former block sued the multinational in a Federal Court of the state
of New York for environmental damages during its past operations. The effects are not
only over the environment, but also over the health and culture of the inhabitants of the
54

Petroecuador EP (2010). El Petroleo en Ecuador. Archivo Petroecuador EP. (pp. 55) Retrieved March
22, 2014, from http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/archivo/001138.pdf
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area. Texaco, aiming to stop the judicial process, signed an exoneration agreement in
1998, cleaned up part of the damage caused, and asked for the case to be transferred to
Ecuadorian courts.
In 2001, Chevron bought Texaco and was forced to face the accusations, since the
case remained pending. As of 2003, the case remained open with no solution but now
under the Court of Justice from Sucumbíos (a province in Ecuador’s Amazon region);
Chevron argued that they had kept their part of the deal, but the Ecuadorian counterpart
blamed the company for covering up the pools contaminated with toxic wastes. The case
was in court for eight years. On 2011, after analyzing scientific reports and investigation,
the Sucumbíos Court ruled in favor of Ecuador’s Amazon, demanding a payment of USD
18 million for the damages caused. Chevron didn’t accept the sentence and took the case
to Ecuador’s Supreme Court, which only ratified the previous decision. So far, the state
had not intervened in the case. The multinational accused the Ecuadorian government of
manipulating the courts, and took the case to the permanent Court of Arbitration in The
Hague (Netherlands). This time, President Correa intervened by trying to catch
international attention with “The Dirty Hand of Chevron” campaign, where international
celebrities visit the affected areas and stick their hand in a contaminated pool to verify the
environmental damage. Pictures of the president and some other celebrities who have
participated can be found in Appendix 4. At the writing of this thesis, the conflict remains
open and Chevron still refuses to pay the sanction.
	
  
	
  
	
  
Business	
  with	
  China	
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Before Correa’s presidency, the government had been very welcoming to foreign
companies for the oil exploration and exploitation, especially American ones. Things
changed when Correa became president and decided to steer away from relationships
with the “Empire”, which is how he refers to the USA as did Chávez. American
companies slowly left Ecuador’s oil industry, but they were replaced with Oriental ones
from China. Since then, the one of the government’s priorities is to foster new and
effective exchange channels that allow bilateral trade55. Confirming the rising relations
with China, Correa commented, “In 2006, 75% of the Ecuadorian oil went to the USA in
exchange for nothing. Now, 50% of our oil is compromised to China, in exchange of
thousands of millions of dollars to finance the development of this country.”56
In Ecuador Made in China (2013), Villavicencio, a journalist and political activist,
criticized the current government’s deals with China and denounced a series of gray areas
in the contracts with China in the oil and hydroelectric industries. The author presents
different contracts, bills of landing, e-mails, and letters as evidence of the crooked deals
with China. Villavicencio, who is currently a refugee in the USA sentenced to prison
after being charged with espionage by the government, argued: “Under the Made in
China republic, the revolutionaries hire Chinese dollars at 7.25% interest, charge a 1%
interest, mortgage the oil, […] and assign the premiums randomly.” 57 The current
government “has forced the state owned Petroecuador to transfer to a semi state foreign
transnational (Petrochina), a USD 36,000 million business, in exchange of five loans of
55

Relaciones bilaterales Ecuador-China. (n.d.). Embajada del Ecuador en la República Popular de China.
Retrieved March 22, 2014, from http://www.ecuadorenchina.org.ec/ecuador-china
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publication.

87

USD 7,000 million each given by the Chinese Development Bank.”58 Correa replied that
the Chinese loans actually represent good deals because they are used to finance projects
with high profitability and denied that Ecuador’s oil is mortgaged to China. Chinese loans
are currently financing important projects including the Coca Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric
project and the construction of Refinería del Pacífico.
“All of the Hydrocarbon laws are violated with China, we ceded our power and
are tied,” commented Dr. Santos Alvite. On the one hand, both Rodríguez and
Villavicencio accuse the government of assigning the oil blocks to Chinese companies
randomly, without going through a bidding process where other foreign companies can
participate. The latter represents a huge loss for the Ecuadorian economy, since bidding
processes allow selecting the most profitable option, instead of just favoring the Chinese
just because of the preferential loans. On the other hand, the law forbidding selling the oil
to intermediaries is violated as well. Villavicencio presents different bills of landing
proving that since 2007 Oriente and Napo crude oil have been provided to Chevron and
other American refining companies through Petrochina. The company acts as a reseller of
Ecuadorian oil to other markets, violating Ecuador’s law of Hydrocarbons.
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Yasuní-‐ITT	
  Oilfields	
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Figure	
  4.7	
  Yasuní	
  National	
  Park	
  and	
  the	
  ITT	
  oilfields	
  Map	
  

Note: Modified by the author based on Guerra Forestal: Sangre por árboles. (2011, November 11).
Desinformación de las 9. Retrieved March 22, 2014, from
http://desinformaciondelas9.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/mapa_itt.jpg

Yasuní National Park is located in the northeastern part of Ecuador, 60% in the
province of Orellana and 40% in the province of Pastaza. The park is a tropical rain forest
surrounded by different rivers, ponds, and swamps. Figure 4.7 highlights the location of
the National Park in the country. In 1989, UNESCO declared the area World Biosphere
Reserve because its 982000 hectares harbor exceptional biodiversity. It houses “165
different species of mammals, 150 of amphibians, 121 of reptiles, 80 of bats, 593 of
birds, 2274 of trees and shrubs, and 280 of lianas. It also has 20% of the world’s birds’
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species, 80% of the orchids, and 40% of the mammals from the Amazon region. […] In a
single hectare of Yasuní 665 species of trees are present, that is more than those in the
USA and Canada altogether.” 59 Enriching the park with culture, three indigenous
ethnicities live in the area: kichwa, shuar and huaorani. (See Appendix 5 for pictures of
the National Park) Besides housing such biodiversity, the park also contains the IshpingoTambococha-Tiputini (ITT) oilfields as shown on the right bottom corner of Figure 4.5.
Inside the park, Petroriental and Repsol-YPF are already exploiting blocks 14 and
16 respectively. Petroamazonas’s block 31 lies in the ITT border; 80% of the block is in
the park; but the three existing oil fields are outside the park. Before the change in the
Law of Hydrocarbons, Petrobras managed block 31, since it is not part of the intangible
area. Even though no companies were authorized to enter the area, three oilfields have
been explored since the 1980s, which has allowed determining the Park’s reserves are
approximately 850 million barrels (20% of Ecuador’s total reserves). Exploiting the ITT
oil would be result in about 107,000 barrels per day for 13 years, with a declining
production in the next 12 years. ITT’s crude oil has bad quality, classified as heavy
(between 13.8° and 15.4°). The latter implies that its quality needs to be enhanced at a
refinery before being sold to the market. Correa began the construction of Refinería del
Pacífico, which will be finished in 2015 and could be used to refine this oil. Nonetheless,
a pipeline must be built to move the crude oil from the Amazon to the refinery in the
Coast. The exploitation of the ITT oilfields has social, environmental and economic costs
(Le Quong, 2013).
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In 2007, to preserve biodiversity and respect the indigenous communities living in
voluntary isolation, Correa launched the Yasuní-ITT Initiative at the General Assembly,
committing to maintaining as indefinitely unexploited the ITT block reserves. “This
would be an extraordinary example of global collective action, that would allow not only
reduce global warming, which benefits the whole planet, but also introduce a new
economic logic for the 21st century.”60 However, the Initiative came with the condition
that the international community financially contributes at least USD 3.5 billion, which
represents 50% of what Ecuador would lose from oil revenues. The funds would go to a
capital fund from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Six years later, in
July 2013, a committee evaluated the Initiative results, which were an economic failure
given that only USD 367 million were collected. On August 16th, “the world has failed
us,” Correa responded, also calling the world’s most powerful countries hypocrites. 61
The president decided to exploit the ITT block.
“The Initiative corresponds to a utopia conceptually and in practice.”62 In my
interview with Vélez, he revealed that he never thought the Initiative was possible to
begin with, since it asked for developed countries to pay Ecuador to keep the oil
underground. Eco. Paredes argues, “When initially proposed, it was a great opportunity
for Ecuador to be known for something innovative at a cost of USD 3.5 billion, but now
that the government says the fields contain USD 40 billion worth of reserves, it all sounds
like a lie.” Dr. Santos seconded the economist during my interview, and added that part
60
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of the Yasuní National Park is already being exploited; so not using the ITT block was
never a reality. When the government announced the construction of Refinería del
Pacífico, it was very clear the ITT reserves were needed, there’s no other way to justify
such an investment Eco. Garcia thinks, “Exploiting the ITT reserves is essential to
maintain Correa’s economic policy based on heavy government spending.”
Dr. Santos Alvite points out the government already created great resistance to
keep the ITT reserves underground with the Initiative. Now that the government changed
the decision, it will be very hard for any company to be able to even try to exploit the
reserves because the people wouldn’t allow it. As mentioned earlier, Yasuní is rich in
biodiversity, and in the social and economic aspects. The decision caused huge turmoil
and many people have taken to protest in the streets. In response, Correa said that if
enough signatures were collected, he would call for a referendum to vote on whether or
not to exploit the fields. In 2014, Yasunidos for Life63, an Ecuadorian NGO, took the
initiative and it has until April 12th 2014 to present 600,000 valid signatures for the
referendum, which, if approved, would occur in May 2014. At the same time, however,
the municipalities of the Amazon region have a counter campaign “Yasuní yes” that
supports the exploitation. The ITT remain to be a source of conflict.
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Refinería	
  del	
  Pacífico	
  
Figure	
  4.8	
  Map	
  of	
  Ecuador’s	
  Refineries	
  

Note: Modified by the author based on Ecuador Administrative Divisions Map. (n.d.). University of Texas.
Retrieved March 23, 2014, from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/txu-pclmaps-oclc-754887586ecuador_admin-2011.jpg

Currently, Petroindustrial is the state-owned company that transforms and refines
the exploited hydrocarbons. The company manages three refineries: La Libertad,
Esmeraldas, and Amazonas, which are shown in Figure 4.8 numbered 1 to 3. La Libertad
refinery, number 1, is located in La Libertad (Santa Elena province). It began refining
processes in 1967 under the management of the British company Anglo. It has a
processing capacity of 46,000 barrels per day, and produces gasoline, chemical solvents,
agricultural oil, and airplane fuel. Number 2 represents the Esmeraldas refinery; built
between 1975 and 1997, it can process 110,000 barrels per day. This refinery can process
heavy crude oils and it has the greatest existent capacity. Lastly, number 3 represents the
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Amazonas refinery, which is actually part of the Shushufindi Industrial Complex that also
has the Shushufindi gas plant. The Amazonas Refinery began operations in 1987 and can
produce 20,000 barrels per day. Altogether, the refining capacity sums to 176,00 barrels
per day. To increase Ecuador’s capacity, on June 2013, Correa announced the
construction of a new refining facility, the “Refinería del Pacífico

- Eloy Alfaro”

represented by number 4 on the map. The refining complex is currently under
construction in El Aromo (Manabí) near Manta, one of Ecuador’s main ports. The
complex is part of the country’s energy plan, will have 300,000 barrels per day capacity.
The government advertises that the project seeks to satisfy the internal fuel
demand, converting Ecuador into an exporter of refined petroleum products, including
producing gasoline, diesel, liquefied petroleum gas, jet fuel, polypropylene, benzene, and
xylene. 64 Jorge Glas, vice-president of Ecuador, mentioned “the project creates
development for the all Ecuadorians […] It represents a change in the production
matrix.”65 In 2007, the project had an estimated cost of USD 5 billion, but, at present, the
projected cost has increased to USD 12.5 billion, making it one of the most expensive in
Ecuador’s history. Refinería del Pacífico is a joint venture between Petroecuador and
PDVSA (Venezuela’s state-owned oil company). In this agreement, Petroecuador owns
51% of the company, and PDVSA the rest. CNPC (China National Petroleum Corp) will
also participate in financing the project through loans to the Ecuadorian government has
loans in exchange of crude oil and other refined oil products. Villavicencio believes “this
is a bad business for the country: we (Ecuador) put the territory, the best seaport, 51% of

64

El Ciudadano (2012, June 9). Refinería del Pacífico avanza en Ecuador. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4CbK9uMu5xE
65
El Ciudadano (2013, July 1). En el Aromo se construye la monumental Refinería del Pacífico. Retrieved
March 19, 2014, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Cj3C247lqo

94

the financing, but we associate with Venezuela that has no money, a Korean company
designs the project, and China loans the money.”66 In other words, Ecuador’s oil reserves
are not big enough to justify the construction of a refinery.
In my interview, Economist García expressed concern over the fact that oil would
have to be imported and the ITT block would definitely be exploited. The construction of
a refinery is important for Ecuador’s economy, but Eco. Paredes argues that it will have
less impact than predicted: “It is said that Ecuador exports cacao beans at low prices to
import chocolate at higher prices. This vision doesn’t work for oil, because, today, the
margin between the price of crude oil and refined products is minimal. The cost of oil
needs to be factored, which, in the end, results in lower profits than expected”. By the
same token, Dr. Santos Alvite is skeptic about the project; “to be profitable, the refined
products should be sold at market prices, not at the current subsidized prices. The project
poses doubts for future generations who will carry the debt acquired with China.
Refinería del Pacífico is set to be finished in 2017, when Correa ends his third
presidential term.
The	
  “Revolución	
  Ciudadana”	
  Continues	
  
The current period has been a time of change. Correa began a revolution aimed at
Ecuador’s development. In the last six years of government, a socialist leftist ideology
has replaced the neoliberalism from the past governments. Consequently, Ecuador’s
international relations changed, fostering relations with Venezuela, Cuba, China, and
OPEC members, while breaking those with the USA. The Constituent Assembly created
a new Constitution, which the citizens approved. Even though critics argue that Correa’s
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government is totalitarian, there is a sense of democracy as, during this time as president,
there have been nine referendums. The government also passed reforms to the existing
laws of Communications and Hydrocarbons. The latter changed contracts in the oil
industry and the distribution of oil revenues, causing the exit of many international oil
companies. As a result, Petroecuador is more powerful and solid than during any other
government. The Ecuador vs. Texaco-Chevron lawsuit has yet to reach a settlement to
which both parties agreed. The Yasuní-ITT Initiative was launched to protect the
biodiversity of the National Park, but it resulted in an economic failure, and the
government announced the exploitation of the ITT block. Experts were skeptical about
the veracity of the Initiative, because, at the same time, the construction of Refinería del
Pacífico began. The project, planned to culminate in 2017, is important for Ecuador’s
economy as it has the potential of making the country an exporter of refined petroleum
materials instead of just crude oil; however, it demands high volumes of crude oil that
would imply the use of the ITT block and importing crude oil from other countries.
Activists do not support Correa’s decision to exploit the ITT block in the Yasuní National
Park, which has resulted in an effort to collect enough signatures to ask for a nation wide
referendum. For now, the Citizens’ Revolution continues as Correa’s third term will end
in 2017.
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Chapter	
  5.	
  The	
  future	
  of	
  Ecuador’s	
  Oil	
  Industry	
  

As a developing country, Ecuador is a victim of the Dutch disease, as a product of
crude oil production, which, coupled with the country’s political instability, have not
allowed broad-base economic development. In this sense, the lack of economic
development is derived from the Dutch disease and the political instability. The Dutch
disease comes from the continual reliance on crude oil, and other primary products, as the
backbone of the economy over the years. In fact, regardless of the political ideology of
the government, the oil dependence has only been heightened. By the same token,
political instability has adversely impacted the Ecuador’s economy. The fact that the
country had ten presidents in the last twenty-four years is proof of this situation.
Bucaram, Arteaga, Mahuad, and Gutiérrez were not able to complete their four-year term.
Constantly changing presidents adversely affected Ecuador’s economic situation,
especially because policies are not allowed to develop completely, i.e., each Head of
State had different ways of approaching the economy, removing what the previous leader
had done. Given oil ‘s importance for the economy, the government has always tried to
control and influence the industry according to their ideology. The crude oil industry
changed from welcoming and prioritizing the interests of international companies, to the
current era of nationalization where the interests of the country come first. In the period
studied, 1990 to 2013, the presidents’ ideologies have led to political interventions that
have shaped Ecuador’s oil industry and its future trajectory. In this manner, political
interventions have affected Ecuador’s oil industry to a great extent.
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Political instability plagued the country from 1990 to 2007. Corruption and
dishonesty were prominent problems in politics that have caused many presidential
regimes to end. Ecuadorians tend to revolt when the government supports corruption or
doesn’t listen to the citizens’ opinions. As mentioned earlier, due to a series of events -coup d’états, office abandonment, and forced removal -- ten different presidents governed
Ecuador from 1990 to 2013. Borja opened the period not renovating Texaco’s oil
contract, instead granting Petroecuador, the state owned Oil Company, some type of
monopoly power over the industry. Durán Ballén quit OPEC because his rightist political
ideology was not in agreement with membership in an oil cartel. Additionally, the costs
were higher than the benefits of the membership. This president was also free market
oriented which opened the door to international companies interested in Ecuador’s oil.
Bucaram, a populist president, followed, but Congress declared him incapable of
governing. Arteaga self-proclaimed president, but she was dismissed after two days and
Alarcón took power. While the presidential mess occurred, world market prices for oil
dropped, distressing the Ecuadorian economy. Mahuad received a country in crisis with
different problems including alarming rates of inflation, which lead to a banking crisis
and culminated with the dollarization of the economy. The latter caused an economic
crisis given that the dollarization occurred at very high exchange rates (USD 1 = 25,000
sucres). A coup d’état forced Mahuad to leave the presidency. Noboa resumed the
government and built Mahuad’s OCP pipeline project through and for private firms. Even
though Petroecuador didn’t agree and criticizes its underutilization, the pipeline helped
the oil private sector to grow. Later on, Gutiérrez attempted to implement a quasisocialist regime. OXY’s contract was terminated, a decision Palacio ratified after
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becoming president when the “forajidos” expelled Gutiérrez. The political instability
ends when Correa leaves the academia to become president.
Rafael Correa, the current president, has proved to be a radical ruler. He
advertises the Citizens’ Revolution as a socialist approach to achieve Ecuador’s
economic development. His government causes controversy, especially among the people
who disagree with his political views. Correa rejoined OPEC, both because of economic
and political advantages derived from belonging to an organization that encourages a
South-South strategic alliance. After rewriting the Constitution, the country began a
nationalist shift. Reforms in the Law for Hydrocarbons changed business and oil wealth
distribution between private companies and the state. Petroecuador became increasingly
important and was stronger than in any other period. The unsettled Texaco-Chevron
lawsuit arose since the company had not cleaned the oilfield it had used as it agreed in the
contract. As a result, Correa started “The dirty hand of Chevron” campaign to gain
international attention. The president moved away from business deals with the USA,
improving its relations with Venezuela. Also, Ecuador began business deals with China,
after the Asian country loaned Ecuador large sums of money to finance different
development projects, such as Refinería del Pacífico.
Experts question how Ecuador will ever be able to pay back the loan, adding that
the country’s crude oil is mortgaged to China. Similarly, in 2007 the Yasuní Initiative
was launched aimed to protect the National Park rich in biodiversity by not exploiting the
ITT block, in exchange of compensation from the international community. In 2013, after
the Initiative didn’t raise enough funds, paradoxically, Correa announced the exploitation
of the block, causing distress in the citizens, who, in turn, started campaigns to stop the
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decision and raise international awareness. At par, the construction of Refinería del
Pacífico began, which would require the exploitation of the ITT block and the import of
oil from other countries, given that Ecuador’s reserves don’t justify such a project. The
refinery is an attempt to convert Ecuador in an exporter of petroleum-based products, not
only crude oil. Despite the controversy, Correa is working towards Ecuador’s economic
development.
On the other hand, a paradox arises between developed and developing nations
when talking about crude oil prices. Taking a look at Figure 4.3 from Chapter 4, during
the years that crude oil prices were relatively low, i.e., 1990 to 2005, in addition to the
political instability, Ecuador experienced financial pressures with an increasing external
debt and even a banking crisis. In contrast, this was a period of economic prosperity for
developed nations such as the USA. When crude oil prices began to escalate starting in
2006, Ecuador’s economic situation began to improve and the government was able to
spend on projects aimed at economic development. Developed nations, however, were
adversely affected by the higher prices and, even though energy prices are just a part of
their economies, many countries entered a financial crisis. This demonstrates that higher
crude oil prices benefit developing nations, but not developed ones, and vice versa. For
this reason, crude oil prices present a paradox when it comes to considering the benefits
of high or low prices.
Currently, Correa is trying to implement an import substitution policy in Ecuador.
During his three regimes, he has increased tariffs for imports in an attempt to encourage
the consumption of nationally produced goods. In this manner, the policy aims to give
local producers both an incentive and an advantage over imported goods, as the local
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ones become cheaper. Market-oriented economists who believe that import substitution
should only be used to jump start the economy during short periods of time, criticize this
approach especially since it will be seven years since it was applied in Ecuador. Results
are mixed, but the approach definitely goes against the absolute advantage theory, since
Ecuador is not as efficient as other countries would be. In this case, a dilemma over
consumer versus local workers arises.
In addition, Ecuador is currently undergoing a period where the president’s
radical policies are mostly affecting the middle class. For instance, the government has
increased taxes for private companies and for the higher social classes, but some of the
tax policies are adversely affecting the middle class. This is an attempt to redistribute the
wealth, trying to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, but, again policies such as
heavy taxation and the so-called “bono de desarollo humano” (human development
bonus). The latter bonus currently at USD 50 and it is only given to people living in
poverty according to the government’s definition67. In Ecuador, as in many other LDCs,
it is very hard to look past the short term. This is actually one of the biggest problems
associated with economic development. Broad based economic development needs
policies and changes that will have long lasting impacts for the long term. Ecuador needs
to look past the short term and begin thinking about a sustainable future, which I will
discuss later.
On the other hand, Ecuador has a lack of human capital. The country has a lack of
public quality education institutions at all levels. Brain drain is an important issue, since
people who have the opportunity of studying abroad typically do not come back to the
67

This topic is very complex and would require an entire research project in order to understand it
completely, but it has criticism associated with creating dependency and doesn’t really provide a long-term
solution.
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country. In this sense human capital flees to other countries, instead of people coming
back and working for the development of the country. Nevertheless, Ecuador is trying to
address the issue by providing scholarships to some of the best universities in the world,
conditioned on the students’ return to the country for twice the length of time they
studied abroad. In my opinion, this presents a solution to the lack of quality education
available domestically and to the brain drain. However, at the same time, there remain a
lack of opportunities and incentives for the private sector to develop. Currently, Correa
favors the public or state owned companies, making competition difficult for the private
sector. The government should try to balance the economy by helping both the private
and public sectors.
From my analysis of the period’s economy, I deduce that oil price levels also
affect the political stability of Ecuador. Oil is a big component of the economy, especially
of the government’s budget. From 1990 to 2007, the periods where political insatiability
reigned, oil prices were relatively low, peaking around USD 55 during 2007 when Correa
assumed the presidency. The previous presidents attempted to rule a heavily indebted
country in economic distress, with high inflation, and low government budgets, so there
was only so much that they could do. When Correa rose to power, however, world oil
prices became incredibly high (around USD 95), increasing the government’s budget,
hence, allowing greater expenditure in various projects. In my opinion, this is one of the
reasons why Ecuador’s politics have been stable in recent years. However, evidence
shows that oil prices are very volatile over the longer term, meaning they could decrease
at any point in time. As the experts that I interviewed agreed, if this were to happen, the
Citizens’ Revolution would fall and Ecuador’s economy would enter into an aggravated
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crisis. Ecuador’s political instability has a chain effect destabilizing the country’s
economic, finance, social, and legal environment, which in turn discourages foreign
direct investment, also contributing to the delay in economic development.

	
  
Ecuador:	
  an	
  oil	
  country?	
  
Ecuador not only possesses oil, but oil is a large part of its economy. In 2011,
49.75% of Ecuador’s exports68 and 41% of the government’s budget were comprised of
crude oil. The following figures 69 represent Ecuador´s GDP by selected economic
activities, and GDP growth for the years 1990 to 2012; for a complete breakdown of GDP
by all economic activities refer to Appendix 6.
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Products exported by Ecuador (2011). (n.d.). OEC: The Observatory of Economic Complexity. Retrieved
March 24, 2014, from http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/export/ecu/all/show/2011/
69
Two graphs are presented because data available for Ecuador from 1990 to 1999 are in sucres, the
official currency of that period. After the dollarization in 2000, the US dollar became the new official
currency, so data after this year is expressed in US dollars.
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Data about for oil and mines, and oil refining was not available separately as in Figure 5.2
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Figure	
  5.2	
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As shown by Figures 5.1 and 5.2, oil has remained a very important component of
Ecuador’s GDP throughout the years. When looking at the data in Appendix 6, it is
noticeable that the production of crude oil has remained constant at around 9% to 12%.
Oil refining, however, as shown in Figure 5.2 with the lime green, has not been a very
strong component of GDP, which reflects the fact that Ecuador primarily produces the
raw product. Crude oil is sold to refineries in the developed nations to produce the
petroleum-based products, and Ecuador purchases the industrialized oil , which is a major
part of the causes for the country’s Dutch disease. Ecuador’s stagnant level of
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As of the moment of writing of this thesis, the official report for 2013 data is not available yet.
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industrialization can be noticed by observing at the manufacturing component of GDP for
both graphs. The oil component of GDP has remained constant, while in 1990
manufacturing was 15.45% of GDP, showing a downward trend that fell to 11.98% of
GDP in 2012. Ecuador still suffers from the Dutch disease and has not been able to
industrialize properly to achieve broad-based economic development.
Other important economic activities that are important to emphasize include
agriculture, services, and construction. Observing at Figure 5.1 and 5.2, agriculture and
fishing was a big component of GDP during the 1990s, but it has lost terrain during the
2000s, a sign that Ecuador is relying less on this activity with time. Services and
construction, on the other hand, have gained importance as both industries continue to
grow through the passage of time.
The same graphs also show Ecuador’s GDP percentage growth reveals through
the period of study of this thesis. During the 1990s, Ecuador had a steady growth from
1% to 3%, peaking in 1991, 1994, and 1997. In 1991, after Borja ended the contract with
Texaco, Petroecuador began to benefit from the oilfields that had been previously
exploited by the multinational. During 1994, Durán Ballén applied different reforms but
also allowed foreign direct investment from small international oil companies. The year
1997, however, is very curious because that was the time when Ecuador had three
presidents (Bucaram, Arteaga, and Alarcón), but Ecuador was still able to grow by 4.3%.
This is probably related to the stable oil prices that OPEC controls; this year is a
particular example of how OPEC price manipulation was beneficial for Ecuador, even
when it was not a member of the cartel. During Mahuad’s regime, in 1999, the country
experienced a negative growth of -4.7%, mostly due to the banking crisis and continuous

106

devaluation of the sucre. After the 2000 dollarization, the Ecuador’s GDP growth rate
began to improve. In 2004, the economy grew by 8.20%, partly because the new OCP
pipeline began its operations, increasing private oil activities in the country. Even though
the economy didn’t grow as much in 2009 (0.6%), Rafael Correa has achieved relatively
high growth rates compared to other heads of states. In 2011, Ecuador reached a growth
rate of 7.8%, which is higher than that of Latin America (4.5%) and the World (3.8%). In
2012, Ecuador’s growth rates remained above Latin American and World growth rates72.
The latter shows that Correa’s administration is actually working towards economic
growth, which is one step on the road to development. Nevertheless, looking at the
growth and Ecuador’s situation overall, I conclude that even when growth occurred in the
Ecuadorian economy, the potential GDP was dampened, given the country’s political
instability together with the reliance on crude oil.
However, oil-producing countries are not all the same. For instance, Ecuador
can’t be compared to Venezuela, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, the world’s oil giants. First of
all, Ecuador’s 8.24 billion barrels proved reserves are almost negligible compared to
other big oil exporters. Even though oil is the backbone of the economy, Ecuador only
exploits and sells crude oil, which corresponds only to the first stage of the industry.
Refinería del Pacífico, although heavily criticized, is an attempt to venture into the
refining stage, but it will not be completed until 2017. As Dr. Santos stated, at present,
“Ecuador is not an oil country, it only owns oil”. The nation still has a long way until it
reaches the level of oil development in all its stages of other oil-producing countries.
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Ecuador needs to solve its political instability problem and diversify its economy as well,
using the oil revenues to develop other industries.

Impacts	
  
In short, oil is the cause for the Dutch disease in Ecuador. In the short run, oil
brings wealth and some economic development. In an economic sense, oil is a symbol of
progress; its revenues are always beneficial, given Ecuador’s heavy dependence on this
non-renewable resource. Oil also helps sustain the government expenditure, which has
dramatically increased during Correa’s regime. The current government is focused on
keeping Petroecuador strong and using the oil revenues to achieve economic
development. As a result, most of the revenues are used to finance projects aimed at this
goal, such as the Refinería del Pacífico. Nevertheless, many of the experts expressed
concern about the government’s over-spending, given that they predict oil reserves to last
for 20 to 30 more years, but factoring in the ITT block. Nevertheless, oil exploration
stopped in 2005 because of the renegotiation of contracts. In my interview, Economist
Paredes was skeptical about running out of oil reserves in the next twenty years; he
commented, “it is just a matter of continuing oil exploration”.
On the other hand, during my interview with Sergio Vélez, he brought a very
important point to the discussion when mentioning that the presence of the oil companies
changes the Amazon region. The process of oil extraction is dangerous and harmful for
the tropical rainforests of the Amazon. In Ecuador, oil extraction is one of the most
damaging industries for the environment, as proven by the Chevron issue where oil
deposits were exhausted and the traces of oil exploitation were not cleaned up as the
contract had requested. The industry is also the cause of many health hazards, water and
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air pollution, decreased biodiversity and damage to the environment in general. Similarly,
oil extraction not only affects the ancestral Amazon territory, but also the lives of
indigenous people living in voluntary isolation. Besides the health hazards posed, the
traditional lives of Ecuador’s indigenous tribes are altered when modern companies
invade their territory, many times disrupting their lifestyles. In times where the
government moralizes social inclusion, the oil industry continues to prevent indigenous
inclusion.
In such a complex global industry, the long run is harder to predict, especially
when most of the oil is tied to the Chinese loans. Eco. Paredes mentioned that the
negative side of things tends to show up in the long run.”73 As long as oil continues to
power the world’s economies, someone will always be interested in exploiting Ecuador’s
oil. When the industry started, the USA was interested; now China is involved. The
future trajectory of the Ecuadoran oil industry will depend on who is the president in
power and the corresponding political ideology. Part of the resource curse is that
countries become increasingly dependent on their primary natural resource, exactly
Ecuador’s case with oil. Besides the environmental, political, and social implications, one
of the biggest problems with oil worldwide is its price volatility. It is hard to predict how
the oil market will behave in the next decades. In the recent years, market prices for oil
have remained high, given that global demand is greater than global supply. If prices
continue to be at the current high level (around USD 90), Ecuador’s heavily reliant oil
economy will survive for as long as it has oil reserves, i.e., 20 to 30 years. However, if
the price of the commodity falls, Ecuador’s dollarized economy would be in trouble.
Monetary policy is not possible since the country dollarized during Mahuad’s
73
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government. Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution development plan would fail since the
government’s budget relies heavily on oil revenues. Eco. Paredes prediction is that “if oil
prices fall, the government will seek international companies interested in risky
investments, just as it was before 2005, prioritizing the private sector.” In this sense, the
government would encourage companies to seek for new oilfields to exploit, but the
contracts would also need to become attractive and fair for Ecuador’s state and the
companies. The latter would imply a shift away from the socialist ideology.

Future	
  Scenarios	
  
Given the volatility of crude oil prices, Ecuador’s reliance on this resource, and
the historical political instability, I have reflected about some possible scenarios that
could predict what will happen with Ecuador’s oil industry in the next couple of years.
There are three scenarios that I consider possible: the first is very optimistic, the second is
very pessimistic, and the last one is a mix of both perspectives.
If oil prices continue at the current high levels, then Ecuador will continue to rely
on the resource. In this optimistic/ideal scenario, the Refinería del Pacífico could be
completed on time and would increase the volume of exports of petroleum-based
products, declining the reliance on imports especially of gasoline and diesel. In this
manner, Ecuador would change its production matrix and increase consumer welfare at
the same time. Oil contracts would be slightly modified so that both Ecuador and private
international companies will be benefitted in a fair manner. In the remaining time of
Correa’s term, the country would reach political stability, fostering an economic,
financial, and legal environment that is attracts foreign direct investment, allowing the
country to prosper. In the social aspects, the oil revenues would be used to create
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different projects that decrease unemployment and promote social inclusion, improving
social aspects (like health and access to quality education), and working towards the
development of the country. By the same token, the government would use the resources
to jump-start other industries such as tourism that can be of benefit for the economy but
are also environmentally friendly. The government would not exploit the ITT oil fields in
the Yasuní National Park; instead it would invest money in building research facilities
that allow the study of the biodiversity in the park, its conservation, and how we can use
the plant species for medicinal purposes just as the local indigenous tribes do. Lastly,
given that Correa is already in his third term, in 2017, the country would host democratic
elections, allowing another head of state to rise to power, but this leader would recognize
the popular support to continue the projects from the previous president.
In contrast, a more pessimistic perspective involves things going wrong. President
Correa’s policies in this scenario would become too radical, and Ecuador would begin to
follow Venezuela’s path. The new refinery would not be completed on time and there
would be problems with Ecuador’s ability to repay the Chinese loans. As a result, China’s
strong drive for oil would bring more Chinese companies to Ecuadorian territory to
exploit the mortgaged oil in an attempt to recover the loans. At the same time, the
increased oil production would decrease oil prices, causing greater incentives to cheat
among OPEC members. In this manner, Correa would exploit the ITT oil fields, in an
attempt to increase Ecuador’s oil production and to finance the economic deficit with
China. In this sense, the country’s reliance on oil would be heightened more than ever.
The revenues, however, in this scenario would not be used for the development of any
other industries or the improvement of social conditions, sinking the country deeper in
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the Dutch disease. Correa would lose credibility because of failing to deliver on different
promises to the citizens. The different events would cause turmoil and discontent, putting
the country in a critical situation. Protests would arise, asking for Correa to leave office,
repeating Ecuador’s political instability. The country would then enter a period of
economic recession and uncertainty, making Ecuador unattractive for foreign investors.
The two scenarios described above are very extremist and shifted to either side of
the spectrum. However, in my opinion, a mixed scenario is more likely to occur given the
country’s current situation. Simply looking at the issues that have occurred since the
signature collection to save the Yasuní National Park together with Correa’s speech
announcing that “Ecuador needs the money from Yasuní to overcame poverty”74, I
believe that the decision to exploit the ITT oil fields is pretty much set. Ecuador will not
value the importance of Yasuní’s biodiversity, prioritizing economic interests. Refinería
del Pacífico will be completed by 2017, but it will not have the impact that the
government advertises. By this I contend that Ecuador will not change its production
matrix, thus remaining an exporter of crude oil as a raw product. The refinery, however,
will benefit local consumers only. Correa will remain president and he will push the
National Assembly to change the constitution so that he can be a candidate for the 2017
elections. His charisma and persuasion abilities will increase his popularity and he has
great chances of winning the elections, to start a fourth term. The latter could be
beneficial for the country, as it will bring political stability and continuity to the
development policies. As in any other political regime, there will be controversies and
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corruption involved. The country will begin its process to development, but until Ecuador
doesn’t diversify its economy, not a lot of progress will be made. After all, the Dutch
disease and the political instability are the reasons why broad based economic
development doesn’t occur in the South American country.

On	
  the	
  road	
  to	
  sustainable	
  development	
  
Sustainability is thinking about the long term future from a social, environmental,
and economic perspective. Ecuador must begin to take decisions based on sustainability.
As new sources of energy appear and oil becomes scarce, the oil industry will begin to
decline. Countries like Ecuador whose economy depends on the black gold, will be
adversely affected. In general, simply being an oil exporter is not quite sustainable.
Hopefully, with the construction of the new refinery, Ecuador may be able to change its
production matrix and export refined petroleum products, instead of just raw material.
Going along the lines of a change in the production matrix, Segundo Rodríguez and Dr.
Santos advised that Ecuador should be concentrating the oil revenues on developing other
industries, such as ecotourism, since the country’s culture and history, accompanies the
diverse landscapes of the four different regions.
For many years, Ecuador has been dedicated to the production of commodities or
raw materials. Yet, if the country is ever going to develop, a change in the production
matrix must occur. Ecuador can’t remain an exporter of raw materials; it has to continue
the industrialization process and begin to export finished goods. Refinería del Pacífico is
advertised as an attempt to do so, but the project won’t be completed until 2017, so its
impact can’t be assessed yet. Changing the production matrix goes along the lines of
sustainable development. Besides creating dependency, the extractive oil industry is very
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destructive for the environment and the Amazon’s ecosystems where the majority of
oilfields are located. As a country, Ecuador needs to develop other industries so that it is
not over reliant on oil. As exemplified with the Texaco-Chevron issue, the exploitation of
crude oil causes permanent damages to the environment, which will adversely affect the
future generations’ capacity of satisfying their own needs. Sustainable decisions have to
be made considering a triple bottom line approach (people, planet, and profit), to ensure
that future generations don’t inherit a country with less opportunities, economic crisis,
broken ecosystems, health hazards, and reduced biodiversity. I believe changing the
production matrix in a way that respects society and the environment, but also generates
profits, that is to say, implementing sustainable development is one of the solutions on
the process for Ecuador’s development.
Being sustainable implies thinking about the future generations. Exploiting the
ITT block in the Yasuní National Park, for instance, would not be a sustainable option, as
it would destroy and alter such a biodiverse ecosystem, almost unique all over the world.
A dilemma arises, however, as Correa mentioned, “Ecuador is a poor country. We still
have children without schooling. We need health care, decent housing. We lack many
things. What would suit the country most would be to exploit the resource. But we also
understand our responsibility in the fight against global warming, the cause of which is
the burning of fossil fuels. […] (But) we cannot be beggars sitting on a sack of gold.”75
Correa is right to a certain extent, but once again, it sounds like Ecuador’s development,
as a country, is still heavily reliant on one resource. In this matter, changing the
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production matrix and using the oil revenues to develop other industries would actually
help the country rely less on such a volatile resource.
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Chapter	
  6.	
  Conclusions	
  and	
  Open	
  Questions	
  	
  
Upon completion of my study, there are a couple of comments and challenges that
I consider valuable sharing. I thought getting experts talking about the oil industry and
such a controversial issue as the Yasuní-ITT would be challenge, but, to my surprise, all
of the professionals were willing to help with my research and share their time, expertise,
knowledge, and opinions. It was amazing to be able to interview some people that are
renown in Ecuador and that I particularly admire. The interviews were very helpful at
enriching my knowledge about the topic. On the other hand, I must admit that finding
sources readily available in English was definitely challenging. There is a lack of
bibliography that is not in Ecuador’s official language, on the different topics covered
throughout the thesis, especially for the time before President Correa. Even the interviews
were conducted in Spanish. At times, it was hard for me to translate ideas and thoughts,
especially if technical terms were involved. By the same token, finding accurate
information about the evolution of prices posed a challenge, especially for historical data
on Ecuador’s Napo and Oriente crude oils. I had to consult different multiple sources and
compile my own set of data for the purpose of this study.
In my opinion, oil, the black gold, represents power. Whoever controls the oil
industry possesses the power, in this case Ecuador’s government. The state should not
have total control of the industry. Currently, the government, through Petroecuador,
exploits, produces, and dominates the oil industry. A government’s job is to regulate
industries, but it can’t be judge and jury at the same time. The current situation does
create inefficiencies, since the state will definitely take biased decisions that favor their
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preferences, which are not always in the best interest of the country’s industry. The
government does a very good job at establishing regulations, but it can’t be a direct part
of the actual business. The lack of honesty in Ecuador’s public sector leads to corruption.
The government places people who they trust and who support the political ideology in
high executive positions. In this sense, oil jobs in the public sector become politicized
instead of placing people with an oil and managerial expertise. The government is not the
ideal administrator for the oil industry, as a regulator, it does a much better job.
On the other hand, one of the limitations for the study is derived from the fact that
politics are subjective. Authors of books and articles consulted were clearly biased by
their political ideologies. Total scientific neutrality doesn’t exist, however, I tried to look
for sources that represent both sides of the spectrum, attempting to represent a more
objective position. Despite the efforts to remain objective, I also have a certain political
ideology that may have affected some of the opinions vested in the present thesis. In
future studies, maybe more empirical data can be consulted, even trying to get the more
experts from the public sector to include their opinion as well. Another limitation of the
study, specially for the last government, is that many of the changes to the oil industry are
still in the quality of projects, so their real impact can’t be measure yet, this is the case
with the business deals with China, Chevron case, Yasuní-ITT oilfields, and Refinería del
Pacífico. In this sense the thesis still poses questions that continue to be unanswered:
•

How much longer will world crude oil prices remain at the current high levels?

•

How will the Chinese loans affect the oil industry and future generations in
general?
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•

Is the Chevron case ever going to reach a settlement that both parties agree with,
and, if so, how much longer will it take?

•

Will the government respect the people’s choice on the exploitation of the ITT
block, or will it prioritize economic interests?

•

When the Refinería del Pacífico begins its operations in 2017, how will the
industry be affected?
o Will Ecuador actually become an exporter of petroleum-based products,
i.e. change its production matrix, with the construction of the Refinería del
Pacífico?

•

Who will be Ecuador’s next president and how will his/her political ideology
intervene in the oil industry?

•

What is the future of Ecuador’s oil industry?

118

Bibliography	
  
Books	
  and	
  Print	
  Publications	
  
Acosta, A. (2006). Breve historia económica del Ecuador (2 ed.). Quito: Corporación
Editora Nacional.
Brock, J. W. (2009). The Petroleum Industry. The structure of American industry (12th
ed., pp. 30 - 57). Upper Saddle River: Pearson/Prentice Hall.
Larrea, M. (1991). Industria, estructura agraria y migraciones internas en el Ecuador:
1950-1982. Quito, Ecuador: FLACSO.
Quang, M. (2013). Dejar el petróleo bajo Tierra: la Iniciativa Yasuní-ITT (1st ed.).
Quito, Ecuador: Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales.
Sampson, A. (1991). The seven sisters: the great oil companies and the world they
shaped. Toronto: Bantam Books.
Sánchez, J. A. (2009). La Iniciativa Yasuní - Ishpingo - Tambococha - Tiputini y su
impacto en la Economía Ecuatoriana. Tesis para obtener el título de Maestría en
Ciencias Sociales con mención en Economía Ecológica (Facultad
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales - Sede Ecuador).
Scherer, F. M., & Ross, D. (1990). Introduction. Industrial market structure and
economic performance (3rd ed., p. 5). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Valarezo, S. V. (2013). Yasuni-ITT Situacion y Perspectivas. Quito, Ecuador: PROSPEC.
Villavicencio, F. (2013). Ecuador Made in China (Second ed.). Quito, Ecuador:
Independent publication.
Waldman, D. E., & Jensen, E. J. (2007). Two Approaches to the Study of Industrial
119

Organization. Industrial organization: theory and practice (3rd ed., pp. 3 - 5).
Boston: Pearson Addison Wesley.
Yergin, D. (1991). The prize: the epic quest for oil, money, and power. New York: Simon
& Schuster.

Online	
  Resources	
  
About Platts. (n.d.). Energy Products & Services, Oil, Coal Insight, Natural Gas
Shipping, Electric Power Methodology Analysis, Metals, Petrochemical.
Retrieved March 18, 2014, from http://www.platts.com/about
Banco Central del Ecuador (2001). Boletin de Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales del
Ecuador. Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales, 39. Retrieved April 4, 2014, from
contenido.bce.fin.ec/home1/estadisticas/cntrimestral/CNTrimestral.jsp
Banco Central del Ecuador (2014). Boletin de Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales del
Ecuador. Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales, 85. Retrieved April 4, 2014, from
http://contenido.bce.fin.ec/home1/estadisticas/cntrimestral/CNTrimestral.jsp
Banco Central del Ecuador (2014). Presentación Coyuntural Marzo 2014. Estadísticas
Macroeconómicas, 5 - 6. Retrieved April 2, 2014, from
http://www.bce.fin.ec/index.php/estadisticas-economicas
Countries Oil Consumption. (n.d.). U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA Independent Statistics and Analysis. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from
http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view=consumption
Countries Proved Reserves. (n.d.). U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA Independent Statistics and Analysis. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from

120

http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view=reserves
Creamer, B. (2010). La Refinería del Pacífico: ¿Oportunidad Real y fin de la iniciativa
Yasuní-ITT?. Boletín de KOYNTURA, -. Retrieved September 4, 2013, from
http://www.usfq.edu.ec/publicaciones/koyuntura/Documents/koyuntura_012.pdf
Cueva, S., & Ortiz, M. (2013). Ingresos Fiscales por Explotación de Hidrocarburos en
Ecuador. Resumen de Políticas, IDB-PB-198. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=38065261
Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per barrel). (n.d.). US Energy Information
Administration. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=rwtc&f=a
Dependencia del crudo se profundiza (2012, June 5). El Comercio. Retrieved September
3, 2013, from http://www.elcomercio.com/negocios/Dependencia-crudoprofundiza_0_712728985.html
Ecuador Administrative Divisions Map. (n.d.). University of Texas. Retrieved March 23,
2014, from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/txu-pclmaps-oclc754887586-ecuador_admin-2011.jpg
Ecuador alista devolución del IVA. Demanda de OXY. (2007, July 26). El Universo.
Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.eluniverso.com/2007/07/26/0001/9/D63F99047DD04636A93D2C5E
3D33DB5A.html
Ecuador. (n.d.). CIA The World Factbook. Retrieved March 8, 2014, from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html
Ecuador - Overview. (n.d.). U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent

121

Statistics and Analysis. Retrieved February 20, 2014, from
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=EC
Ecuador. (n.d.). The World Bank. Retrieved March 8, 2014, from
http://data.worldbank.org/country/ecuador
EcuadorTimes. (2013, January 30). Fernando Villavicencio presents his revealing book
“Ecuador: Made in China”. EcuadorTimes. Retrieved March 8, 2014, from
http://www.ecuadortimes.net/2013/01/30/fernando-villavicencio-presents-hisrevealing-book-ecuador-made-in-china-2/
El Parque Nacional Yasuní. (n.d.). Amazonia por la Vida. Retrieved September 4, 2013,
from http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/Parque-nacional-Yasuni/el-parquenacional-yasuni.html
Estadísticas Petroleras. (n.d.). IDE Perspectiva. Retrieved March 16, 2014, from
http://investiga.ide.edu.ec/index.php/estadisticas-73/petroleo/394-estadisticaspetroleras
FAQs: Oil. (n.d.). IEA: International Energy Agency. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from
http://www.iea.org/aboutus/faqs/oil/
GDP growth (annual %). (n.d.). The World Bank. Retrieved April 4, 2014, from
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/all?displa
y=default
Global Conservation Significance of Ecuador's Yasuní National Park. (n.d.). PLOS ONE:
accelerating the publication of peer-reviewed. Retrieved September 3, 2013,
from http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0008767
Guerra Forestal: Sangre por árboles. (2011, November 11). Desinformación de las 9.

122

Retrieved March 22, 2014, from
http://desinformaciondelas9.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/mapa_itt.jpg
Historia - Caso Texaco. (n.d.). Chevron Tóxico. Retrieved March 29, 2014, from
http://texacotoxico.org/historia/
Jacome, L. (2004). The Late 1990s Financial Crisis in Ecuador: Institutional Weaknesses,
Fiscal Rigidities, and Financial Dollarization at Work. IMF Working Papers.
Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0412.pdf
Jukić, A. (n.d.). Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Processes Presentation. Faculty of
Chemical Engineering and Technology. Retrieved February 17, 2014, from
http://www.fkit.unizg.hr/_download/repository/PRPP_2013_Crude_oil_composit
ion.pdf
'La mano sucia de Chevron' se lanza hoy. (2013, September 17). El Hoy. Retrieved
March 29, 2014, from http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/la-mano-suciade-chevron-se-lanza-hoy-590939.html
La mano sucia. (n.d.). La mano sucia de Chevron. Retrieved March 29, 2014, from
http://lamanosucia.com/
Mapa de Bloques Petroleros del Ecuador. (n.d.). Secretaría de Hidrocarburos. Retrieved
March 19, 2014, from http://www.hidrocarburos.gob.ec/mapa-de-bloquespetroleros/
Member Countries. (n.d.). OPEC. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm
Oil Market Chronology. (n.d.). Earth-Policy. Retrieved March 16, 2014, from

123

http://www.earth-policy.org/datacenter/xls/update67_4.xls
Petroecuador EP (2010). El Petroleo en Ecuador. Archivo Petroecuador EP, -. Retrieved
March 22, 2014, from
http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/archivo/001138.pdf
Petroecuador-EP. (2011). Período Enero - Diciembre 2011. INFORME CIFRAS
PETROLERAS, -. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/peh_docsusogeneral/
002102.pdf
Petroecuador-EP. (2012). Período Enero - Diciembre 2012. INFORME CIFRAS
PETROLERAS, -. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/peh_docsusogeneral/
002103.pdf
Petroecuador-EP. (2013). Período Enero - Diciembre 2013. INFORME CIFRAS
PETROLERAS, -. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/archivo/ep002761.p
df
Pino, A. (n.d.). Crnel. Lucio Gutierrez. Enciclopedia del Ecuador. Retrieved March 19,
2014, from http://www.enciclopediadelecuador.com/Indice.php?Ind=&Let=G
PGE. (2013). Ley de Hidrocarburos. Procuraduría General del Estado | República del
Ecuador, May 2013. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
www.pge.gob.ec/es/documentos/doc_download/227-ley-de-hidrocarburos.html
Presidente destaca beneficios de los contratos petroleros con China. (2011, July 6).
Revista Vistazo. Retrieved March 23, 2014, from

124

http://www.vistazo.com/webpages/pais/imprimir.php?id=16258
Products exported by Ecuador (2011). (n.d.). OEC: The Observatory of Economic
Complexity. Retrieved March 24, 2014, from
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/export/ecu/all/show/2011/
¿Qué es la Iniciativa?. (n.d.). YASUNI-ITT | Crea un Nuevo Mundo. Retrieved March 23,
2014, from http://yasuni-itt.gob.ec/quees.aspx
Rafael Correa dice que Ecuador necesita el dinero del Yasuní para superar la pobreza.
(2014, April 24). El Comercio. Retrieved April 25, 2014, from
http://www.elcomercio.com/politica/Rafael-Correa-Ecuador-Yasuni-EducacionEntrevista-Espana-alexa_0_1126087492.html
RIGZONE - What is Heavy Oil and How is it Formed?. (n.d.). RIGZONE. Retrieved
March 18, 2014, from
http://www.rigzone.com/training/heavyoil/insight.asp?insight_id=184&c_id=14
Refinería del Pacífico estará lista el 2017. (2013, June 29). Presidencia de la República
del Ecuador. Retrieved September 4, 2013, from
http://www.presidencia.gob.ec/refineria-del-pacifico-estara-lista-el-2017/
Relaciones bilaterales Ecuador-China. (n.d.). Embajada del Ecuador en la República
Popular de China. Retrieved March 22, 2014, from
http://www.ecuadorenchina.org.ec/ecuador-china
Romero, S., & Krauss, C. (2011, February 14). Ecuador Judge Orders Chevron to Pay $9
Billion. New York Times. Retrieved March 29, 2014, from
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/world/americas/15ecuador.html?ref=americ
as&_r=0

125

Rosero, F. N. (2007). Impacto de la comercialización externa de petróleo y derivados en
la economía nacional y propuesta de implementación de fuentes energéticas
renovables. Tesis presentada como requisito para optar al Título de Máster en
Seguridad y Desarrollo, -. Retrieved February 20, 2014, from
http://repositorio.iaen.edu.ec/bitstream/24000/88/1/IAEN-030-2007.pdf
Sebastian, M. S., & Hurtig, A. (2004). Oil exploitation in the Amazon basin of Ecuador: a
public health emergency. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública. Retrieved
March 19, 2014, from http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S102049892004000300014&script=sci_arttext
Schipani, A. (2012, October 9). Ecuador vs US oil: Quito loses a round. InterAmerican
Security Watch. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/ecuador-vs-us-oil-quito-loses-a-round/
Soy, S. (n.d.). The Case Study as a Research Method. University of Texas at Austin.
Retrieved September 3, 2013, from
https://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm
Valencia, A. (2013, July 6). Ecuador says China's CNPC joins $12 billion refinery
project. Reuters. Retrieved September 4, 2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/06/us-ecuador-refinery-cnpcidUSBRE9650CN20130706
Wallace, S. (2013). Rain Forest for Sale. National Geographic Magazine, January.
Retrieved March 28, 2014, from
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/01/125-yasuni-national-park/wallacetext

126

Yasuni: Ecuador abandons plan to stave off Amazon drilling. (2013, August 15). The
Guardian. Retrieved September 2, 2013, from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/ecuador-abandons-yasuniamazon-drilling

Interviews	
  
E. Santos, personal interview, January 7, 2014
S. Vélez, personal interview, January 9, 2014
P. Paredes, personal interview, January 9, 2014
S. Rodríguez, personal interview, January 10, 2014
L. García, personal interview, January 8, 2014
F. Santos Alvite, personal interview, March 17, 2014

Videos	
  
El Ciudadano (2012, June 9). Refinería del Pacífico avanza en Ecuador. Retrieved March
19, 2014, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4CbK9uMu5xE
El Ciudadano (2013, July 1). En el Aromo se construye la monumental Refinería del
Pacífico. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Cj3C247lqo
Vice Ecuador (2014, February 8). La Mano Sucia de Chevron. Retrieved March 30, 2014,
from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdBhx8pHYz4

127

Appendix	
  1:	
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Source:
Scherer, F. M., & Ross, D. (1990). Introduction. Industrial market structure and
economic performance (3rd ed., p. 5). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
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Appendix	
  2:	
  Expert	
  Interviews	
  (Resumes	
  and	
  Guide)	
  
Luis	
  Alfredo	
  García,	
  MS.	
  	
  
Interviewer:
Date:
Place:
Time:

Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana
January 8, 2014
Hernando de la Cruz N32-66 y Ave. Mariana de Jesús. Quito - Ecuador
4 PM

Interview	
  Guide	
  
•

•

•

Oil and politics
o Oil industry in Ecuador for the past 23 years
! Political, economic, and social impacts
! Relevant events that should be noted
o How has the oil industry evolved throughout the years?
! Short-run and long-run impacts during each administration
o Is Ecuador an oil country, or just a country that has oil?
o How has the relationship with other countries changed throughout these
years?
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry?
o Should the government intervene in the industry?
o What impacts does oil exploitation have on the economy?
o How does oil exploitation work in the private sector?
o How is the price for crude oil decided in Ecuador?
o Why did Ecuador exit the OPEC in 1992, only to re-enter in 2007?
Yasuní-ITT
o What was really expected from the Initiative in 2007?
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block
will have in the short and long run?
o What should be done with the reserve?
o How will be Refinería del Pacífico’s impact the economy?
What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future

Resume	
  
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee)
LUIS ALFREDO GARCÍA C.
INFORMACIÓN GENERAL.
•

Nacionalidad: Ecuatoriano
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•

Idiomas: Inglés and Español

EDUCACIÓN.
•
•
•
•

•

Primaria: Eugenio Espejo
Secundaria: Sebastián de Benalcázar (1963-1969)
Pregrado: Universidad Central del Ecuador. Facultad de Economía. (1969-1975).
Graduado con honores.
Especialización: Elaboración & Evaluación de Proyectos de Inversión. Nueve
meses a tiempo completo. 1976. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. Graduado
con Honores.
Posgrado: Colorado School of Mines. Master of Science in Petroleum
Economics. 1977-1979. Golden-Colorado. USA.

EXPERIENCIA LABORAL.
•

•

•

•

•

Directorio General de Hidrocarburos. (1973 – 1976) Quito, Ecuador.
o Economista Junior: 1973
o Economista I: 1975
o Economista II y Jefe de la Unidad de “Evaluación de Transacciones”:
1976.
Ministerio de Energía. (1979-1983) Quito, Ecuador.
o Jefe de la unidad de Asuntos Internacionales
o Asesor del Ministro en Comercio Internacional de Hidrocarburos. Dicha
unidad fue creada por mi persona, y mis tareas incluyeron la elaboración
de reportes técnicos acerca del Mercadeo Internacional de Hidrocarburos
para altas autoridades del sector energético.
o Delegado ecuatoriano en múltiples reuniones internacionales:
! OPEC en Viena (Austria) como parte de diferentes comités y de la
comisión económica.
! Jefe de la Delegación ecuatoriana en varias reuniones en
Latinoamérica.
! OLADE (Organización Latino Americana de Energía) como
representante del país
CEPE - Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana. (1983-1988)
o Asesor técnico del Comité de Mercadeo Internacional
o Jefe del Departamento de Estudios de Mercado
o Jefe del Departamento de Producción
o Jefe del Departamento de Petróleo
o Director de Mercadeo Internacional
o Gerente del área Mercadeo Externo-Interno
o Jefe de la Oficina de Mercadeo Internacional en Taiwan
Naftomar Shipping Co. (1989)
o Agente comercial del acuerdo comercial monopolista para la explotación y
distribución de gas licuado de petróleo al mercado ecuatoriano
TRIPETROL Oil Trading. (1990-1998)
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•
•
•

o Encargado de las cuentas de comercio de crudo y derivados de Petroperu,
Petrobras, Enap. Repsol, PDVSA y otras del Caribe y América Central.
o Tripetrol manejaba el 80% de las exportaciones de Crudo Oriente bajo
convenios con Petroecuador.
Anglo. (1999)
Coastal y El Paso. (2000-2002)
Shell Trading (US) Co. & Shell Western Supply and Trading Ltd. (20032014)
o Agente Comercial
! Negociar con EP-Petroecuador y Flopec.
! Preparar información del comercio internacional para Petroecuador
y otras compañías productoras de petróleo.
! Identificar oportunidades de negocio dentro del sector energético
ecuatoriano.

INFORMACIÓN DE CONTACTO.
o Dirección de Oficina: Av. Orellana E9-195 y Av. 6 de Diciembre. Edif.
Alisal de Orellana. Piso 10. Of.1002.
o Teléfonos: (5932) 3819-934 / 942
o Fax: (5932) 3819-950
o Celular: (5939) 99734-592.
o E-mail: lagc.trading.ec@andinanet.net / afredogrc@yahoo.com
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Pablo	
  Lucio	
  Paredes,	
  Ph.D.	
  	
  
Interviewer: Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana
Date:
January 9, 2014
Place: Avenida Vía Láctea, Universidad San Francisco de Quito. Casa Corona, Facultad
de Economía. Quito - Ecuador
Time:
5:30 PM
Interview	
  Guide	
  
•

•

•

•

Oil and politics
o Oil industry in Ecuador for the past 23 years
! Political, economic, and social impacts
! Relevant events that should be noted
! Evolution of political ideologies
o Is Ecuador an oil country, or just a country that has oil?
! How has the oil industry evolved along the years?
o What impacts does oil exploitation have on the economy?
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry?
o Should the government intervene in the industry?
o How has the relationship with international oil companies changed?
o Why did Ecuador exit the OPEC in 1992, only to re-enter in 2007?
! How is Ecuador´s relationship with other OPEC members?
Yasuní-ITT
o What was really expected from the Initiative in 2007?
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block
will have in the short and long run?
o What should be done with the reserve?
Refinería del Pacífico
o How are China and Venezuela involved in the project?
o How will be Refinería del Pacífico’s impact the economy?
What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future?

Resume	
  
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee)
PABLO LUCIO PAREDES FERNANDES
Golondrinas 137 – Urb. Campo Alegre – Monteserrin. Quito, Ecuador
Teléfono: (593) 2259694
Celular: (593) 983516318
Email:pabloluc@uio.satnet.net
Doctor en Economía con 28 años de experiencia en:
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•
•
•
•

•

El área académica, especialmente en el campo de la Macroeconomía: Universidad
Católica / ESPOL / IDE / USFQ
En el área de la Consultoría con múltiples trabajos para instituciones y empresas
nacionales e internacionales
En el área empresarial: socio inicial de la revista EKOS Economía, Colegio
Terranova, Executive Forums capítulo Ecuador
En el área de la comunicación: programas de TV “Usted y su dinero” y
“Economía para todos”, programa de radio “Economía de la Vida Diaria”,
programa de radio sobre fútbol, editorialista del diario El Universo, colaborador
de diversas revistas y medios.
En publicaciones que se detallan más adelante

FORMACIÓN
1985
1981

Doctorat en Economie Appliquée – Institut d´Etudes Politiques
Paris
Maitrise et DEA en Physique Nucleaire – Universite Paris

1974

Bachiller Colegio Americano

EXPERIENCIA
Experiencia como Profesor
•
•
•
•

Universidad Católica Quito Economía – Modelización Micro y Macroeconómica
(1985-1992)
ESPOL Instituto de Economía Guayaquil Economía – Varios Micro y
Macroeconómica (1997-2005)
IDE Quito y Guayaquil - Director de Investigaciones y Publicaciones - Entorno
Macroeconómico (1998-2008)
Universidad San Francisco Quito Director del Instituto de Economía y Profesor
(2009-Hasta la presente)
Logros alcanzados y estrategias aplicadas (siempre la misma estrategia):

!
!
!
!
!

Cumplimiento
Calidad
Respeto
Humildad
Publicar para compartir con los demás

Área de Conocimiento
•

Ciencias sociales,educación comercial y derecho
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•
•

Ciencias sociales y del comportamiento
Economía

Idiomas
•
•

Inglés
Francés

Producción Científica
•

!

!

Trabajos publicados en revistas (2008-2013)
o Revista Koyuntura (USFQ) de la cual soy editor:
o #1 Marzo 2009- Crisis de liquidez en el Ecuador y el mundo
o #4 Junio 2009 - Deuda Externa ¿se paga? ¿Es ilegítima?
o #8 Diciembre 2009 - Economía 2010
o # 9 Enero 2010 - 2000/2009: una mejor década pero falta
o #16 Noviembre 2010 - El choque de trenes en el mundo
o #19 Marzo 2011 – Mirada al 2011
o #21 Mayo 2011 - 15 Años de Comercio Internacional
o #27 Febrero 2012 – La Economía del Deporte y los Derechos de TV
o #29 Junio 2012 – La economía desde el 2007
o #33 Marzo 2013 – Apuntes sobre el mundo actual
o #35 Julio 2013 – Las Ciudades Libres
o Revista Polemika (USFQ) de la cual soy editor:
o #1 Junio 2009 – La crisis mundial: mirar los excesos más que la caída
o #2 Noviembre 2009 – Educación: el poder estatal omnipresente
o #4 Junio 2010 – Los “fantasmas” del liberalismo
o #7 Junio 2011 – El deportes es más que el deporte
o #8 Octubre 2011 – Política: entre la necesidad y el abuso
Libros (2008-2013)
o En Busca de la Constitución Perdida - Julio 2008
o De la No República a la No República – Abril 2010
o La Revolución Ciudadana … tanto para tan poco - Enero 2013
Libros (hasta el 2008-)
o Cimas, Abismos y Tempestades de la Economía - 1998
o El Libro de la Dolarización - 2000
o La dolarización ¿un amor eterno? - 2005
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Segundo	
  Rodríguez,	
  MBA.	
  B.E.	
  	
  
Interviewer: Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana
Date:
January 10, 2014
Place: Av. America N22-148 y Ramirez Davalos. Edif. SAA Tercer oiso Oficina 306.
Quito, Ecuador.
Time:
10:45 AM
Interview	
  Guide	
  
•

•

•

Oil and politics
o Oil industry in Ecuador for the past 23 years
! Political, economic, and social impacts
! Relevant events that should be noted
o How has the oil industry evolved in this period?
o How has Petroecuador changed in the period?
! Short and long term impacts of the administration
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry?
o How is Petroecuador´s relationship with other foreign companies?
o How does oil exploitation work in the public sector?
o How is the price for crude oil decided in Ecuador?
o Why did Ecuador exit the OPEC in 1992, only to re-enter in 2007?
Yasuní-ITT
o What was really expected from the Initiative in 2007?
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block
will have in the short and long run?
o What should be done with the reserve?
o How will be Refinería del Pacífico’s impact the economy?
What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future?

Resume	
  
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee)
SEGUNDO M. RODRÍGUEZ ACOSTA
Nacionalidad: Ecuatoriano
Idiomas: Español, Inglés (80%)
Dirección: Av. América N22-148 y Ramírez Dávalos (Sector U. Central) Quito,
Ecuador.
Teléfonos: (593) 2547200 – (593) 2549286
Celular: (593) 999-834921
E-mail: srodrigueza50@hotmail.com / smrodriacosta@gmail.com
Perfil:
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Profesional de alto nivel, con un serio compromiso con la honestidad, ética profesional y
excelencia en la dirección y ejecución de planes de desarrollo de campos y proyectos
petroleros y productivos con alta calidad, que excedan expectativas.
Información Personal:
Docente Universitario con más de 35 años de experiencia en las Cátedras de Matemáticas
e Investigación Operativa. Además de estar capacitado para dictar en pre y pos grado, las
cátedras de Matemática, Investigación de Operaciones, Diseño y Evaluación de
Proyectos, Gerencia y Gestión de Proyectos.
Formación Académica:
•
•
•

•
•

•
•

•

Oct. 2008 – Jul/2009 UNAM – CUAED (Mexico DF)
o Diplomado en “Formación del Docente en Educación a Distancia”
Abril – Diciembre/2007 (U. Central del Ecuador)
o Diplomado en “Docencia Universitaria”
1999 – 2001 (U. Central del Ecuador)
o Magíster en Administración de Empresas, MBA
o Tesis: “Propuesta de Modelo de Evaluación de Impactos en la
Contratación sobre Exploración y Explotación de Hidrocarburos para
optimización de los Ingresos del Estado Ecuatoriano”
1987 – 1989 (E. Politécnica Nacional)
o Egresado del Postgrado (Maestría) en “Ingeniería Industrial”
Enero – Abril/1978 (Instituto Mexicano del Petróleo)
o Diplomado en “Supervisión de Montaje y Operación de Plantas
Criogénicas de gas natural”
2000 – 2001 (ESPE)
o Diplomado en “Gestión del Aprendizaje Universitario”
1969 – 1976 (U. Central del Ecuador)
o Ingeniero de Petróleos
o Tesis: "Levantamiento Artificial por Bombeo Eléctrico Sumergible"
(Campo Sacha)
1963 – 1969 (Instituto Nacional “Mejía”)
o Bachiller en Humanidades Modernas, Especialización Físico- Matemático

Experiencia Profesional:
•
•
•
•

May 2002 – a la fecha
o Consultoría en ingeniería de reservorios
Sep/2001 – May/2002
o Petroproducción (Alianzas Operativas)
Nov/1994 – Ago/2001
o Petroecuador (Adm. De contratos)
Ago/1980 – Oct/1994
o Petroproducción (Ing. De Yacimientos)
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•

Ene/1978 – Ago/1980
o CEPE (Planta de Gas – Shushufindi)

Las principales actividades y funciones que estuvieron bajo mi responsabilidad durante
los períodos de tiempo antes citados, entre otras son las siguientes:
•
•
•
•

•
•

•

Construcción, montaje, fiscalización y arranque de la Planta Criogénica de Gas
Licuado de petróleo (LPG) de Shushufindi.
Evaluación de perfiles eléctricos y radioactivos a hueco abierto y entubado y
diseño de programas de pruebas iniciales de producción.
Estudios de Ingeniería de Yacimientos para desarrollo de campos nuevos, así
como para optimización de producción de campos explotados.
Estudios de Ingeniería de Yacimientos para evaluación de Reservas y
optimización del comportamiento de producción y de los factores de
recuperación.
Simulación matemática de yacimientos.
Análisis y evaluación Técnica de Planes de Desarrollo, Planes Quinquenales,
estudios de simulación de yacimientos, etc., propuestos por las Contratistas con
diferente modalidad contractual para la exploración y explotación de
hidrocarburos.
Análisis, evaluación y aprobación de Planes de Actividades y Presupuestos
anuales de Compañías de prestación de Servicios.

Entre las empresas que he participado como contraparte de PETROECUADOR en los
diferentes estudios de Ingeniería de Yacimientos y Proyectos de Desarrollo, constan:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

AGIP Oil Ecuador B. V.
City Investing Co. Ltda.
Energy Development Corporation (E.D.C.)
Kerr – McGee Ecuador Energy Corporation, Ecuador Branch
Occidental Exploration and Production Co.
Repsol - YPF Ecuador.
Vintage Oil Ecuador S.A.

Experiencia Docente:
•

•
•

Sep/1974 – a la fecha (U. Central – F.C. Administrativas)
o Matemática
o Investigación Operativa
o PPTC
Ene/1995 – Sep/2001 (ESPE – F. Ingeniería Comercial)
o Investigación Operativa
Oct/1991 – Abr/1993 (ESMIL – F. Administración)
o Investigación Operativa
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Menciones Honoríficas:
•
•

Premio "Mejor Egresado (Estudiante)" de la Promoción 1975-1976 de la
Escuela de Geología, Minas y Petróleos, Facultad de Ingeniería.
Premio "Mejor Trabajador de PETROECUADOR – AÑO 1996" como
Funcionario de la Unidad de Administración de Contratos.

Publicaciones:
•

•

•

•

•

Octubre 2011.- Texto: “Enseñanza - Aprendizaje de la Investigación Operativa –
Volumen 2”. ImpresoresMYL. Quito. 325p. Contenido: Programación Lineal,
Modelos de Transporte y Asignación, Teoría de Colas (Líneas de Espera),
Simulación Matemática.
Mayo 2011.- Texto: “Enseñanza - Aprendizaje de la Investigación Operativa –
Volumen 1”. ImpresoresMYL. Quito. 235p. Contenido: Modelos de Optimización
de Precios, Teoría de Decisiones, Control de Inventarios, Redes Pert-Cpm.
Septiembre 1993.- Edición del Texto: "Investigación Operativa: Programación
Lineal"; aprobado por el Consejo Académico de la Facultad de Ciencias
Administrativas de la Universidad Central del Ecuador.
Julio 1983.- Participación con el trabajo "Levantamiento Artificial para el Campo
Bermejo" en el III Congreso Ecuatoriano de Ingenieros Geólogos, de Minas y
Petróleos.- Quito.
Noviembre 1980.- Participación con el trabajo "Deshidratación del gas en Plantas
Criogénicas" en el II Congreso Ecuatoriano de Ingenieros Geólogos, de Minas y
Petróleos.- Quito.

Capacitación Cronológica:
•
•

•

•
•
•
•
•

Junio 2012.- Seminario Taller de “Herramientas de Gerencia de Proyectos”,
Corporación Elite – Project Management Institute (PMI).- Quito.
Marzo 2012.- Seminario Taller de “Fundamentos de la Gerencia de Proyectos
basada en el PMBOK”, Corporación Elite – Project Management Institute
(PMI).- Quito.
Abril 1999.- Primer encuentro de “Simulación Matemática de Reservorios”,
Fundación Geociencia, Ingeniería en Geología Minas y Petróleos, Universidad
Central.- Quito.
Febrero 1999.- Advanced Forum on “Extended Reach and Horizontal Drilling”,
por Arco Oriente Inc..- Quito.
Agosto 1998.- Curso de “Negociación Avanzada” dictado por el Dr. Claudio
Creamer, Universidad San Francisco y PETROECUADOR.- Quito.
Septiembre 1997.- Curso de “Negociación Básica” dictado por el Dr. Claudio
Creamer, Universidad San Francisco y PETROECUADOR.- Quito.
Julio 1991.- Curso sobre "Weltest User Course" dictado por la compañía ECLBergeson (Intera).- Quito.
Julio 1991.- Curso sobre "Log Evaluation & Clan Log Analysis" dictado por la
compañía ECL-Bergeson (Intera).- Quito.
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•
•

•
•

•

•

•
•

•

•
•

•
•

•

•

Noviembre 1990.- Curso sobre "Calidad de Gestión" dictado por la compañía
Venezolana Ceprozul.- Quito.
Julio1990. –Cursotitulado "Producction Optimization of Oil and Gaswells by
Nodal Systems analysis" dictado por el Dr. Kermit E. Brown y la compañía
Ricthisarm.- Quito.
Abril 1990.- Curso titulado "CO2 Flooding" dictado por el Dr. Sammi H. Raza,
de la compañía Oil and Gas Consultants International.- Tulsa-Oklahoma-USA.
Abril 1990.- Curso titulado "Waterflooding" dictado por el Profesor Mr. Jerry D.
Neil, de la compañía Oil and Gas Consultants International.-Tulsa-OklahomaUSA.
Febrero 1990.- Seminario sobre "Pozos Horizontales" dictado por la compañía
Halliburton (HRS).- Quito. - Marzo 1989.- Curso titulado "Improved Oil
Recovery (Enhanced) Unit I and II" dictado por el Dr. Charles R. Smith - Oil and
Gas Consultants International.- Calgary – Alberta - CANADA.
Noviembre 1988.- Curso sobre "Toma de decisiones bajo incertidumbre" dictado
por los Profesores Walter Smith V. y Armando Galindo, Instituto Mexicano del
Petróleo (IMP) y Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos del Guayas.- Guayaquil.
Abril 1988.- "Séminaire sur l'INJECTION MISCIBLE DE CO2", dictado por la
Compañía Francesa BEICIP.- Quito.
Agosto 1987.- Curso titulado "Análisis de núcleos" dictado por los Profesores
Robert E. Carlile y Mihai Vasilache, Instructores de Texas Tech UniversityHouston en la Escuela Politécnica.-Guayaquil.
Noviembre 1986.- Curso titulado "Improved Oil Recovery Unit I and Unit II"
dictado por el Profesor Dr. Charles R. Smith de la compañía Oil and Gas
Consultants International.- Denver-Colorado-USA.
Febrero 1986.- Curso sobre "Estadística Multivariada" dictado por el Ing. Pierre
Kummert, Asesor Técnico de CEPE, en el Centro de Capacitación.-Quito.
Octubre 1985.- Curso titulado "Introduction to reservoir engineering" dictado por
los Ings. Fred Brinkman y Don Sobocinski, compañía Exxon Production
Research.- Quito.
Enero 1983.- Curso sobre "Estadística Matemática", Centro de Matemáticas de la
Universidad Central.- Quito.
Noviembre 1982.- Curso titulado "Applied Reservoir Engineering Problems"
dictado por el Profesor Mr. G. W. Tracy de la compañía Oil and Gas Consultants
International.- Santa Bárbara-California-USA.
Octubre 1982.- Curso titulado "Applied Reservoir Engineering" dictado por el
Dr. Charles Smith de la compañía Oil and Gas Consultants International.- Santa
Bárbara-California- USA.
Otros de diferente especialidad en la ingeniería de petróleos, y de especialización
Académica y pedagógica, desde 1977 a 1982.
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Esteban	
  Santos,	
  L.MA.	
  LL.M.	
  	
  
Interviewer: Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana
Date:
January 10, 2014
Place: Avenida Amazonas N35-89, Edificio Amazonas 4000, 5to piso. Quito, Ecuador
Time:
5:00 PM
Interview	
  Guide	
  
•

•

•

•

Oil and politics
o Summary of the political ideologies that have governed Ecuador starting
on 1990
! Important events
o How have relationships with other countries changed in terms of
commerce?
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry?
o Should the government intervene in the oil industry?
o How is Ecuador´s relationship with other foreign companies?
o Why did Ecuador exit the OPEC in 1992, only to re-enter in 2007?
Yasuní-ITT
o What was really expected from the Initiative in 2007?
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block
will have in the short and long run?
o What should be done with the reserve?
Refinería del Pacífico
o How are China and Venezuela involved in the project?
o How will be Refinería del Pacífico’s impact the economy?
What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future?

Resume	
  
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee)
ESTEBAN RAMIRO SANTOS LÓPEZ
Celular: 098902868
E-mail: esantos@izurietamorabowen.com / er.santos@udlanet.ec
IDIOMAS:
•
•
•
•
•

Inglés (Nativo)
Francés (Nativo)
Español (Nativo)
Italiano (Bajo)
Portugués (Bajo)
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ESTUDIOS:
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
(IHEID)&LAW FACULTY UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA. GINEBRA, SUIZA (2010)
• Ganador de la beca completa de estudios Hans Wildsforf (Fundación ROLEX)
2009-2010
• Título de Master of Laws (LL.M.). Geneva Master in International Dispute
Settlement (MIDS).
UNIVERSIDAD ANDINA SIMÓN BOLÍVAR (UASB) (2009)
• Master of Arts (M.A.) Magíster Internacional en Integración. Mención en
Negociaciones Económicas Internacionales.
UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO (USFQ) (2008)
• Abogado,
• Sub-especialización en Relaciones Internacionales.
INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES ET DU DEVELOPPMENT
(HEI). GINEBRA, SUIZA (2007)
• Programme d'été sur des études d'OMC: Curso intensivo en de Comercio y
Derecho Comercial Internacional, enfocado en la Organización Mundial del
Comercio (OMC).
UNIVERSIDAD DE SALAMANCA, ESPAÑA (2005)
• Cursado cuarto año de estudios en Derecho
EXPERIENCIA LABORAL:
IZURIETA MORA BOWEN ESTUDIO JURÍDICO (Empleador actual)
• Abogado. Director del Departamento de Arbitraje & Mediación •
www.izurietamorabowen.com
UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS AMÉRICAS (UDLA)
• Profesor: Cátedra: - Teoría Política Contemporánea. (Marzo 2012) - Negociación
II (Agosto 2012)
• Organismos Internacionales (Agosto (2012)
COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PICHINCHA (CAP)
• Expositor: Seminarios formación de Mediadores (Sep 2011 hasta la presente)
LARREÁTEGUI, MEYTHALER & ZAMBRANO ABOGADOS. (Oct2010- abril2011)
• Abogado. Área de especialización litigio civil, Arbitraje y Mediación.
CENTRO DE ARBITRAJE Y MEDIACIÓN, CÁMARA ECUATORIANOAMERICANA DE COMERCIO (AMCHAM) (Marzo 2011 hasta presente)
• Secretario Arbitral
CENTRO DE ARBITRAJE Y MEDIACIÓN, CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE QUITO
(CAM-CCQ) (Septiembre 2008 hasta presente)
• Mediador del Centro.
UNITED NATIONS 14th SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL PALACIO
DE LAS NACIONES; GINEBRA, SUIZA. (Julio 2010)
• Delegado representante de la República del Ecuador ante el Consejo de Derechos
Humanos.
ESTUDIO JURÍDICO TERÁN, VELÁSTEGUI & VEGA. ABOGADOS. (2008- 2010)
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• Abogado en libre ejercicio en calidad de Asociado del estudio.
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA DE LA COMUNIDAD ANDINA (Enero 2007-Agosto
2009)
• Asistente de Magistrado, despacho de la República del Perú. • Área de
especialización, Propiedad Intelectual, elaboración de proyectos de sentencias
entorno a Interpretaciones Prejudiciales.
Otros Estudios, Docencia y Seminarios:
•

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Profesor: Seminario-Taller Formación de Mediadores. Programa organizado por
el Colegio de Abogados de Pichincha con el aval de la Universidad San Francisco
de Quito. 2011
V y VI Conferencia de Arbitraje Internacional: Quito, 2011, 2012.
ICC International Commercial Mediation Competition 2010: Representante
del Master of International Dispute Settlement (MIDS). Cámara de Comercio
Internacional, CCI, Paris, Francia. 2010.
9th annual International Mediation Interest Group (IMIG) meeting:
Organización Mundial para la Propiedad Intelectual. OMPI. Ginebra, 2010.
Managing Risks and Getting Results: How to use Mediation Effectively in
International Business Disputes. Cámara de Comercio Internacional, CCI, Paris,
Francia. 2010.
Foundation for International Arbitration Advocacy FIAA: workshop on
international advocacy. Ginebra, Suiza. 2010.
Swiss Arbitration Association (ASA): New Developments in International
Arbitration. Berna, Suiza. 2009
Justice and Politics: Conferencia Juez Mohamed Bennouna con ocasión de la
declaración unilateral de independencia de Serbia sobre la Republica de
Montenegro. Palacio de la Paz, Haya, Holanda. 2009.
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) Conference: Resolución de controversias bajo el
presente tratado. Bruselas, Bélgica. 2009.
Programa de Litigación Arbitral/ Formación de Secretarios Arbitrales: Centro de
Arbitraje y Mediación, Cámara de Comercio de Quito. 2009
Seminario de Arbitraje Comercial Internacional: Lima, Perú. 2006.
Leadership and Staff preparation, Londrinhas, Brasil (2004): Seminario de
Preparación en técnicas de liderazgo y manejo de conflictos.
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Fernando	
  Santos	
  Alvite	
  	
  
Interviewer: Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana
Date:
March 17, 2014
Place: Skype Interview
Time:
11:00 AM
Interview	
  Guide	
  
•

•

•

Oil and politics
o Oil industry in Ecuador for the past 23 years
! Political, economic, and social impacts
! Oil management policies of the presidents from 1990 – 2013
• Rodrigo Borja
• Sixto Duran Ballén
• Abdala Bucaram
• Fabián Alarcón
• Jamil Mahuad
• Gustavo Noboa
• Lucio Gutiérrez
• Alfredo Palacio
• Rafael Correa
o How has the oil industry evolved along the years?
! Short and long term impacts of the different political
administrations
o Is Ecuador an oil country, or just a country that has oil?
o How have relationships with other countries changed in terms of
commerce?
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry?
o Should the government intervene in the industry?
o How does oil exploitation affect Ecuador´s economy?
o How is crude oil price decided?
o Why did Ecuador exit the OPEC in 1992, only to re-enter in 2007?
Yasuní-ITT
o What was really expected from the Initiative in 2007?
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block
will have in the short and long run?
o What should be done with the reserve?
o How will be Refinería del Pacífico’s impact the economy?
What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future?

Resume	
  
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee)
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FERNANDO SANTOS ALVITE
Informal Resume
Fernando Santos A., es Director de LAFARGE CEMENTOS S.A., desde el año 2.005.
Fue designado a partir de la adquisición del grupo LAFARGE de la planta de cementos
Selva Alegre en el Ecuador.
Antes de dedicarse a la actividad del cemento el Dr. Santos trabajó en la industria
petrolera, tanto en el sector público como privado. Fue Ministro de Energía y Minas del
Ecuador y por varios años antes asesor jurídico de la Organización de Países
Exportadores de Petróleo con sede en Viena. En el sector privado fue asesor de
Occidental, Amoco, Santa Fe, CNPC, y BHP en sus operaciones en el Ecuador.
El Dr. Santos también es árbitro en los Centros de Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio de
Quito y la Cámara de Comercio Ecuatoriano Americana. Fue también Vicepresidente de
ambas Cámaras.
El Dr. Santos tiene un título de doctor en jurisprudencia por la Universidad
Central del Ecuador y actualmente es profesor de Derecho Económico de la Universidad
de las Américas de Quito.
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Sergio	
  Vélez	
  Valarezo,	
  Ph.D.	
  	
  
Interviewer:
Date:
Place:
Time:

Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana
January 0, 2014
Isla Floreana y Ave. de los Shyris. Quito, Ecuador
9:00 AM

Interview	
  Guide	
  
•

•

•

Oil and politics
o Oil industry in Ecuador for the past 23 years
! Political, economic, and social impacts
! Relevant events that should be noted
o Is Ecuador an oil country, or just a country that has oil?
o How has oil exploitation affected Ecuador´s Amazon region?
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry?
o Should the government intervene in the oil industry?
Yasuní-ITT
o In your book you mention the Initiative as “utopian”, what do you mean
by that?
o National considerations about the Initiative
o International considerations about the Initiative
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block
will have in the short and long run?
! How will the indigenous communities of the Amazon be affected?
o What should be done with the reserve?
o Is the Refinería del Pacífico the reason why the ITT block is going to be
exploited?
What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future?

Resume	
  
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee)
SERGIO OSWALDO VÉLEZ VALAREZO
Estudios Superiores: Sociología, Ciencias Políticas, Filosofía
Especialidades:
Planificación, Proyectos, Investigación, Docencia
Dirección:
París N41-195 y Sena, Sector Jipijapa, Quito
Código Postal:
170137
Teléfonos:
593 02 6014760 (Domicilio) / 593 98 226 0130 (Móvil)
E-mail:
servelez1@yahoo.com / servelez6@gmail.com
ESTUDIOS SUPERIORES:
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•
•
•

•
•
•

Doctorado y Maestría en Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador,
1986-1989 / 2008-2009.
Licenciatura en Sociología y Ciencias Políticas, Universidad Central del Ecuador,
1969-1973.
Especialización en Planificación Estratégica y Políticas Científicas y
Tecnológicas, Universidad de Brasilia-Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología
de Brasil, CNP, Brasil, 1985.
Diplomado en Historia Andina, Curso Internacional Avanzado, Facultad
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO, 1984.
Diplomado en Planificación Estratégica Situacional, Instituto ALTADIR,
Venezuela, 1989.
Diplomado en Administración Cultural, Curso Internacional, OEA-Escuela de
Administración Pública de Venezuela, 1975.

EDUCACIÓN CONTINUA
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Seminario Internacional “Pluralismo Jurídico y Justicia de Paz”, Instituto de Altos
Estudios Nacionales-Consejo de la Judicatura, 2012.
III Conferencia Ibeoramericana sobre Justicia Electoral, Instituto Internacional
para la Democracia-TCE, 2011.
Seminario “Respuestas del derecho a desafíos del Siglo XXI”, Universidad
Andina Simón Bolívar, 2010.
Curso de Formación Política, Ministerio de Coordinación de la Política, juniojulio 2009, Quito.
Seminario "Nueva Ley orgánica de Garantías Jurisdiccionales", 8-10 Dic. 2009,
Universidad Andina, Quito.
Seminario “La crisis financiera internacional, impacto y salidas para Ecuador y
América Latina, Asamblea Nacional, Quito, marzo 2009.
Cursos y talleres del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, BID, sobre Diseño,
Ejecución, Monitoreo y Evaluación de Proyectos; Marco Lógico; Políticas y
procedimientos sobre Adquisición de Obras, Bienes y Servicios de Consultoría;
Evaluación Ambiental Estratégica; Fortalecimiento y Reingeniería de Procesos,
2003-2004.

EXPERIENCIA LABORAL
SECTOR PÚBLICO
•
•
•

Asesor Vicepresidencia del Tribunal Contencioso Electoral, ago. 2011 – feb.
2012
Secretario General de la Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1992 – 1996.
Asesor Parlamentario y Secretario de la Comisión de Racionalización del Estado,
Congreso Nacional del Ecuador, 1991-1992.
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•

•

•

Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología del Ecuador, CONACYT: Técnico en
Planificación (1985-1987); Jefe de la División de Estudios y Planificación (19881989)
Centro Nacional de Promoción de la Pequeña Industria y Artesanía, CENAPIA:
Coordinador Técnico Nacional, 1990-1991; Jefe del Departamento de Motivación
y Organización Empresarial, y Jefe Técnico Nacional del Programa de Desarrollo
Artesanal BID-CENAPIA,: 1979-1982.
Universidad Central: Funcionario del Dpto. de Información y Cultura; Biblioteca
General y Biblioteca de la Facultad de Economía, 1970 – 1979.

SECTOR PRIVADO
•
•
•
•
•

•

Vicepresidente de la Corporación Ecuatoriana por el Buen Vivir, INCLUIR,
actual.
Director Ejecutivo y Miembro Fundador de la Corporación Ecuatorial
Amazónica, CEA, 2005.
Director Ejecutivo de la Corporación de Estudios Prospectivos y Estratégicos del
Ecuador, PROSPEC, 2004;
Director Ejecutivo, Federación Nacional de Cámaras de la Pequeña Industria del
Ecuador, FENAPI, 1998-1999;
Consultor Independiente: Registro de la Asociación de Compañías Consultoras
del Ecuador, ACCE, Nº 4483 - IC; Registro del Comité de Consultoría Nº 1-3703,
1999 - a la fecha;
Gerente-Propietario, Empresa ECOPRODUCTOS ANDINOS, 1992-2000
(producción de panela en polvo).

EXPERIENCIA EN PLANIFICACIÓN
•
•
•
•
•

Coordinador de Planificación del Seguro Social Campesino, agosto 2007 – agosto
2009.
Jefe de Planificación y Proyectos, Dirección Administrativa, Distrito
Metropolitano de Quito, 2002-2003.
Director de Planificación del Ministerio de Medio Ambiente 1997–1998.
Especialista y Jefe (E) de la División de Estudios y Planificación, Consejo
Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología del Ecuador, CONACYT, 1985-1989.
Jefe de Planificación del Instituto Andino de Artesanías Populares, IADAP –
Convenio Andrés Bello, 1990 – 1991.

EXPERIENCIA EN COORDINACIÓN, DIRECCIÓN Y/O EJECUCIÓN DE
PROGRAMAS Y PROYECTOS
•

Consultor BID - Director del “Programa de Desarrollo de la Frontera Amazónica
del Norte, AMAZNOR”, (Contrato de Préstamo 1420/OC-EC); y, del “Programa
de Fortalecimiento de las Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Frontera Norte”,
(Cooperación Técnica), 2003-2004:
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•

•

Consultor OEA - Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Coordinador del Proyecto de
Mejoramiento Productivo de Fincas del Cantón Puerto El Carmen del Putumayo,
“MEJORFIN”, 2002.
Consultor - Coordinador Convenios Internacionales del Ministerio de Medio
Ambiente, Programa PATRA, Proyecto Shushufindi, 1997-1998.

EXPERIENCIA EN CONSULTORÍA
•

•

•

•

•
•

•

•

Sistematización documental para publicación “ECUADOR: ECONOMÍA Y
FINANZAS POPULARES Y SOLIDARIAS para el BUEN VIVIR”, PNUDPNFPEES-SECRETARÍA NACIONAL DEL MIGRANTE, Ed. Febrero 2013,
Quito.
Estudio y propuesta de “Creación de Indicadores de gestión y Escenarios
Prospectivos para la ejecución del Plan de Desarrollo Alternativo y Sostenible de
la Zona Norte del Ecuador”, Unidad de Desarrollo del Norte, UDENOR, 2005.
Estudios de Prefactibilidad (“Desarrollo Binacional e Indígena en la Cuenca del
Río Napo”, “Parques y Reservas Naturales Binacionales Amazónicas”), para el
Plan Binacional de Desarrollo Ecuador-Perú, Organización de Estados
Americanos, OEA - Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo del Perú, INADE - Instituto
de Ecodesarrollo de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana, ECORAE, 2000-2001.
Plan Estratégico de Fortalecimiento de la Defensoría del Pueblo y Concienciación
de Derechos Humanos, PNUD-FLACSO , Proyecto “Apoyo al Plan de Derechos
Humanos”, ECU/99/AH/17 – ECU/99/006, 2001;
Coordinación-relatoría “Seminario Internacional Andino de Gestión del Turismo
Sostenible y Competitivo”, OIT- Ministerio de Turismo, 2001;
Propuesta técnica para “Diagnóstico y Definición de Programas Estratégicos de
Desarrollo General y Sectorial de la Pequeña Industria Ecuatoriana”, BID Ministerio de Industrias, 2000, (ejecutado)
Consultoría para elaboración “Programa de Proyectos Productivos”, y
organización del “Simposio de Políticas Públicas y Acción Social para el
Desarrollo Humano de los Sectores en Situación de Pobreza”, Fondo de Inversión
Social del Ecuador, FISE, 1999.
Estudio “Situación y perspectivas de la industria en cuero de Cotacachi”, Centro
Andino de Acción Popular”, CAAP, 1990.

EXPERIENCIA DOCENTE
•

•

Universidad Central del Ecuador: Profesor de las Escuelas de Sociología,
Economía, Psicología y Trabajo Social, en las materias de: Teorías del
Subdesarrollo, Antropología Social, Sociología General, Historia Contemporánea
de América Latina, Introducción a la Lógica, Metodología de la Investigación,
Planificación del Desarrollo, Diseño de Proyectos, Dirección de Tesis de Grado,
1974-1993;
FLACSO – PNUD – Ministerio de Defensa, Proyecto ECU 94/016: Instructor de
Derechos Humanos y Ambientales, 1999;
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•
•

Instituto Nacional de Guerra del Ecuador: Profesor del Curso de Prospectiva y
Estrategias de Desarrollo, 1996–1997;
Preparación y dictado de Conferencias, Cursos, Seminarios.

PUBLICACIONES
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

“YASUNÍ-ITT. Situación y perspectivas”, Ed. Centro de Estrategia y Prospectiva
Ecuador, PROSPEC, Nov. 2013, Quito.
"Cultura, ciencia y tecnología en el Ecuador: en pos del Buen Vivir", 2º edición,
2011, edición digital.
“Frontera Norte del Ecuador: perspectivas de desarrollo humano”, 2009, autor,
edición digital.
“Desarrollo binacional e indígena en la cuenca del río Napo”, autor, edición
digital, 2002.
“Por la cultura, con la cultura, Volvamos a tener Patria”, Programa para la Casa
de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 2000.
"Agonía de la Educación Media", coautor, FESO, 1991.
"El sector informal manufacturero en el Ecuador", autor, CIPAD, 1990.
“Planificación y Evaluación de la Investigación Científica en la Universidad",
coautor, Universidad Central del Ecuador, 1989.
“Memorias del Encuentro Nacional de Investigadores Universitarios en Salud,
Vivienda, Educación y Empleo”, coautor, Universidad Católica Santiago de
Guayaquil, 1988.
"Cultura, ciencia y tecnología en el Ecuador: reflexiones sobre el presente y
futuro", autor, Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo, 1988.
"Los Quichuas del Coca y el Napo", coautor, Universidad Central del Ecuador,
1969.

Artículos publicados en revistas y otros medios: (últimos)
•

•
•

•

•

“Yasuní-ITT: situación y perspectivas, Revista NOVEDADES
JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 60, dic. 2013, Ediciones Legales,
Quito.
“Derecho, moral y catolicismo”, Revista NOVEDADES JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA
DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 57, sept. 2013, Ediciones Legales, Quito.
“Ética y Tecnología: el polígrafo o detector de mentiras”, Revista NOVEDADES
JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 49, enero 2013, Ediciones Legales,
Quito.
“Premio Espejo: cambio necesario y consecuente”, Revista NOVEDADES
JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 46, octubre 2012, Ediciones
Legales, Quito.
"Vicisitudes del Quinto Poder, Revista NOVEDADES JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA
DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 16, Abril 2010, Ediciones Legales, Quito.
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•

•

•
•

“Frontera Norte del Ecuador: nuevos horizontes”, Revista NOVEDADES
JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 10, Octubre 2009, Ediciones
Legales, Quito.
“Constitución 2008: del dicho al hecho...”, Revista NOVEDADES
JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 1, Enero 2009, Ediciones Legales,
Quito.
“La crisis financiera mundial: caracterización, origen, efectos y alternativas”,
http://viviendoconfilosofia.blogspot.com/, 2008.
“Migrantes: la otra cara del éxito”: WEB ApiaVirtual; 2008.

IDIOMAS
•

Español (nativo); inglés y portugués (lectura)

OTRAS FUNCIONES Y ACTIVIDADES
•
•

•
•

•

Participante calificado para la conformación del Consejo de Participación
Ciudadana y Control Social, Consejo Nacional Electoral, 2009.
Consultor de Planes de Negocio, Madrid, España, (Consecución financiamiento
implementación proyecto Programa de Retorno Voluntario de la Organización
Internacional de Migraciones, OIM), septiembre 2005-mayo 2006.
Asistente de comercialización y diseño publicitario, Empresa “ANDES SIGN”,
Los Ángeles, USA, junio 2004-agosto 2005.
Miembro de la Sección de Sociología y Ciencias Políticas de la Casa de la Cultura
Ecuatoriana.
• Presidente de la Asociación de Empleados del Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y
Tecnología, 1988.
Presidente de la Asociación de Empleados del Centro Nacional de Promoción de
la Pequeña Industria y Artesanía, CENAPIA, 1981.
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Appendix	
  3:	
  Oil	
  Price	
  History	
  1972	
  -‐	
  2013	
  
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Oil Price FOB (USD per Barrel)
Oriente Crude
Cushing, OK WTI
Napo Crude Oil
Oil
Spot Price
2.40
2.46
4.00
3.14
13.40
12.44
11.80
13.88
12.00
13.47
12.90
14.53
12.50
14.56
23.00
21.54
35.20
33.97
34.40
37.07
32.50
33.59
27.60
29.35
27.40
28.87
25.90
27.00
15.05
12.80
19.20
14.20
15.97
12.70
19.64
16.20
24.53
20.20
21.54
16.22
20.58
16.81
18.43
14.42
17.20
13.68
18.43
14.83
22.12
18.02
20.61
15.45
14.42
9.20
19.34
15.50
30.38
24.86
25.98
19.14
26.18
21.71
31.08
26.03
41.51
31.74
56.64
43.21
42.47
66.05
53.17
48.42
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2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

61.84
85.39
54.22
72.67
100.36
99.82
97.36

57.01
80.79
49.95
69.44
92.25
97.21
92.91

72.34
99.67
61.95
79.48
94.88
94.05
97.98

The author compiled the different prices were compiled from the following sources:
Acosta, A. (2006). Breve historia económica del Ecuador (2 ed.). Quito: Corporación
Editora Nacional.
Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per barrel). (n.d.). US Energy Information
Administration. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=rwtc&f=a
Estadísticas Petroleras. (n.d.). IDE Perspectiva. Retrieved March 16, 2014, from
http://investiga.ide.edu.ec/index.php/estadisticas-73/petroleo/394-estadisticaspetroleras
Oil Market Chronology. (n.d.). Earth-Policy. Retrieved March 16, 2014, from
http://www.earth-policy.org/datacenter/xls/update67_4.xls
Petroecuador-EP. (2011). Período Enero - Diciembre 2011. INFORME CIFRAS
PETROLERAS, -. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/peh_docsusogeneral
/002102.pdf
Petroecuador-EP. (2012). Período Enero - Diciembre 2012. INFORME CIFRAS
PETROLERAS, -. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/peh_docsusogeneral
/002103.pdf
Petroecuador-EP. (2013). Período Enero - Diciembre 2013. INFORME CIFRAS
PETROLERAS, -. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from
http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/archivo/ep002761.p
df
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Appendix	
  4:	
  “The	
  Dirty	
  Hand	
  of	
  Chevron”	
  Campaign	
  
	
  

On September 17th 2013, President Rafael Correa visited Aguarico 4 (Orellana province),
the oilfield that Chevron-Texaco operated. The president denounced the multinational’s
breach of contract at not cleaning the oil waste pools left in the area. At the oilfield, after
introducing his bare hand in a contaminated pool, Correa denounced, “This is the dirty
hand of Chevron”. This event marked the beginning of an international campaign where
celebrities and activists visit the contaminated site and repeat Correa’s gesture, in an
attempt to demonstrate the world the damage caused.
The following are some images from the campaign:

Rafael Correa
Ecuador’s President
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Antonia Juhasz
Analyst Expert on Oil
Impact y Chevron’s
Malpractices

Alexandra Costeau
Researcher –
Environmental Activist

154

Jean-Luc Melechone
President of the French
Left-wing Party

Mia Farrow
Actress and Activist

155

Danny Glover
Actor, Director, and
Political Activist

These photos are stills from the following video about the campaign:
Vice Ecuador (2014, February 8). La Mano Sucia de Chevron. Retrieved March
30, 2014, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdBhx8pHYz4
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Appendix	
  5:	
  Yasuní	
  National	
  Park	
  in	
  Pictures	
  
The Flora

Photo Credit: “Yasuní National Park” by Iniciativa Yasuní-ITT
From http://yasuni-itt.gob.ec/images/lastNews/5-index.jpg

Photo Credit: “Ceiba tree roots at Yasuní” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook
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From
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=601053186612588&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578057.&type=3&theater

Photo Credit: “Yasuní Ecologic Reserve” by Patricio Terán | El Comercio
From http://www.elcomercio.com/paper/Imagenes-fauna-flora-YasuniITT_5_976152376.html

Photo Credit: “The waters of the Yasuní” by Ma. Fernanda Silva 2013
Used with permission from the photographer
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Photo Credit: “Water Hyacinth” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook
From
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=601528846565022&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578057.&type=3&theater

Photo Credit: “Endless Yasuní Park” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook

159

From
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=582590468458860&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578065.&type=3&theater
The Fauna

Photo Credit: “The regal moth” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook
From
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=565840253467215&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578132.&type=3&theater

Photo Credit: “Cobalt-winged Parakeet” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook
From
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=595248687193038&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578057.&type=3&theater
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Photo Credit: “Pink / Amazon river Dolphin” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook
From
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=562500187134555&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578132.&type=3&theater

Photo Credit: “Monkey species from Yasuní” by Patricio Terán | El Comercio
From http://www.elcomercio.com/paper/Imagenes-fauna-flora-YasuniITT_5_976152376.html
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Photo Credit: “ Vigilant Black Caiman” by Patricio Terán | El Comercio
From http://www.elcomercio.com/paper/Imagenes-fauna-flora-YasuniITT_5_976152376.html

Photo Credit: “Green Vine Snake” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook
From
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=560852053966035&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396580339.&type=3&theater
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The People

Photo Credit: “Huaorani Community” by Ma. Fernanda Silva 2013
Used with permission from the photographer

Photo Credit: “Green Vine Snake” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook
From
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=566881673363073&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396580336.&type=3&theater
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Photo Credit: “Huaorani Man” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook
From
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=558230444228196&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396580340.&type=3&theater
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Appendix	
  6:	
  GPD	
  by	
  Economic	
  Activity	
  and	
  GDP	
  Growth	
  Rate	
  
Data for 1990 – 1999 in thousands of 1975 Sucres

Data for 2000 – 2012 in thousands of 2007 US Dollars
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Economic Activities as a Percentage of GDP 1999 – 2012

The data was compiled by the author from the quarterly reports of national accounts from Banco Central del Ecuador. As of
the moment of writing this thesis, complete official data for 2013 is not available yet. Also, data about oil refining as a separate
component of GDP was not available for the years 1990 through 1999.
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Sources:

Banco Central del Ecuador (2001). Boletin de Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales del Ecuador. Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales, 39.
Retrieved April 4, 2014, from contenido.bce.fin.ec/home1/estadisticas/cntrimestral/CNTrimestral.jsp
Banco Central del Ecuador (2014). Boletin de Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales del Ecuador. Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales, 85.
Retrieved April 4, 2014, from http://contenido.bce.fin.ec/home1/estadisticas/cntrimestral/CNTrimestral.jsp
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Appendix	
  7:	
  Interview	
  Audio	
  Files	
  
•
•
•
•
•
•

20140107 Dr. Esteban Santos
o Duration: 47 min 15 sec
20140109 Eco. Pablo Lucio Paredes
o Duration: 43 min 40 sec
20140109 Soc. Sergio Vélez Valarezo
o Duration: 1 hr 56 min 30 sec
20140110 Eco. Luis Alfredo García
o Duration: 47 min 05 sec
20150110 Ing. Segundo Rodríguez
o Duration: 29 min 39 sec
20140317 Dr. Fernando Santos Alvite
o Duration 51 min 05 sec
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